210、由于意愿和理解力，情感和思维，仁和信能从作为其主体的实质抽象出来为人们所思考，并且这就是人们思考它们的方式，所以对这些事物的正确观念(正确观念是，它们是实质或形式的状态)消亡了。这完全就像感觉和行为，它们并非从感觉和运动器官中抽象出来的事物。若从这些抽象或脱离出来，它们纯粹是虚构的想象；事实上，就像脱离眼睛的视觉，脱离耳朵的听觉，脱离舌头的味觉等等。
210. Since we can think about volition and discernment, about feeling and thought, and about charity and faith apart from the substantial realities that are their subjects, and since we have thought about them in this way, we have lost any appropriate concept of them, any realization that they refer to the states of substantial realities or forms. Exactly the same principle applies to sensations and actions, which are not things in the abstract apart from our sensory and motor organs. In the abstract, or apart from their organs, they are theoretical constructs only. They are like sight with no eye, hearing with no ear, taste with no tongue, and so on.
210. Because it has been possible for people to think of will and intellect, affection and thought, and charity and faith abstractly from the substances which are the subjects of which they are predicated, and that is how they have thought of them, it has come about that a right idea of them has perished - the right idea being that they are states of substances or forms, entirely as in the case of sensations and actions, which are likewise not things existing apart from their sensory and motor organs. Abstracted or divorced from these, they are only figments of the imagination, being like sight independent of an eye, hearing independent of an ear, taste independent of a tongue, and so on.
210. From the fact that it has been possible to think of will and understanding, besides affection and thought, and charity and faith abstractly from the substances which are their subjects, and that they have been so considered, it has come about that a true idea of these things, as being states of substances or forms, has perished. They are just like sensations and actions which are not things abstract from the sensory and motor organs; abstracted or separated from these, they are nothing but figments of the imagination. For they are like sight without the eye, hearing without the ear, taste without the tongue, and so forth.
210. From its being possible to think of will and understanding, of affection and thought, and of charity and faith, abstractly from the substances which are their subjects, and from their having been so thought of, it has come to pass, that a correct idea of these things, as being states of substances or forms, has perished. It is altogether as with sensations and actions, which are not things abstract from the organs of sensation and motion. Abstracted, that is, separate, from these they are mere figments of reason; for they are like sight apart from an eye, hearing apart from an ear, taste apart from a tongue, and so forth.
210. Ex eo quod de voluntate et intellectu, deque affectione et cogitatione, tum de charitate et fide, abstracte a substantiis, quae sunt illorum subjecta, cogitari potuisset, et cogitatum sit, factum est quod justa idea de illis perierit, quae est quod sint status substantiarum seu formarum, 1 prorsus sicut sunt sensationes, et actiones, quae nec sunt res abstractae ab organis sensoriis et motoriis; abstractae seu separatae ab illis non sunt nisi quam entia rationis; sunt enim sicut visus absque oculo, auditus absque aure, gustus absque lingua, et sic porro.
Footnotes:
1. Prima editio: formarum;