278、以肉眼观之，身体动作看上去就像种子、果实和鸡蛋的外在形式，或坚果和杏仁的外壳那样简单、一致；然而，它们却包含它们所源于的一切在先成分在自己里面。它们之所以看上去如此简单和一致，是因为一切最终成分都被包裹在一层覆盖物中，这层覆盖物将其与在先成分区分开来。每个层级都被一层覆盖物如此包裹，由此与其它层级区分开来。所以，属于第一层级的事物不会被第二层级感知到，属于第二层级的事物也不会被第三层级感知。举个例子，意愿之爱，也就是心智的第一层级，不会在理解力的智慧，也就是心智的第二层级中被感知到，除非通过思想某件事的一种快乐。第一层级，就是刚才所说的意愿之爱，不会在记忆知识，也就是第三层级中被感知到，除非通过知道和谈论中的一种满足。由此可推知，每一个行为，或身体动作，都包含这一切在先成分，尽管它表面看上去如此简单，可以说是一个单一实体。
278. There is a reason that our physical acts look so simple and plain to the eye, like the outer forms of seeds, fruits, and eggs and like almond nuts in their kernels, when in fact they contain within themselves all the prior elements that have given rise to them. The reason is that every final form is a covering that serves to mark it off from its antecedents. Then too, every level is enveloped with a membrane that serves to mark it off from another. As a result, elements of the first level are unrecognizable to the second level, and elements of this are unrecognizable to the third level. For example, the love of our volition, which is the first level of our mind, is discernible in the wisdom of our discernment, which is the second level of our mind, only by a kind of delight in thinking about something. That first level (the love of our volition, as already noted [277]) is discernible in the knowledge of our memory, which is the third level, only as a kind of pleasure found in being knowledgeable and in talking.
The obvious conclusion from this is that a deed that is a physical act encloses all these elements, even though it seems as simple as can be in its outward form.
278. When viewed with the eye, actions of the body appear as simple and uniform as seeds, fruits and eggs do in external form, or as nuts and almonds do in the shell, and yet they contain within them all the prior elements from which they originate. The reason they appear so simple and uniform is that every final element is enveloped in a covering which distinguishes it from prior ones. Every other degree, too, is surrounded with a covering which distinguishes it from the next. Consequently those qualities which belong to the first degree are not discerned from the second degree, nor are those qualities which belong to the second degree discerned from the third degree.
So for example, love belonging to the will, which is the first degree of the mind, is not discerned in the wisdom of the intellect, which is the second degree of the mind, except in consequence of a certain delight in thinking about some matter. The first degree, which is, as said, love belonging to the will, is not discerned in the knowledge of the memory, which is the third degree, except in consequence of a certain gratification in knowing and speaking.
It follows as a consequence from this that any work which is an action of the body contains all those prior elements, even though in outward form it appears so simple as to be a single entity.
278. The acts of the body, viewed by the eye, appear thus simple and uniform, as do seeds, fruits and eggs in external form, or as nuts and almonds in their kernels, yet they contain in themselves all the prior things from which they exist, because every outmost thing is covered around, and by this means kept distinct from prior things. Each degree also is surrounded by a covering, and by this means kept distinct from another degree. Consequently, things of the first degree are not known from the second degree, nor are those of that degree known by the third degree. Take an example. The love of the will which is the first degree of the mind is not known in the wisdom of the understanding which is the second degree of the mind, except by a certain enjoyment of thinking of the matter. The first degree which, as has been said, is the love of the will, is not known in the knowledge of the memory, which is the third degree, except by a certain pleasure in knowing and speaking. It follows from these examples that a deed, which is an act of the body, includes all these things although in external form it appears simple and as one thing.
278. The acts of the body when viewed by the eye, appear thus simple and uniform, as seeds, fruits, and eggs do, in external form, or as nuts and almonds in their shells, yet they contain in themselves all the prior things from which they exist, because every outmost is sheathed about and is thereby rendered distinct from things prior. So is each degree enveloped by a covering, and thereby separated from other degrees; consequently things of the first degree are not perceived by the second, nor those of the second by the third. For example: The love of the will, which is the first degree of the mind, is not perceived in the wisdom of the understanding, which is the second degree of the mind, except by a certain enjoyment in thinking of the matter. Again, the first degree, which is, as just said, the love of the will, is not perceived in the knowledge of the memory, which is the third degree, except by a certain pleasure in knowing and speaking. From all this it follows that every deed, or bodily act, includes all these things, although externally it appears simple, and as if it were a single thing.
278. Quod actus corporis ab oculo spectati appareant ita simplices et uniformes sicut in externa forma semina, fructus, ova, et sicut nuces et amygdalae in crusta, 1 et usque in se contineant omnia priora ex quibus sunt, est quia omne ultimum est circumtectum, et per id distinctum a prioribus; unusquisque etiam gradus est circumcinctus velamine, et per id distinctus ab altero: quare illa quae primi gradus sunt non noscuntur a secundo gradu, nec ea quae hujus gradus sunt noscuntur a tertio: sicut pro exemplo; Amor voluntatis, qui est primus gradus mentis, in sapientia intellectus, quae est secundus gradus mentis, non noscitur nisi quam per quoddam jucundum cogitationis rei; primus gradus qui, ut dictum est, est amor voluntatis, in scientia memoriae, quae est tertius gradus, non noscitur quam per quoddam amaenum sciendi et loquendi. Ex his consequitur, quod opus, quod est actus corporis, includat omnia illa, tametsi in externa forma apparet simplex sicut unum.
Footnotes:
1. Prima editio: nucleo,