372、⑴心智的一切都与意愿和理解力有关，身体的一切都与心和肺有关。心智无非是指意愿和理解力，它们整体上包含了一个人所感受、所思想的一切，因而包含属于一个人的情感和思维的一切。一个人所感受到的东西是其意愿的属性，他所思想的东西是其理解力的属性。人们都知道，人的思维的一切都是其理解力的属性，因为他用理解力来思考。但人们并不十分清楚，人的情感的一切都是其意愿的属性。之所以不是十分清楚，是因为当人在思考时，他没有注意到他的情感，只注意到他所思考的东西。同样，当听一个人说话时，他没有注意到语气，只注意到话语本身。然而，思维当中的情感就像话语当中的语气；因此，从说话者的语气就知道他的情感，从话语则知道他的思维。
情感是意愿的属性，因为一切情感都是爱的属性，接受爱的容器是意愿，如前所示。一个人若不知道情感是意愿的属性，就会将情感和思维混为一谈；他会说，情感与思维是一体的。而事实上，它们不是一体的，却作为一体行动。它们被混淆了，这一点从日常用语明显看出来，如：“我想这么做”，意思就是“我愿这么做”。另一方面，这二者的区别也可从日常用语明显看出来，如：我愿意思想这个问题。当他思想它时，意愿的情感就呈现在理解力的思维中，就像我们所说的话语中的语气那样。人们都知道，身体的所有部分都与心肺有关，却不知道，心和肺与意愿和理解力存在一种对应关系。因此，我们将在下文论述这个主题。
372, 1. Everything in the mind goes back to volition and discernment, and everything in the body goes back to the heart and the lungs. "Mind" means simply volition and discernment, which embrace everything that moves us and everything we think. This means that it embraces everything that belongs to our feeling and thinking. The things that move us belong to our volition, and the things we think about belong to our discernment.
We recognize that everything we think belongs to our discernment because discernment is the basis of our thinking. It is not so clear to us, however, that everything that moves us belongs to our volition. This is because when we are thinking, we do not pay attention to our feeling but only to what we are thinking. It is like our listening to someone talk and paying no attention to the tone quality but only to the discourse itself. Yet the feeling within our thinking is like the tone quality within our speech, so that we can tell how people are feeling from their tone of voice and can tell what they are thinking from what they say.
The reason feelings belong to volition is that every feeling is an aspect of love, and as already noted [358-361], volition is the vessel of love.
People who do not know that feelings belong to volition confuse feeling with thinking. They actually say that feeling is the same as thinking even though they are not the same but simply act in unison. We can see this confusion in casual speech when someone says "I think I'll do that" meaning "I intend to do that." The fact that they are two things also shows up in casual speech when someone says "I'd like to think about that." When someone does "think about that," there is volition's feeling within discernment's thought just the way there is tone quality within speech, as noted.
It is generally recognized that everything in the body depends on the heart and the lungs; but it is not generally recognized that there is a correspondence of the heart and the lungs with volition and discernment. This matter, then, needs to be dealt with later [374-393].
372. (1) All the constituents of the mind are connected with the will and intellect, and all the constituents of the body with the heart and lungs. By the mind we mean nothing else than the will and intellect, which comprise in their entirety all that a person feels and all that a person thinks, thus all elements that pertain to a person's affection and thought. The things that a person feels are properties of his will, and those that he thinks are properties of his intellect.
People know that all the components of a person's thought are properties of his intellect, since a person thinks with the intellect. But it is not so well known that all the components of a person's affection are properties of his will. It is not so well known for the reason that when a person thinks, he does not pay attention to his affection, but only to what he is thinking. Similarly, when he hears someone speaking, he does not pay attention to the intonation but to the utterance itself. And yet the affection in thinking is like the intonation in speech, which is why from the intonation of a speaker one discerns his affection, and from the utterance his thought.
[2] Affection is a property of the will because every affection is a property of love, and the recipient vessel of love is the will, as we showed above.
A person who does not know that affection is a property of the will confuses affection with thought; for he says that it is one with thought. But in fact they are not one, but operate as one. The confusion of the two is apparent from common speech, as in the statement, "My thought is to do this," meaning, "My will is to do it." On the other hand, the distinction of the two is also apparent from common speech, as in the statement, "I want to think about this." And when he does think about it, the affection of the will is present in the thought of the intellect, like the intonation in an utterance, as we said.
People know that all the constituents of the body are connected with the heart and lungs, but they have not known that there is a correspondence of the heart and lungs with the will and intellect. Therefore we will consider this point in the discussions that follow.
372. (i) All things of the mind have relation to the will and understanding, and all things of the body to the heart and lungs. By the mind nothing else is understood than the will and understanding, which in their entirety are all the things that affect a man and all he thinks of, thus all things of man's affection and thought. Those things by which man is affected belong to his will, and those of which he thinks belong to his understanding. It is known that all the things of man's thought belong to his understanding, since he thinks from the understanding. But it is not so well known that all the things of man's affection belong to his will, because when he thinks, he pays no heed to the affection, but only to what he is thinking; just as when he hears somebody speaking, he pays attention not to the sound, but to the words themselves; when yet affection stands in the same relation to thought as sound does to the spoken word. Consequently one knows from the sound of a speaker's voice what his affection is, and from the words what his thought is. Affection belongs to the will because every affection belongs to love, and the receptacle of love is the will, as was shown above. He who does not know that affection belongs to the will confuses affection with the understanding, for he declares it to be one with thought; yet they are not one although they act as one. That they are confused is clear from the common expression "I think I shall do this," meaning, "I will do it." But that they are two things is also clear from a common expression, "I wish to think over this matter," and when he thinks it over, the affection of the will is present in the thought of the understanding, just as sound is present in the spoken word, as was said before. That all things of the body have relation to the heart and lungs is well known, but that there is a correspondence of the heart and lungs with the will and the understanding is not known. This subject will therefore be discussed in what follows.
372. (1) All things of the mind have relation to the will and understanding, and all things of the body to the heart and lungs. By the mind nothing else is meant than the will and understanding, which in their complex are all things that affect man and all that he thinks, thus all things of man's affection and thought. The things that affect man are of his will, and the things that he thinks are of his understanding. That all things of man's thought are of his understanding is known, since he thinks from the understanding; but it is not so well known that all things of man's affection are of his will, this is not so well known because when man is thinking he pays no attention to the affection, but only to what he is thinking; just as when he hears a person speaking, he pays no attention to the tone of the voice but only to the language. Yet affection is related to thought as the tone of the voice is to the language; consequently the affection of the one speaking is known by the tone, and his thought by the language. Affection is of the will, because all affection is of love, and the will is the receptacle of love, as was shown above. He that is not aware that affection is of the will confounds affection with understanding, for he declares it to be one with thought, yet they are not one but act as one. That they are confounded is evident from the common expression, I think I will do this, meaning, I will to do it. But that they are two is also evident from a common expression, I wish to think about this matter; and when one thinks about it, the affection of the will is present in the thought of the understanding, like the tone in speech, as was said before. That all parts of the body have relation to the heart and lungs is known, but that there is a correspondence of the heart and lungs with the will and understanding is not known. This subject will therefore be treated in what follows.
372. I. Quod omnia Mentis se referant ad voluntatem et intellectum, et omnia Corporis ad cor et pulmonem. Per Mentem non aliud intelligitur quam voluntas et intellectus, quae in suo complexu sunt omnia quae hominem afficiunt, et quae homo cogitat, ita omnia quae affectionis et cogitationis hominis sunt; illa quae afficiunt hominem sunt voluntatis ejus, et illa quae homo cogitat, sunt intellectus ejus. Quod omnia cogitationis hominis sint ejus Intellectus, scitur, quoniam homo cogitat ex intellectu; at quod omnia affectionis hominis sint ejus voluntatis, non ita scitur; quod non ita sciatur, est causa, quia homo cum cogitat, non attendit ad affectionem, sed solum ad illa quae cogitat; sicut cum audit loquentem, non attendit ad sonum, sed ad ipsam loquelam, cum tamen affectio in cogitatione 1 similiter se habet sicut sonus in loquela, quare ex sono loquentis cognoscitur affectio ejus, et ex loquela cogitatio ejus.
[2] Quod affectio sit voluntatis, est quia omnis affectio est amoris, et amoris receptaculum est voluntas, ut supra ostensum est. Qui non scit quod affectio sit voluntatis, confundit affectionem cum intellectu, dicit enim unum esse cum cogitatione, at usque non unum sunt, sed ut unum agunt; quod confundantur, patet a communi loquela, quod dicatur, hoc cogito facere, hoc est, hoc volo facere; quod autem duo sint, patet etiam a communi loquela, quod dicatur, de hac re volo cogitare, et cum de illa cogitat, inest affectio voluntatis cogitationi intellectus, sicut sonus inest loquelae, ut dictum est. Quod omnia corporis se referant ad cor et pulmonem, notum est; sed quod correspondentia sit cordis et pulmonis cum voluntate et intellectu, non notum est; quare de hac re in sequentibus agetur. 2
Footnotes:
1. Prima editio: cogitatioine
2. Prima editio: agetur,