上一节  下一节  回首页


《圣治(天意)》 第11节

(一滴水译,2022)

  11、诚然,人们知道宇宙万物都涉及良善与真理,因为他们将良善理解为普遍接受并包含爱的一切方面之物,将真理理解为普遍接受并包含智慧的一切方面之物。殊不知,良善若不与真理结合,就不是真实事物;真理若不与良善结合,也不是真实事物。表面上看,没有真理的良善似乎是真实事物,没有良善的真理似乎也是真实事物,但事实并非如此。因为爱(属于爱的一切都被称为良善)是事物的存在,智慧(属于智慧的一切都被称为真理)是来自那存在的事物的显现,如《圣爱与圣智》一书(14-16节)所示。由于没有显现的存在不是真实事物,没有存在的显现也不是真实事物,所以没有真理的良善不是真实事物,没有良善的真理也不是真实事物。同样,与任何事物都无关的良善算什么呢?既然它不能影响任何事物,或被感知到,那么它还能被称为良善吗?

  当与良善结合时产生影响的元素,就是使觉察和感受成为可能的元素,与真理有关,因为它与存在于理解力中的东西有关。如果你只是简单地对某个人说“良善”,却不说这样或那样的具体东西是良善,那么这“良善”有什么实际意义呢?良善只因被感觉为良善的具体事物而具有实际意义。与良善的这种结合只发生在理解力里面,而理解力的一切都与真理有关。意愿也一样。不知道、感知和思考人所意愿的东西,意愿不是真实事物;但与这些功能一起,就是某种真实事物。一切意愿都属于爱,与良善有关;一切知道、感知和思考都属于理解力,与真理有关。由此清楚可知,去意愿不是真实事物,意愿具体的东西才是某种真实事物。

  一切功用同样如此,因为功用就是良善。功用若不聚焦于能与它合为一体的某种事物,就不是功用,因而不是真实的东西。功用从理解力中获得它的焦点;与来自理解力的功用结合或相联的东西与真理有关;功用从真理中获得自己的品质。

  从这几个例子明显看出,没有真理的良善不是真实事物;同样,没有良善的真理也不是真实事物。我们说,与真理一起的良善和与良善一起的真理是真实事物,由此可推知,与虚假一起的邪恶和与邪恶一起的虚假不是真实事物;因为后者与前者对立。对立就是毁灭,在这种情况下,它毁灭真实的东西。我们将在下文论述这一点。


上一节  目录  下一节


Divine Providence (Rogers translation 2003) 11

11. People know, indeed, that everything in the universe has some relation to goodness and truth, because by goodness is meant something that universally embraces and includes all aspects of love, and by truth is meant something that universally embraces and includes all aspects of wisdom. But people do not as yet know that goodness is not real unless united with truth, and that truth is not real unless united with goodness. It appears, indeed, as though goodness may be real apart from truth, and that truth may be real apart from goodness, but still they are not. For love, all of whose constituents are good, is the being of anything real, and wisdom, all of whose constituents are truths, is the expression of anything real from that being, as we have shown in our treatise Divine Love and Wisdom 14-16. Consequently, as being has no reality apart from expression, or expression apart from being, so goodness is not real apart from truth, and truth is not real apart from goodness.

Similarly, what is good without reference to anything? Can it be called good? For it is incapable of affecting anything or of being perceived.

[2] That which in union with good has the power to affect and which allows it to be perceived and felt relates to truth, because it relates to what exists in the intellect. Say to someone simply "good," and not that this or that is good. Has "good" then any meaning? But from this or that which is perceived as one with good, it has meaning. That which is perceived as one with good is united with good nowhere else than in the intellect, and everything in the intellect relates to truth.

It is the same with willing. To will without knowing, perceiving and thinking what one wills is not something real. But in union with these it becomes something real. All willing is connected with love and relates to goodness, while all knowing, perceiving and thinking is a function of the intellect and relates to truth. It is apparent, therefore, that simply to will is without meaning, but that to will this or that has meaning.

[3] It is the same with all useful endeavor, because useful endeavor is good. Unless useful endeavor is directed to some application with which to unite itself, it is not useful and so is not real. Useful endeavor takes its application from the intellect, and that which is joined or attached to the endeavor from the intellect relates to truth. That is what gives useful endeavor its character.

[4] From these few considerations it can be seen that good is not real apart from truth, thus that neither is truth real apart from good.

We say that good united with truth, and truth united with good, are real. It follows from this that evil in union with falsity, and falsity in union with evil, are not something real, for the latter are the opposite of the former, and opposition means destruction - in this case the destruction of the latter's reality. But more on this subject hereafter.

Divine Providence (Dole translation 2003) 11

11. It is generally recognized that everything in the universe involves what is good and what is true. That is, we understand "goodness" to mean that which everywhere comprehends and comprises everything that has to do with love, and we understand "truth" to mean that which everywhere comprehends and comprises everything that has to do with wisdom. It has not been generally recognized, though, that something good is nothing unless it is united to something true and that something true is nothing unless it is united to something good.

It does seem as though something good could be real apart from something true and that something true could be real apart from something good, but this is not the case. In fact, love (all of whose elements are called good) is the reality of anything, and wisdom (all of whose elements are called true) is the manifestation of that thing that follows from its reality, as I explained in Divine Love and Wisdom 14-16. Just as reality is nothing apart from manifestation, then, and manifestation is nothing apart from reality, so goodness apart from truth or truth apart from goodness is nothing. By the same token, what is something good apart from its relationship to something else? Can we really call it good? There is no effectiveness or perception involved in it.

[2] The element that has an effect when it is united to goodness, the element that makes perception and sensation possible, involves what is true because it involves what is in our discernment. Say to someone simply "goodness" without saying that some particular thing is good--is that "goodness" really anything? It is something only because of the particular thing that we identify with it. The only place this identification occurs is in our discernment, and our discernment involves what is true.

The same holds true for intending. To intend without knowing, perceiving, and considering what we intend is nothing, but together with these functions it is something. All our intending is a matter of love and involves what is good; and all our knowing, perceiving, and considering is a matter of discernment and involves what is true; so we can see that "intending" is nothing. Intending something in particular, though, is something.

[3] It is the same with all acts of service, because acts of service are good. Unless an act of service is focused on some benefit that is integral to it, it is not really an act of service, so it is nothing. It gets its focus from our discernment; and what is therefore united to or associated with the act involves what is true. This is where the act of service gets its quality.

[4] We can tell from these few examples that nothing good is really anything at all apart from something true, and that nothing true is anything at all apart from something good. We say that goodness together with truth, or truth together with goodness, is something. It follows, then, that evil together with falsity, or falsity together with evil, is nothing. This is because they are opposites to goodness and truth, and an opposite is destructive. In this case, it destroys the "something." But more on this later [19].

Divine Providence (Dick and Pulsford translation 1949) 11

11. It is known, indeed, that all things in the universe have relation to good and truth; for by good is understood that which universally comprehends and involves all things of love, and by truth that which universally comprehends and involves all things of wisdom; but it is not yet known that good has no reality unless united to truth, and truth has no reality unless united to good. It appears, indeed, as if good has reality without truth, and as if truth has reality without good; but still they have not. For love, all things pertaining to which are called goods, is the being (esse) of a thing, and wisdom, all things pertaining to which are called truths, is the existing (existere) of a thing from that being, as is shown in the treatise THE DIVINE LOVE AND WISDOM (n. 14-16). Since being has no reality without existing, and existing has no reality without being, so good has no reality without truth and truth has no reality without good. So, too, what is good that is not related to anything? Can it be called good, since it is subject neither to affection nor to perception?

[2] The principle in intimate connection with good which affects, and which causes itself to be perceived and felt, has relation to truth, for it has relation to what is in the understanding. If you say to anyone simply "good", and not that this or that thing is good, has good any reality? It has reality when it is used of something which is perceived to be good. This union with good takes place nowhere but in the understanding, and every thing of the understanding relates to truth. It is the same with willing. To will, without knowing, perceiving, and thinking what one wills, has no reality; but together with these it takes on reality. All willing is of love, and has relation to good; and all knowing, perceiving, and thinking are of the understanding, and have relation to truth. From this it is clear that to will has no reality, but to will this or that has reality.

[3] It is the same with every use, because a use is a good. Unless a use is determined to something with which it may be one, it is not a use, and thus it has no reality. Use derives from the understanding that something as its own; and that which is united or adjoined to the use from the understanding has relation to truth; and from this the use derives its quality.

[4] From these few illustrations it may be evident that good without truth has no reality; and likewise truth without good. When it is said that good with truth and truth with good have reality, it follows from this that evil with falsity and falsity with evil have no reality; for the latter are opposite to the former. Now opposition destroys, and in this case it destroys that which has reality; but this will be treated in what follows.

Divine Providence (Ager translation 1899) 11

11. It is acknowledged that all things in the universe have relation to good and truth, for by good is meant that which universally embraces and involves all things of love, and by truth that which universally embraces and involves all things of wisdom. But it is not yet acknowledged that good is not any thing until it has become joined with truth, and that truth is not any thing until it has become joined with good. There is an appearance, indeed, that good is something apart from truth, and that truth is something apart from good, and yet they are not; since love (all things of which are called goods) is the being (esse) of a thing, and wisdom (all things of which are called truths) is the coming forth (existere) of a thing from that esse, as has been shown in Divine Love and Wisdom 14-16; and just as esse is nothing apart from existere, and existere is nothing apart from esse, so good is nothing apart from truth, and truth is nothing apart from good. So again, what is good unless related to something? Can it be called good, since no affection or perception can be predicated of it?

[2] The thing in connection with good that affects and causes itself to be perceived and felt has relation to truth, since it has relation to what is in the understanding. Say to any one, not that this or that is good, but simply "the good," is "the good" any thing? Good is something because of this or that which is perceived as one with good. This is united with good nowhere but in the understanding; and every thing of the understanding has relation to truth. It is the same with willing. To will, apart from knowing, perceiving, and thinking what one wills, is not any thing; but together with these it becomes something. All willing is of love, and has relation to good; and all knowing, perceiving, or thinking is of the understanding, and has relation to truth. From this it is clear that to will is nothing, but to will this or that is something.

[3] It is the same with every use, because a use is a good. Unless a use is determined to something with which it may be a one it is not a use, and thus it is not any thing. It is from the understanding that use derives its something to which it may be determined; and that from the understanding which is conjoined or adjoined to the use has relation to truth; and it is from that that the use derives its quality.

[4] From these few things it is clear that good apart from truth is not any thing; and that truth apart from good is not any thing. When it is said that good with truth and truth with good are something, it follows from this that evil with falsity and falsity with evil are not any thing; for the latter are opposite to the former, and opposition destroys, and in this case destroys that something. But more about this in what follows.

De Divina Providentia 11 (original Latin, 1764)

11. Notum quidem est, quod omnia in universo se referant ad bonum et verum, quia per bonum intelligitur id quod universaliter complectitur et involvit omnia amoris, et per verum intelligitur id quod universaliter complectitur et involvit omnia sapientiae; sed non adhuc notum est, quod bonum non sit aliquid nisi unitum vero, nec quod verum sit aliquid nisi unitum bono: apparet quidem sicut bonum sit aliquid absque vero, et quod verum sit aliquid absque bono, sed usque non sunt: amor enim, cujus omnia vocantur bona, est Esse rei, et sapientia, cujus omnia vocantur vera, est Existere rei ex illo Esse, ut in Transactione de DIVINO AMORE ET DIVINA SAPIENTIA 14-16, ostensum est; quare sicut Esse absque Existere non est aliquid, nec Existere absque Esse, ita bonum absque vero, ac verum absque bono, non est aliquid. Similiter, quid est bonum absque relatione ad aliquid; num dici potest bonum, est enim nullius affectionis et nullius perceptionis;

[2] id una cum bono quod afficit, et quod dat se percipi et sentiri, se refert ad verum, quia ad illud quod est in intellectu; dic alicui nude bonum, et non hoc aut illud est bonum; num bonum est aliquid; at ex hoc aut illo, quod ut unum percipitur cum bono, est aliquid; hoc non alibi unitur bono quam in intellectu, et omne intellectus se refert ad verum. Simile est cum velle; velle absque scire, percipere et cogitare quid homo vult, non est aliquid, at una cum his fit aliquid; omne velle est amoris, et se refert ad bonum, et omne scire, percipere et cogitare est intellectus, et se refert ad verum; inde patet quod velle non sit aliquid, sed quod hoc aut illud velle sit aliquid.

[3] Simile est cum omni usu, quia usus est bonum; usus nisi determinatus sit ad quoddam, cum quo sit unum, non est usus, ita non est aliquid; usus suum aliquid trahit ab intellectu, et id quod inde usui conjungitur vel adjungitur, se refert ad verum; ex eo trahit usus suum quale.

[4] Ex his paucis constare potest, quod bonum absque vero non sit aliquid, ita quod nec verum absque bono sit aliquid. Dicitur quod bonum cum vero, ac verum cum bono, sint aliquid; inde sequitur quod malum cum falso et falsum cum malo non sint aliquid, sunt enim haec illis opposita, et oppositum destruit; hic destruit aliquid: sed de hac re in sequentibus.


上一节  目录  下一节