198、前面（196节）说明，人所拥有的思维，无不来自其生命之爱的某种情感；思维无非是情感的形式。既然人能看见自己的思维，却无法看见自己的情感，只能感受它们，那么可推知，人断定自己的谨慎成就一切，是基于处于表象的视觉，而非基于进入感觉，不进入视觉的情感。因为情感只有通过思维中的一种快乐和推理某事时的一种满足才能显明；那时，这种满足和快乐便与那些出于爱自己或爱世界而相信自己的谨慎之人里面的思维合为一体。思维漂浮在自己的快乐中，就像船只漂浮在河流上；而船长因注意力都在风帆上，故没有注意到这河流。
198. We showed above that a person has no thought that does not spring from some affection of his life's love, and that thought is nothing but a form of affection. Since, then, a person sees his thought and cannot see the affection, affection being something he feels, it follows that from what he sees, which is caught up in the appearance, he decides that human prudence accomplishes all things, and this not from the affection, which does not come to view but is only felt. For affection displays itself only through some delight consciously felt and the pleasure of reasoning about it, and this pleasure and delight are then bound up with the thinking in people who from a love of self and a love of the world are impelled by a belief in their own prudence. The thought then drifts along in its delight like a boat in the current of a river, to which the boat's captain pays no attention, giving attention only to the sails that he spreads.
198. I have already explained [196] that we do not have any thoughts that do not come from some feeling of our life's love, and that thought is simply a form of feeling. This means that when we see our thoughts but cannot see our feelings (we only sense them), then on the basis of what we can see, on the basis of the way things seem, we presume that our own prudence accounts for everything. We attribute nothing to our feelings, because they do not come into our view, but are only sensed. Our feelings make themselves known only through a kind of pleasure in thinking and a sense of gratification when we reason about something. This pleasure and gratification then make common cause with the thinking in people who believe in their own prudence because they love themselves or love the world. Their thought drifts along in its pleasure like a boat in the current of a river, a current that the skipper does not notice because all attention is on the billowing sail.
198. It was shown above that man has no thought except from some affection of his life's love, and that thought is nothing but the form of affection. Since, then, man sees his thought, but cannot see his affection, for this he feels, it follows that it is from sight, which is in the appearance, that he concludes that one's own prudence does all things; and not from affection, which does not come into sight but into feeling. For affection only makes itself manifest through a certain delight of thought and pleasure of reasoning concerning it; and then this pleasure and delight make one with the thought in those who believe in ones own prudence from the love of self or from the love of the world; and thought flows on in its own delight like a ship in the current of a river, a current to which the captain pays no heed, attending only to the sails which he unfurls.
198. It has been shown above that no thought is possible to man except from some affection of his life's love; and that thought is nothing but the form of affection. Since, then, man sees his thought, but cannot see his affection, for that he feels, it follows that it is from sight, which is in the appearance, and not from affection, which comes into feeling and not into sight, that man concludes that his own prudence does all things. For affection is evident only through a certain delight in thought and satisfaction in reasoning about it; and this satisfaction and delight then make one with the thought in those who from self-love or love of the world believe in their own prudence; and thought floats on in its delight like a ship in the current of a stream, to which the master pays no attention, regarding only the sail he spreads.
198. Supra ostensum est, quod non aliqua cogitatio hominis detur, nisi ex affectione aliqua amoris vitae ejus, et quod cogitatio non sit aliud quam forma affectionis: cum itaque homo videt suam cogitationem, 1et non potest affectionem, hanc enim sentit, sequitur quod ex visu, qui est in apparentia, statuat quod propria prudentia faciat omnia, 2et non ex affectione, quae non in visum venit, sed in sensum: affectio enim se solum manifestat per quoddam jucundum cogitationis et volupe ratiocinationis de eo, et tunc hoc volupe et jucundum facit unum cum cogitatione apud illos, qui in fide propriae prudentiae sunt ex amore sui aut ex amore mundi; et cogitatio in jucundo suo fluit 3sicut navis in vena fluminis, ad quam nauclerus non advertit, sed solum ad vela quae expandit.
Footnotes:
1 Prima editio: cogitationem,
2 Prima editio: omnia;
3 Prima editio: ffuit