320、⑷人若相信（这是真理），一切良善和真理皆来自主，一切邪恶和虚假皆来自地狱，就不会将良善归给自己，视它为有功的，也不会将邪恶归给自己，认为自己对它负有责任。然而，由于这一点违背了那些确信以下表象之人的信念，即：智慧和谨慎来自人，不是照着人心智的结构状态流入的（参看319节），所以有必要进行解释；我需要按下列顺序清楚说明这一点：
①人若确信表象，即：智慧和谨慎来自人，因而在他里面如同他自己的，就必然觉得若非如此，他将不是一个人，而要么是一个动物，要么是一个雕像；然而，事实恰恰相反。
②照着真理，即：一切良善和真理皆来自主，一切邪恶和虚假皆来自地狱而相信和思想，似乎是不可能的；而事实上，如此行是真正的人性原则，因而如天使一般。
③对那些不承认主的神性，也不承认邪恶就是罪的人来说，如此相信和思想是不可能的；但对那些承认这两个事实的人来说，是可能的。
④那些作出这两个承认的人，只会反思自己里面的邪恶，并照着避开和远离如罪的邪恶程度而将它们扔回它们所来自的地狱。
⑤这意味着圣治既不将邪恶归给任何人，也不将良善归给任何人；相反，人自己的谨慎两者都归给。
320. (4) If a person were to believe, as is the truth, that all goodness and truth originate from the Lord, and all evil and falsity from hell, he would not assign goodness to himself and make it deserving of merit, nor assign evil to himself and make himself guilty of it. This, however, is contrary to the belief of people who have affirmed in themselves the appearance that wisdom and prudence originate from mankind and do not flow in in accordance with the state of the organization of people's minds, as discussed just above in no. 319. Therefore we must demonstrate it, and to do so clearly, we must demonstrate the several points in the following sequence:
1. Someone who affirms in himself the appearance that wisdom and prudence originate from mankind, and that they are therefore in him as his, cannot but have it seem to him that he would otherwise not be human, but would be either an animal or a statue, when in fact the opposite is the case.
2. To believe and think, as is the truth, that all goodness and truth originate from the Lord, and all evil and falsity from hell, seems to be an impossibility, when in fact it is something truly human and thus angelic.
3. To believe and think in this way is impossible for people who do not acknowledge the Lord's Divinity, and who do not acknowledge evils to be sins, whereas it is possible for people who do acknowledge these two things.
4. Insofar as they refrain from evils as sins and are averse to them, people who possess these two acknowledgments simply reflect on the evils in themselves and cast them away from themselves back to hell from where they came.
5. Thus Divine providence does not assign evil to anyone, nor good to anyone, but it is a person's own prudence that assigns the one or the other to him.
320. 4. If we believed that--as is truly the case--everything good and true comes from the Lord and everything evil and false comes from hell, then we would not claim the goodness as our own and make it self-serving or claim the evil as our own and make ourselves guilty of it. However, this contradicts the belief of people who have convinced themselves of the appearance that wisdom and prudence come from themselves and do not flow in according to the way their minds are structured (see 319 above). For this reason, it needs to be explained; and to do that clearly, I shall use the following sequence. (a) If we convince ourselves of the appearance that wisdom and prudence come from ourselves and are therefore within us as our own possessions, it necessarily seems to us that if this were not the case we would not be human at all, only animals or statues; and yet the truth is just the opposite. (b) It seems as though it would be impossible to believe and think in accord with the truth that everything good and true comes from the Lord and everything evil and false from hell, when in fact to do so is truly human and angelic. (c) Believing and thinking like this is impossible for people who do not acknowledge the Lord's divine nature and who do not acknowledge that evils are sins; but it is possible for people who acknowledge these two facts. (d) If we make these two acknowledgments, we simply reflect on the evils within ourselves and, to the extent that we abstain and turn from them as sins, throw them back into the hell they came from. (e) This means that divine providence does not charge anyone with evil or credit anyone with good. Rather, our own prudence makes each of these claims.
320. IV. IF MAN BELIEVED, AS IS THE TRUTH, THAT ALL GOOD AND TRUTH ORIGINATE FROM THE LORD, AND ALL EVIL AND FALSITY FROM HELL, HE WOULD NOT APPROPRIATE GOOD TO HIMSELF AND ACCOUNT IT MERITORIOUS, NOR WOULD HE APPROPRIATE EVIL TO HIMSELF AND ACCOUNT HIMSELF RESPONSIBLE FOR IT. As this, however, is contrary to the belief of those who have confirmed in themselves the appearance that wisdom and prudence originate from man, and do not flow in according to the state of the organisation of men's minds, treated of above (n. 319), it must now be demonstrated; and in order that this may be done clearly, the following order will be observed:
1. He who confirms in himself the appearance that wisdom and prudence originate from man and consequently are in him as his own, must needs see that if this were not so he would not be a man, but either a beast or a statue; when yet the contrary is true.
2. To believe and think, as is the truth, that all good and truth originate from the Lord and all evil and falsity from hell, appears as if it were impossible, when yet it is truly human and consequently angelic.
3. To believe and think thus is impossible to those who do not acknowledge the Divinity of the Lord, and who do not acknowledge evils to be sins; but it is possible to those who acknowledge these two things.
4. Those who are in the acknowledgment of these two things reflect only upon the evils in themselves and, so far as they shun them as sins and turn away from them, they cast them out from themselves to the hell from which they come.
5. In this way the Divine Providence does not appropriate either evil or good to anyone, but one's own prudence appropriates both.
320. (4) If man believed, as is the truth, that all good and truth are from the Lord and all evil and falsity from hell, he would not appropriate good to himself and make it meritorious, nor appropriate evil to himself and make himself guilty of it. But as this is contrary to the belief of those who have confirmed in themselves the appearance that wisdom and prudence are from man, and do not flow in according to the state of the organization of men's minds (of which just above,319), it must now be made clear; and for the sake of distinctness this shall be done in the following order:
(1) To one who confirms in himself the appearance that wisdom and prudence are from man, and are therefore in him as his, it must needs seem that otherwise he would not be a man, but a beast or a statue; and yet the contrary is the truth.
(2) To believe and think, as is the truth, that every good and truth is from the Lord and every evil and falsity from hell, appears like an impossibility; and yet it is the truly human principle, and therefore the angelic.
(3) To believe and think thus is impossible to those who do not acknowledge the Divinity of the Lord, and who do not acknowledge that evils are sins; but it is possible to those who do acknowledge these two things.
(4) Those that are in these two acknowledgments, so far as they shun and turn away from evils as sins need only to reflect upon the evils in themselves and cast them away from themselves to the hell from whence they are.
(5) Thus the Divine providence does not appropriate evil to any one, nor good to any one, but his own prudence appropriates both.
320. IV. Quod si homo crederet sicut veritas est, quod omne bonum et verum sit a Domino, ac omne malum et falsum ab inferno, non appropriaret sibi bonum, et id meritorium faceret, nec appropriaret sibi malum, ac se reum ejus faceret. Sed haec quia sunt contra fidem illorum, qui apud se confirmaverunt apparentiam, quod sapientia et prudentia ab homine sint, et non influant secundum statum organizationis mentis eorum, de qua mox supra 319, ideo demonstranda sunt; quod ut fiat distincte, erit in hoc ordine. 1. Quod qui confirmat apud se apparentiam, quod sapientia et prudentia sint ab homine et inde in illo ut ejus, non videre possit aliter, quam quod alioquin non foret homo, sed vel bestia, vel sculptile; cum tamen contrarium est. 2. Quod credere et cogitare sicut veritas est, quod omne bonum et verum sit a Domino, ac omne malum et falsum ab inferno, appareat sicut impossibile, cum tamen id est vere humanum et inde angelicum. 3. Quod ita credere et cogitare sit impossibile illis, qui non agnoscunt Divinum Domini, et qui non agnoscunt mala esse peccata; at quod possibile sit illis, qui duo illa agnoscunt. 4. Quod qui in duabus illis agnitionibus sunt, solum reflectant super mala apud se, et illa a se ad infernum, unde sunt, rejiciant, quantum illa ut peccata fugiunt et aversantur. 5. Quod sic Divina Providentia non appropriet alicui malum, nec alicui bonum, sed quod propria prudentia utrumque appropriet.