76、凡理性没有被蒙蔽的人，都能明白或理解，没有“这是他自己的”这种表象，人无法处于求知欲或对知道的任何情感，或处于对理解的任何情感。因为一切快乐和享受，因而属于意愿的一切都来自属于爱的情感。除非从情感中获得某种快乐，否则，谁愿意去知道或理解任何东西呢？除非影响他的东西看似他自己的，否则，谁能拥有这种情感的快乐呢？如果什么东西都不是他的，一切都是别人的，换句话说，如果一个人正在将自己的某种东西，或自己的情感注入第二个不想知道或理解之人的头脑，那么这第二个人会接受它吗？他有接受它的能力吗？他岂不像是我们所说的哑巴牲口或笨蛋吗？
由此很清楚地看出，尽管人所感知和由此思考、知道，并照着这种感知所愿、所行的一切都流入他，但按照主的圣治，这一切都看似他自己的；要不然，这个人什么也得不到，因而无法被赋予任何理解或智慧，如前所述。众所周知，一切良善和真理都是主的，不是人的，但在人看来，似乎是他的；正因一切良善和真理看上去都是这样，所以教会和天堂的一切，因而爱和智慧，以及仁和信的一切看上去也都是这样，然而，这些东西没有一样是人的。除非在人看来，他貌似凭自己感知这些东西，否则，他无法从主获得它们。由此明显看出这个问题的真相，即：凡一个人出于自由所行的，无论是否理性，只要符合他的理性，在他看来似乎都是他自己的。
76. Everyone with an unobstructed rationality can see and comprehend that without the appearance that it is his, a person cannot be moved by any affection for knowing, nor by any affection for understanding. For every delight and pleasure, thus everything pertaining to the will, springs from an affection having to do with love. Who can wish to know something or understand something if he does not feel the pleasure of some affection? And who can have that pleasure of affection unless that which affects him appears to be his? If nothing were his, but everything another's, that is to say, if one were to infuse from his own affections something into the mind of another who lacked any affection for knowing or understanding as if of himself, would the other receive it? Indeed, could he receive it? Would he not be as something we term a brute or log?
[2] It can be clearly seen from this that even though everything flows in that a person perceives and so thinks and knows, and in consequence of his perception wills and does, still it is of the Lord's Divine providence that it appear to be the person's. For, as we said, a person otherwise would receive nothing, thus could not be endowed with any intelligence or wisdom.
People know that every good and truth is not man's but the Lord's, and yet that it appears to a person as his. And because every good and truth so appears, so also do all the constituents of the church and heaven, accordingly all the constituents of love and wisdom, and of charity and faith; and yet no element of these is man's. No one can receive these from the Lord unless it appears to him that he perceives them as though of himself.
From this can be seen the truth of the matter, that whatever a person does in freedom, whether it accords with reason or not, provided it accords with his reason, appears to him as his own doing.
76. Anyone whose rationality has not been beclouded can see or grasp the fact that if we did not seem to be in possession of ourselves, we would not experience any wish to know anything or any wish to understand anything, since all pleasure and satisfaction and therefore all volition comes from feelings that derive from love. Who could set out to know or understand something unless there were some feeling of satisfaction involved? Could we have any such feeling of satisfaction unless what moved us seemed to be really ours? If it were not ours at all, but came from someone else--that is, if one person were instilling some of his or her feelings into the mind of someone who really had no inclinations to know or to understand--would that second person accept the feelings? Could that second person accept them? Could we call that second person anything but a dumb animal or a passive lump?
Clearly, then, it stands to reason that even though everything is flowing in, everything we perceive and therefore think and know, everything we intend and do in response to our perceptions, still it is by divine providence that it all seems to be ours. Otherwise, as just noted, we would not accept anything and could not be given any intelligence or wisdom.
It is acknowledged that everything good and true belongs not to us but to the Lord, even though it does seem to us to be ours. Since everything good and true does seem to be ours, so does everything that has to do with the church and heaven, with love and wisdom, and with charity and faith, even though no element of them really belongs to us. None of us could accept them from the Lord if we did not seem to perceive them as our own.
This supports the truth of the matter, namely, that whatever we do freely, whether or not it is guided by reason, seems to be ours as long as it is in accord with our reason.
76. Everyone whose rationality is not obscured may see or comprehend that man, without the appearance that it is his own, cannot be in any affection of knowing, or in any affection of understanding. For every delight and pleasure, and therefore everything that belongs to the will, is from affection which is of love. Who can wish to know anything and to understand anything unless he has some pleasure from the affection? And who can have this pleasure of affection unless that by which he is affected appears to be his own? If there were nothing of his own but everything another's, that is to say, if anyone from his own affections should suggest something to the mind of another who had no affection for knowing and understanding as if from himself would that other receive it, or indeed could he receive it? Would he not be like what is called a dullard or a stock?
[2] From this it may be clearly evident that, although everything that a man perceives and thence thinks and knows, and wills and does in accordance with the perception, flows into him, still it is of the Divine Providence of the Lord that it should appear to be his own; for, as has been said, man would otherwise receive nothing, and therefore could not be gifted with any understanding and wisdom. It is well known that everything that is good and true is not man's but the Lord's, and yet that it appears to man to be his own; and because everything that is good and true so appears, even all things of the Church and of heaven, consequently all things of love and wisdom, and also of charity and faith, so appear, and yet nothing of these is man's. No one can receive them from the Lord unless it appears to him that he perceives these things as if from himself. From these considerations the truth (veritas) on this matter may be evident, namely, that whatever a man does from freedom, whether it be of reason or not, provided it be according to his reason, appears to him to be his own.
76. From an unobscured rationality any one can see or comprehend that it is only from an appearance that it is his that man can be in any affection for knowing, or in any affection for understanding. For every enjoyment and pleasure, and therefore every thing of the will, is from affection, which belongs to love. Who can wish to know any thing or to understand any thing, unless he has some pleasure from affection? And who can possess this pleasure of affection unless that which moves the affection appears to be his? If nothing were his, but everything another's, in other words, if any one from his own affections should pour something into the mind of another who had no affection for knowing and understanding as if from himself, would the other receive it, or even possess the ability to receive it? Would he not be like what is called a dullard and a stock?
[2] From this it is clearly evident that although every thing that man perceives, and thinks and knows therefrom, and wills and does in accordance with the perception, flows into him, nevertheless it is made by the Lord's Divine providence to appear to be man's; for otherwise, as has been said, the man could receive nothing, and therefore he could be endowed with no understanding or wisdom. It is acknowledged that every thing good and true is the Lord's and not man's, and yet that it appears to man to be his; and because every thing good and true so appears, all things of the church and of heaven, consequently all things of love and wisdom, and of charity and faith, so appear, and yet nothing of these is man's. Unless it appeared to man that he perceived these things as if from himself, he could not receive them from the Lord. From all this the truth of the matter can be seen, namely, that whatever one does from freedom, whether it be of reason or not, provided it is in accordance with his reason, appears to him to be his.
76. Quisque ex rationalitate non obvelata videre aut comprehendere potest, quod homo absque apparentia quod sit ejus, non possit in aliqua affectione sciendi esse, nec in aliqua affectione intelligendi, nam omne jucundum et volupe, ita omne voluntatis, est ex affectione quae amoris; quis potest aliquid velle scire, et velle intelligere, nisi ei aliquid volupe affectionis sit; et quis potest habere id volupe affectionis, nisi id quo afficitur appareat sicut ejus; si nihil ejus, sed omne alterius esset, hoc est, si quis ex suis affectionibus infunderet aliquid in mentem alterius, cui nullae affectiones sciendi et intelligendi sicut ex se forent, num reciperet, imo num posset recipere; essetne sicut id quod vocatur brutum et stipes:
[2] inde manifeste constare potest, quod tametsi omnia influunt, quae homo percipit et inde cogitat et scit, et secundum perceptionem vult et facit, usque Providentiae Divinae Domini sit, ut id appareat sicut hominis, nam, ut dictum est, alioquin homo nihil reciperet, ita non aliqua intelligentia et sapientia donari posset. Notum est, quod omne bonum et verum, non sit hominis sed sit Domini, et tamen quod appareat homini sicut ejus, et quia omne bonum et verum ita apparet, etiam omnia Ecclesiae et Coeli, proinde omnia amoris et sapientiae, tum charitatis et fidei, ita apparent, et tamen nihil eorum hominis est; illa recipere a Domino nemo potest, nisi appareat ei percipere illa sicut a se. Ex his constare potest veritas hujus rei, quod quicquid homo ex libero facit, sive sit rationis vel non rationis, modo sit secundum ejus rationem, illi appareat ut ejus.