89、由于一切意愿皆来自爱，一切理解皆来自智慧，故可推知，意愿的能力来自神性之爱，理解的能力来自神性智慧；因此，两者都来自主，主是神性之爱本身和神性智慧本身。由此可知，出于自由照着理性行动并非来自其它源头。人都是照理性（自由）行动的，因为自由和爱一样，与意愿是不可分离的。然而，人有一个内在意愿和一个外在意愿；他能照着外在意愿，而非同时照着内在意愿行动，如假冒为善者或阿谀奉承者所行的那样。然而，这种外在意愿来自自由，因为它来自一种渴望或爱，想要表现为别的东西，而不是他真实的样子，或来自对某种邪恶的爱，这爱是他内在意愿的一个延伸。但就像刚才（86节）说的，除邪恶之外，恶人不能出于自由照着理性做任何事。诚然，他能行善，但不是出于他的内在自由，也就是真正属于他的自由而行的。结果，这自由没有使他的外在自由成为良善。
89. Now because all willing springs from love, and all understanding from wisdom, it follows that the ability to will springs from Divine love and the ability to understand from Divine wisdom, thus both from the Lord, who is Divine love itself and Divine wisdom itself. It follows from this that to act in freedom in accordance with one's reason has no other origin.
Everyone acts in accordance with his reason because freedom, like love, cannot be separated from will. However, a person has in him an inner will and an outer will, and he can act in accordance with the outer will and not at the same time in accordance with the inner will. This is what a hypocrite or sycophant does. And yet the outer will is in freedom, because it springs from a love of appearing different from what one is, or from a love of some evil that one intends from a love belonging to the inner will. But as we said above, an evil person can in freedom in accordance with his reason do only evil, and is unable in freedom in accordance with his reason to do good. He may indeed do it, but not in an inner state of freedom, which is his real freedom, and this causes his outer freedom not to be good.
89. Now, since all our intending stems from love and all our discerning stems from wisdom, it follows that our ability to intend stems from divine love and our ability to discern stems from divine wisdom. This means that both come from the Lord, who is divine love itself and divine wisdom itself. Naturally, then, this is the only source of our acting freely and rationally. We all act [freely and] rationally because our freedom, like our love, is inseparable from our intentions.
However, we have more inward and more outward intentions, and we can act on the more outward ones and not at the same time on the more inward ones. This is what hypocrites and flatterers do. Their outer intentions are free because they come from a desire to appear other than they really are or because of a love for something evil, a love that is an extension of the love of their deeper intentions. But as already noted [86], evil people cannot freely and rationally do anything but evil; they cannot freely and rationally do anything good. They can do good, but not from their inner freedom, the freedom that is really theirs. The result is that there is nothing good about their outer freedom.
89. Now because all willing is from love and all understanding is from wisdom, it follows that the power to will is from the Divine Love, and the power to understand is from the Divine Wisdom; and thus that both are from the Lord who is the Divine Love itself and the Divine Wisdom itself. Hence it follows that to act from freedom according to reason is from no other source. Everyone acts according to reason because freedom, like love, is inseparable from willing; but in man there is an interior and an exterior willing; and he can act according to the exterior and not at the same time according to the interior, as the hypocrite and the flatterer do; and yet such exterior willing is from freedom, because it is from the love of appearing to be other than what one really is, or it is from the love of some evil to which one is inclined from some love of his interior will. But as has been said above, a wicked man cannot from freedom according to his reason do anything except what is evil; moreover, he cannot from freedom according to reason do good. He can indeed do it, but not from that interior freedom which is his own, the freedom to which his exterior freedom owes the fact that it is not good.
89. Since, then, all willing is from love and all understanding is from wisdom, it follows that the power to will is from the Divine love, and the power to understand from the Divine wisdom, and thus both are from the Lord, who is Divine love itself and Divine wisdom itself; and from this it follows that to act from freedom in accordance with reason is from no other source. And as freedom, like love, is inseparable from willing, so all action is in accordance with reason. But there is in man an interior and an exterior willing; and he can act in accordance with the exterior and not at the same time in accordance with the interior, as the hypocrite or flatterer does; and yet such exterior willing is from freedom, since it is from a love of appearing to be something else from what one is, or it is from a love of some evil that one has in mind from a love of the interior will. And yet, as just said, an evil man is unable to do any thing from freedom in accordance with his reason except what is evil. From freedom in accordance with reason he has no ability to do good. He can do good, to be sure, but not from that interior freedom which is his own freedom, the freedom from which his exterior freedom takes its quality of not being good.
89. Nunc quia omne velle est ex amore, et omne intelligere est ex sapientia, sequitur quod posse velle sit ex Divino Amore, et posse intelligere sit ex Divina Sapientia, ita utrumque ex Domino, qui est Ipse Divinus Amor et Ipsa Divina Sapientia. Inde fluit, quod ex libero secundum rationem agere, non aliunde sit. Quisque agit secundum rationem, quia liberum sicut amor non potest separari a velle; sed apud hominem datur interius velle et exterius velle, et potest agere secundum exterius, et non simul secundum interius; ita agit hypocrita et assentator; et usque exterius velle est ex libero, quia ex amore apparendi aliter quam est, vel ex amore alicujus mali quod ex amore voluntatis interioris intendit; sed ut supra dictum est, malus non [aliud] potest ex libero secundum rationem suam agere quam malum, non autem potest ex libero secundum rationem agere bonum; potest quidem hoc agere, sed non ex libero interiori, quod est ejus proprium liberum, ex quo trahit exterius liberum, quod non sit bonum.