3730. It was further shown that people do not know what an idea is, for when they were held in thought about an idea, [everything] vanished, so that nothing at all was seen. Therefore it was stated that people today do not know what an idea is. But I spoke about ideas, saying that in common discourse it is still a familiar expression to say "such and such is according to my idea," or "his idea is," meaning only everyday thought.
This all shows that people know nothing of inward qualities or of the inner person. Since they do not even know that thought is distinguished into ideas or composed of ideas, neither do they beyond that know what thought is, nor are they able to distinguish it from the will: in fact, they are hardly aware that they have thought, because they do not reflect on the inward person. Consequently, they can have no other conception than a most general one of the fact that they think, even though they think differently than they speak and act - from which they may know this.
Therefore it was said that an idea is a miniature thought, or a component of thought - perhaps this can be understood. This makes it clear that inward qualities are entirely conjoined to outer ones, so that people only tarry a while in their physical senses and in their body.
3730. It was further shown that men do not know what an idea is, for when they are held in thought respecting an idea, [all the ideas] vanished, so that there seemed to be nothing [left], but yet ideas are spoken of, as it is still common in familiar discourse to say, that "such a thing is according to my idea," and "[my] idea is so and so," by which nothing more is signified than thought in general. Hence now it appears that men know nothing concerning interior things, thus concerning the interior man, since they neither know that thought is distinguished into ideas, or composed of ideas, nor yet what thought is, nor can they distinguish it from will; yea, they scarcely know that they have thought, because they do not reflect upon the inner man. Hence they can have no other conception than a most general one, scarcely indeed that they think, although they think otherwise than they speak or than they act, and thence they might know it. Wherefore it was said that an idea is a less thought, that of which thought is composed; this perhaps may be understood. Hence also it appears that interior things are altogether conjoined with external, so that man lives only in the bodily senses and in the body, in which things they are.
3730. Porro ostensum, quod non sciant homines quid idea, nam cum tenebantur in cogitatione de idea, disparebant, sic ut nihil usquam videretur, quare loquutum quod homines hodie nesciant quid idea, sed loquutum de ideis, quod in familiari sermone usque sit, dicendo quod secundum meam ideam tale sit, et quod idea ejus talis, qua significatur solum cogitatio in communi: exinde constat nunc, quod homines nihil de interioribus sciant, sic de interno homine, cum ne [quidem] sciant quod cogitatio sit distincta in ideas, seu composita ex ideis, porro cum nec sciant quid cogitatio, et distinguere possint eam a voluntate: imo vix sciunt quod cogitationem habeant; quia non reflectunt super interiorem hominem; proinde quod non alium conceptum habere possint, quam communissimum, vix quod cogitent, tametsi aliud cogitant quam loquuntur, et quam agunt, et inde scire possint; quare dictum quod idea sit minor cogitatio, ex qua cogitatio composita, forte hoc potest intelligi: inde constat quoque, quod interiora sint prorsus conjuncta externis, sic ut homo solum in sensibus corporis, et in corpore degat, in quibus sunt.