418.良善就是邻舍，因为良善属于意愿，而意愿是人生命的存在（实体）。理解力的真理若是从意愿的良善发出的，也是邻舍。因为意愿的良善在理解力中披上形式，在那里使自身在理性之光中显为可见。一切经验都能说明，良善就是邻舍。谁不是因为一个人意愿和理解力的品质，也就是他的善良和正直而爱这个人？例如，若不是因为国王、君王、将军、总督、执政官、地方长官、法官在言行中所展现的正义和判断力，谁会爱他们？若不是因为主教、教会牧师或教士的学识、生活的正直和对于拯救灵魂的热情，谁会爱他们？若不是因为将军，或他手下将领勇敢和谨慎兼备，谁会爱他们？爱商人是因为他的诚实，爱工人或仆人是因为他的忠诚。进一步说，爱树是因为它的果实；爱土地是因为它的生育力；爱宝石是因为它的价值等等。值得注意的是，不仅正直的人爱别人里面的善良与公正，不正直的人也是如此。因为他知道，与正直的人打交道无需担心丧失名声、地位或财富。然而，不正直的人对良善的热爱并非对邻之爱，因为不正直的人内心不爱别人，除非能为他服务。出于自己里面的良善而爱别人里面的良善才是真正的对邻之爱；因为这时，这两种善会彼此亲吻、相互结合。
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418. 良善為何是鄰舍？因為良善屬於意志, 而意志是一個人生命的根本。從意志中的良善發出的真理因而也是鄰舍。因為意志之中的良善成形於認知之中, 在那裡使自己在理性之光中成為可見。
一切的經歷可用來表明, 良善就是鄰舍。我們愛一個人, 是基於此人意志與認知的性質如何, 也就是裡面的善與義。例如, 我們愛君王,王子,將軍,行政官,執政官,地方長官,法官, 是因為他們言語與行為中展現的正義與公平。我們愛教會領袖,執事和他們的同工是因為他們的知識,生活的正直,拯救靈魂的熱情。我們愛軍隊元帥和手下將領, 是因為他們的剛毅與謹慎。我們愛商人, 是因為他們的誠實。我們愛工人與僕人, 是因為他們的忠誠。延伸來說, 我們愛樹, 因為它結的果; 愛土地, 因為它的肥沃; 愛石頭, 因為它的價值; 等等。
奇怪的是, 不僅正直之人愛別人裡面的善與義, 不正直的人也是如此, 因為他知道, 在與正直之人交往時, 無需擔心喪失他的名譽,地位和財富。然而, 不正直之人對良善的熱愛並非愛鄰舍之愛——不正直之人內心裡不會愛自己以外的任何其他人, 除非其他人以某種方式為他服務。
出於自己裡面的良善而對他人裡面良善的愛, 是真正對鄰舍的愛。在此情形下, 兩種良善彼此擁抱, 成為親密夥伴。
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418. The reason goodness is our neighbor is that goodness belongs to our will and the will is the underlying reality of our life. Truth is our neighbor, too, but only to the extent that it emanates from something good in our will. Goodness that belongs to the will takes shape in our intellect and visibly presents itself there in the light of reason.
All our experience shows that goodness is our neighbor. We love people for the quality of their will and intellect, that is, the goodness and justness in them. For example, we love monarchs, princes, generals, officials, consuls, civic leaders, and judges for the judgment they show in their words and actions. We love church leaders, ministers, and their assistants for their knowledge, integrity of life, and passion for the well-being of souls. We love army generals and commanders under them for their fortitude and prudence. We love retailers for their honesty. We love workers and servants for their faithfulness. For that matter, we love a given species of tree for its fruit; the soil for its level of fertility; a stone for its preciousness; and so on.
Strange as it may seem, it is not just honest people who love goodness and justness in others. Dishonest people do too, because they do not fear losing reputation, respect, or wealth at the hands of honest people. The love that dishonest people have for goodness is not love for their neighbor, however - dishonest people do not inwardly love any others outside themselves unless those others serve them somehow.
Loving goodness in another person from goodness in ourselves is genuine love for our neighbor. In that situation the two goodnesses embrace and form a partnership.
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418. The reason why good is the neighbour is that good belongs to the will, and the will is the being (esse) of a person's life. The truth in the understanding is also the neighbour, but only so far as it is the product of good in the will. For good in the will takes on form in the understanding and there makes itself visible in the light of reason. All experience goes to show that good is the neighbour. Does anyone love a person except for what his will and understanding are like, that is, for the goodness and righteousness in him? For example, does anyone love a king, a prince, a duke, a provost or governor or magistrate of any rank, or any kind of judge, except for the [righteousness and] 1 judgment they display in speech or action? Does anyone love a bishop or any church minister or a person in holy orders, except for his learning, uprightness of life and zeal for saving souls? Does anyone love the general of an army, or any of the officers under his command, except for a combination of bravery and prudence? Does anyone love a trader except for his honesty? Or a workman or servant except for his faithfulness? To go further, does anyone love a tree except for its fruit, a piece of ground except for its fertility, a stone except for its value, and so on? The extraordinary thing is that not only does an upright man love goodness and fairness in another, but so does a dishonest man, because he knows that in dealing with him he need have no fear of losing his reputation, rank or wealth. But the dishonest man's love of good is not love of the neighbour, for the dishonest man does not inwardly love any other, except in so far as they serve his purposes. Loving the good in another out of the goodness in oneself is the real love for the neighbour; then the goodness in each kisses the other and establishes a mutual bond.
Footnotes:
1. It would appear that the text is incomplete at this point.
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418. Good is the neighbor, because good belongs to the will, and the will is the being [esse] of man's life. The truth of the understanding is also the neighbor, but only so far as it proceeds from the good of the will; for the good of the will take form in the understanding, and makes itself visible there is the light of reason. That good is the neighbor is evident from all experience. Who loves a person except from the quality of his will and understanding, that is, from what is good and just in him? For example, who loves a king, a prince, a general, a governor, a consul, any magistrate or judge, except for the judgment from which they act and speak? Who loves a primate, a minister of the church, or a canon, except for his learning, his integrity of life, and his zeal for the salvation of souls? Who loves the general of an army or any officer over him, except for bravery combined with prudence? Who loves a merchant except for his honesty? Who loves a workman or a servant, except for his fidelity? Nay, who loves a tree except for its fruit, the soil except for its fertility, a precious stone except for its value? and so on. And what is remarkable, it is not only the upright man who loves what is good and just in another, the man who is not upright does so also, because with him he is in no fear of losing reputation, honor, or wealth. But the love of good in one who is not upright, is not love of the neighbor; for he loves another interiorly only so far as he is of service to him. But loving what is good in another from the good in oneself is genuine love to the neighbor; for the goods then kiss and mutually unite with each other.
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418. Good is the neighbor because good is of the will, and the will is the being of a man's life. Truth in the understanding is also the neighbor, but only so far as it proceeds from good in the will; since the good of the will takes form in the understanding, and there renders itself visible in the light of reason. Common experience shows that good is the neighbor; for a person is loved according to the quality of his will and understanding, that is, according to what is good and upright in him. A king, prince, general, praetor, consul, magistrate, or judge, of whatever rank, is loved only for the wisdom of his respective actions and speech; a prelate, minister, or canon of the Church for his learning, for the integrity of his life, and his zeal for the salvation of souls; the general of an army, or any officer under him, for his courage and skill; a merchant for his honesty; a workman, or a servant for his fidelity; nay, a tree for its fruit, soil for its fertility, a stone for its precious character, and so on.
It is remarkable that not only does the upright man love what is good and just in another, but so also does the unprincipled man; for in his dealings with a good and just person he is in no fear of losing his reputation, his honor or his wealth. With an unprincipled man, however, the love of good is not the love of the neighbor, for he does not love another interiorly, but only so far as he can make use of him. Genuine love towards the neighbor is to love the good in another from the good in oneself, for then these are united in mutual affection.
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418. Quod Bonum sit Proximus, est quia Bonum est voluntatis, ac Voluntas est Esse vitae hominis; Verum Intellectus etiam est proximus, sed quantum id procedit a bono voluntatis, nam bonum voluntatis format se in intellectu, et ibi se sistit videndum in luce rationis. Quod bonum sit proximus, constat ex omni experientia; quis amat personam nisi ex qualitate voluntatis et intellectus ejus, hoc est, ex 1 bono et justo in illa; ut pro exemplo, 2 Quis amat Regem, Principem, Ducem, Praetorem, Consulem, ullam Magistratus personam, et ullum Judicem, nisi ex Judicio, ex quibus agunt et loquuntur; quis amat Primatem, aliquem Ministrum Ecclesiae, aut Canonicum, nisi ex eruditione, integritate vitae, et zelo pro animarum salute: quis amat Ducem exercitus ac aliquem Praefectum sub illo, nisi ex fortitudine et simul prudentia: quis amat Mercatorem nisi ex sinceritate: quis amat operarium et famulum nisi ex fidelitate: imo quis amat arborem nisi ex fructu, humum nisi ex fertilitate, lapidem nisi 3 ex pretiositate, et sic porro. Et, quod mirum est, non modo probus amat bonum et justum in altero, sed etiam improbus, quia cum illo non est in ullo timore jacturae famae, honoris et opum; sed amor boni apud improbum, non est Amor proximi, nam improbus non alium interius amat, nisi quantum sibi inservit. Ast amare bonum in altero ex bono in se, est genuinus amor erga proximum, tunc enim Bona osculantur se mutuo et se conjungunt.
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