789# 启13:4.“他们都拜那龙，它把权柄给了兽”表示对唯信得救和称义的承认，唯信得救和称义通过这些设计的结合方式被确立或强化和证实，从而在教义上被接受。这从“拜”、“龙”和“兽的权柄”的含义清楚可知：“拜”是指承认并尊崇为神性，从而在给教会的教义上接受，因为那些承认神性并出于这种承认尊崇它的人就拜它，也在给教会的教义上接受它；“龙”是指那些在教义和生活上处于与仁分离之信，因而承认唯信得救和称义的人(对此，参看AE714节)；从龙所获得的“兽的权柄”是指通过设计的信仰与作为的结合方式而对该信条的确立或强化和证实(参看AE786节)。由此清楚可知，“他们都拜那龙，它把权柄给了兽”表示对唯信得救和称义的承认，唯信得救和称义被这些设计的结合方式确立或强化和证实，从而在教义上被接受。虽然我们说，唯信得救和称义通过设计将它与善行结合的方式被确立或强化和证实，但这句话必须这样来理解：这教义决不能通过任何方式被确认或强化和证实，因为这个信条由“龙”来表示，通过来自属世人的推理对它的确认或证实由这“兽”来代表；“龙及其兽”表示与圣言不一致，不能与它结合的东西。
为叫人清楚明白，它不能被结合，我要在此说明：唯信决不能产生任何良善；换句话说，从唯信中决不能产生任何好果子。人们以为，信就相信主为我们的罪遭受十字架的苦难，由此把我们从地狱中救赎出来，使人称义并得救的，主要是对这些事的信仰。此外，人们还以为，信就相信神是三位一体，相信圣言教导的那些事，相信永生和最后审判之日的复活，以及教会所教导的其它事。由于他们将信仰与仁爱的生活，也就是与行善分离，所以如今绝大多数人以为，知道这些事，思想并谈论它们就是得救之信；因此，他们不注意去意愿和实行它们；他们甚至不知道他们当意愿和实行什么。教会也不教导这一切，因为教会的教义是唯信的教义，不是生活的教义。他们将生活的教义称为道德神学，而他们轻视道德神学，因为他们认为，道德生活的美德本身虽是善行，但对得救毫无贡献。
然而，知道、思想并谈论上述这些事并不是信，它们即便被称为信，仍不会像树结出果实那样产生良善，这一点可从以下事实明显看出来：
(1)人将他所知道、思想并谈论的一切，只要他理解，都称为真理；将他所意愿并实行的一切，只要他喜欢，都称为良善；因此，真理属于人的信，良善属于他的爱。由此清楚可知，属于信的真理不同于属于爱的良善，或说信之真理不同于爱之良善，就像知道和思想不同于意愿和实行一样。从以下事实可知它们是不同的，并且何等不同：人有可能知道、思想、谈论，甚至理解他因不喜欢而不意愿和实行的许多事；而另一方面，凡人出于爱意愿和实行的，他都出于信去思想和谈论，即便没有在世人面前如此行，在独自一人，只剩下他自己时也会如此行。由此可推知：
(2)人的爱和意愿进入其信和思维的一切，而信和思维却不能进入其爱和意愿。因为人所爱的，他也喜欢去实行、知道、思想、谈论和理解，从而喜欢去信。同样，如果用意愿来取代爱，那么人所意愿的，他也愿意去实行、知道、思想、谈论和理解，从而愿意去信。论及爱的话同样可以论及意愿，因为爱属于意愿，意愿是爱的容器。由此可推知，爱产生信，就像意愿产生思维一样。由于信和思维一样被产生，而爱和意愿一样去产生，所以可知，说信产生爱是一种颠倒。由此明显可知，相信信产生被称为善行的良善，就像树结出果实一样，就是相信违反秩序的东西。
(3)在此论到信和爱的话，也适用于真理和良善，因为真理属于信，信属于真理；事实上，人所相信的，他称之为真理。良善也属于爱，爱属于良善；因为人所爱的，他称之为良善。严格来说，就本身而言，真理只是形式上的良善；因为良善的确能以诸如被感觉到的方式来呈现自己，但却无法被看见，除非以某种形式。它呈现自己，以至于在思维上，因而在理解力和感知上被看见所处的形式被称为真理。由此可推知，爱产生信，就像良善产生真理一样；因此，信不像树结出果实那样产生爱之良善。
(4)此外，知道，并由此思想和谈论来自记忆；而出于爱意愿和实行来自生命。人能从记忆思想和谈论很多不是来自他生活(这生活就是爱)的事；每个伪君子和奉承者都是这样。然而，当独自一人时，他不会出于不来自他爱的生命或生活思想和谈论任何东西，因为爱就是每个人的生活，爱怎样，生活就怎样；而记忆只是一个仓库，生活从中拣选它所思想和谈论的东西，凡服务于生活的，都会滋养它。因此，说信就像树结出果实那样产生良善，就是说人的思维和言语产生他的生活，他的生活不产生他的思维和言语；然而，恶人，即便非常坏的人，也能出于记忆思想和谈论真理，而只有善人才能出于生活如此行。
(5)唯信，或与行为上的良善，也就是善行分离之信是不可能的，这一点从信的本质明显看出来：信的本质就是仁爱，仁爱就是对做属于信的那些事的情感。因此，无仁之信就像没有情感的思维；由于没有情感的思维不是思维，所以无仁之信不是信。因此，谈论无仁之信就是谈论没有情感的思维、没有灵魂的生命、没有存在的显现、没有形成之物的形式、没有产生之物的产物和没有原因的结果。因此，唯信是非实体；从非实体中产生行为上的良善，也就是善行，就像一棵好树结出果实一样，是一个自相矛盾的说法，由此被相信成为某种事物的东西不是任何东西。
(6)由于无仁之信是不可能的；然而，对一个事物看上去就像是信，也被称为信的思维和说服是可能的，但它不是得救之信，只是历史的信，因为它是从别人的口中发出的。事实上，一个人若从他认为值得相信的另一个人那里相信某种东西，接受它，把它储存在记忆中，并出于记忆思想和谈论它，却看不到它是假的还是真的，就只是将它作为某种历史的东西来持有。然而，如果他通过来自圣言的表象和来自历史之信的推理而在自己里面确认它，那么对他来说，它就变成说服的信，而说服的信就像猫头鹰的视觉，在黑暗中看见物体，在光明中却什么也看不见。这种说服的信从对虚假的一切确认中存在。因为一切虚假都能被确认，直到它看似真理；被如此确认的虚假发出一种昏昧之光。由此也清楚看出，这种信不能产生善行。
(7)由于思维的信无非是历史的信或说服的信，所以可推知，它只是属世之信。事实上，属灵之信是从属灵之爱，也就是仁爱产生的，就像光是从太阳产生的一样；属灵之信并不产生属灵之爱，就像光不产生太阳一样。因此，纯属世之信从纯属世之爱中产生，而属世之爱从自我之爱获得其灵魂，而自我之爱的快乐是被称为玩乐、欲望或淫荡的肉体快乐，从这些涌出各种邪恶，从这些邪恶又涌出虚假。由此清楚可知，从这些发出的信不能像树结好果子那样产生良善，即便它产生某些良善，它们也是源于人之自我的良善，这些良善本身是邪恶，同时也是寻求功德的良善或说邀功的良善，寻求功德的良善是极不公正的。但属灵之信则不然，我们会在下文论述这信。
789. ( (Verse 4)) And they worshipped the dragon, which gave power unto the beast. By these words is signified the acknowledgment of salvation and justification by faith alone, strengthened and confirmed by those modes of conjunction that were devised, and thence received in doctrine. This is evident from the signification of worshipping, as denoting to acknowledge and worship as Divine, and thence to receive in the doctrine which is for the church. For those who acknowledge, and from such acknowledgment worship it as Divine, adore it, and also receive it in doctrine which is for the church. The same is evident from the signification of the dragon, as denoting those who are in faith separate from charity both in doctrine and in life, thus, such as acknowledge salvation and justification by faith alone (concerning which see above, n. 714); also from the signification of the power of the beast from the dragon, as denoting the strengthening and confirmation of that dogma by the devised conjunctions of faith with works (concerning which see above, n. 786). It is evident, therefore, that by the words "they worshipped the dragon who gave power to the beast," is signified the acknowledgment of salvation and justification by faith alone, strengthened and established by the devised modes of conjoining it with good works; and thence reception in doctrine.
It is said that the dogma concerning salvation and justification by faith alone is strengthened and confirmed by the devised modes of conjunction thereof with good works; but it must be understood that that doctrine cannot by any means be so strengthened and confirmed. For that dogma is meant by the dragon; and the confirmation of it by reasonings from the natural man is described by this beast; and by the dragon and his beast is signified such as are not in accordance with the Word, and cannot be conjoined with it.
[2] In order that it may be clear that it cannot possibly be conjoined, it shall here be shown that faith alone cannot produce any good; in other words, from faith alone good fruit cannot possibly be produced. It is supposed that faith consists in believing that the Lord suffered on the cross for our sins, and thereby redeemed us from hell; and that a faith in these things is what principally justifies and saves. And, besides this, it is supposed that faith consists in believing that God is triune; also in believing those things that are in the Word; in believing in eternal life, and a resurrection on the day of the Last Judgment, and the other things which the church teaches. Now because they separate faith from the life of charity, which is to do good works, most persons at this day suppose, that to know these things, to think and speak of them, is the faith which saves. They therefore pay no attention to willing them and doing them; nor do they even know that they ought to will and do them. Neither does the church teach this, because the doctrine of the church is a doctrine of faith alone, and not a doctrine of life. The doctrine of life they call moral theology, which they regard as of little account, because they believe that the virtues of a moral life, which in themselves are good works, contribute nothing to salvation.
[3] But that to know, think, and speak of the things above mentioned, is not faith, and, even although they are called faith, that still they do not produce goods, as a tree its fruits, is evident from the following:
1. Everything that a man knows, thinks, and speaks, so far as he understands it, he calls truths; and everything that he wills and does, so far as he loves it, he calls goods. Hence truths pertain to a man's faith, and goods to his love. From this it is evident that the truths of faith are distinct from the goods of love; just as knowing and thinking are from willing and doing.
That they are distinct, and how far they are so, can be known from this fact. It is possible for a man to know, think, speak, and even understand, many things that he neither wills nor does, because he does not love. On the other hand, whatever a man wills and does from love, this he also thinks and speaks of from faith, if not before the world, yet when he is by himself and left to himself. From this it follows:
[4] 2. That the love and will of man enter into everything pertaining to his faith and thought; but that faith and thought cannot enter into his love and will. For what a man loves, he also loves to do, know, think about, speak of, and understand, thus also to believe. Similarly if the will be assumed in the place of the love, what a man wills, he also wills to do, know, think about, speak of, and understand, thus also to believe. The reason why the same things are said of the will as of the love is, that the love is of the will, and the will is the receptacle of love. It follows, therefore, that love gives rise to faith, as the will to thought. And because faith, like thought, is produced, and love like the will produces, it follows that to say that faith produces love is an inversion. From these things it first becomes evident that to believe that faith produces goods, which are called good works, as a tree produces fruit, is contrary to order.
[5] 3. What is said here concerning faith and love, is also to be understood of truth and good, since truth pertains to faith and faith to truth; for what a man believes, he calls truth. Good also pertains to love and love to good; for what a man loves, he calls good. Truth, regarded strictly, is nothing else but good in form; for good may indeed present itself in such a way as to be felt, but not seen, except in some form. And the form in which it presents itself so as to be seen in the thought that is in the understanding and perception, is called truth. From these considerations also it follows, that love produces faith, as good produces truth; consequently that faith does not produce the good of love, as a tree does fruit.
[6] 4. Moreover, to know and thence to think and speak are from the memory; but to will and to do from love are from the life. Man can think and speak many things from the memory which are not from his life - which is love - as is the case with every hypocrite and flatterer. He cannot, however, when left to himself, think and speak anything from the life which is not from his love. For love is the life of every one; and according to the quality of the love such is the life; but the memory is only the storehouse, from which the life selects what it thinks and speaks, and what may serve it for nourishment. To say therefore that faith produces goods as a tree does fruit, is to say that a man's thought and speech produce his life, and not that the life produces these; when, yet, the wicked, even the very worst, can think and speak truths from the memory, but only the good can do so from the life.
[7] 5. That faith alone, or a faith separate from goods in act, which are good works, is not possible, is evident from the essence of faith, which is charity. Charity, moreover, is the affection for doing those things that pertain to faith. Therefore faith without charity is like thought without affection; and thought without affection is not thought; consequently faith without charity [is not faith]. To speak, therefore, of faith without charity is to speak of thought without affection, also of life without a soul, of manifestation (existere) without being (esse), of a form without that which forms, of a product without that which produces, and of an effect without a cause. Faith alone therefore is a nonentity; and from a nonentity to produce goods in act, which are good works, as a good tree does fruit, is a contradiction, from which what is believed to be something turns out to be nothing.
[8] 6. Because faith without charity is not possible, and yet the thought and persuasion that it is so seems to be faith, and is also called faith, but is not saving faith; it is merely an historical faith, because it proceeds from the mouth of another. For he who believes any thing from another whom he supposes worthy of credit, and so accepts it, stores it in his memory, and thence thinks and speaks of it, without seeing whether it be false or true, possesses it merely as something historical. If, however, he confirms it in himself, by appearances from the Word, and by reasonings, then from an historical faith it becomes a persuasive faith; and this is like the sight of an owl, which sees objects in darkness, and not in the light. Such a persuasive faith exists from every confirmation of what is false. For every falsity can be confirmed, until it appears to be like truth; and falsity when confirmed shines with a fatuous light (lumen).
From these things also it is clear that such a faith cannot produce good works.
[9] 7. Because the faith that is only thought is nothing but an historical or persuasive faith, it follows that it is merely natural. For spiritual faith is produced from spiritual love - which is charity - just as light is caused by the sun; it does not produce that love, just as the light does not produce the sun. A faith, therefore, merely natural is produced by a love merely natural, which derives its soul from the love of self; the delight of this love is a delight of the flesh, which is called pleasure, lust, and wantonness; from these flow evils of every kind, and from these evils, falsities. It is evident, therefore, that the faith proceeding therefrom cannot produce goods as a tree does good fruits. And even if it does produce any, they are goods from the man's proprium; and these in themselves are evils, and at the same time merit-seeking goods, which are in themselves iniquitous. It is different, however, with spiritual faith, of which we shall speak in the following article.
789. Verse 4. And they worshipped the dragon which gave authority unto the beast, signifies the acknowledgment of salvation and justification by faith alone, established and corroborated by these devised modes of conjunction, and thus received in doctrine. This is evident from the signification of "to worship," as being to acknowledge and revere as Divine, and thus to receive in doctrine that is for the church; for such as acknowledge the Divine and from such acknowledgment revere it, these worship it, and also receive it in doctrine which is for the church. Also from the signification of "the dragon," as being those who are in faith separated from charity in doctrine and in life, thus who acknowledge salvation and justification by faith alone (of which see above, n. 714). Also from the signification of "the authority of the beast" from the dragon, as being the establishment and corroboration of that dogma by devised conjunctions of faith with works (See above, n. 786). From this it is clear that "they worshipped the dragon which gave authority to the beast" signifies the acknowledgment of salvation and justification by faith alone, established and corroborated by devised modes of conjoining it with good works, and thus its reception in doctrine. It is said that the dogma of salvation and justification by faith alone is established and corroborated by devised modes of conjoining it with good works; but it must be understood that this doctrine can in no way be established and corroborated by such means, for this dogma is meant by "the dragon," and the confirmation of it by reasonings from the natural man is represented by this "beast;" and "the dragon and its beast" signify what is discordant with the Word and cannot be conjoined with it.
[2] To make clear that it cannot be conjoined, I will here show that faith alone can in no way produce any good, that is, that from faith alone no good fruit can come. It is supposed that faith is to believe that the Lord suffered the cross for our sins, and thereby redeemed us from hell, and that it is mainly a faith in this that justifies and saves. It is supposed, moreover, that faith is a believing that God is triune, a believing of what is taught in the Word, a believing in eternal life and in the resurrection on the day of the Last Judgment, and the other things that the church teaches. And as they separate faith from the life of charity, which is doing what is good, most persons at this day suppose that to know these things and to think and speak about them is the faith that saves; consequently they pay no attention to willing them and doing them; they do not even know what they ought to will and do. Nor does the church teach this, because the doctrine of the church is the doctrine of faith alone, and not the doctrine of life. The doctrine of life they call moral theology, which they make of little account, because they believe that the virtues of a moral life, which in themselves are good works, contribute nothing to salvation.
[3] But that knowing, thinking, and speaking about these things is not faith, and even if this be called faith it does not bring forth what is good, as a tree its fruits, can be seen from the following.
1. All things that a man knows, thinks about, and talks about so far as he understands them, he calls truths; and all things that he wills and does so far as he loves them, he calls goods; thus truths belong to man's faith, and truths 1to his love. From this it is clear that the truths, which pertain to faith, are distinct from the goods, which pertain to love, as knowing and thinking are distinct from willing and doing. That they are distinct, and how far they are distinct, man can know from this, that it is possible for a man to know, to think about, speak about, and even to understand, many things that he does not will and do because he does not love them; but on the other hand, whatever a man wills and does from love, that he thinks and speaks about from faith; if not before the world yet with himself when he is alone and left to himself.
[4] From this it follows, 2. that a man's love and will enter into all things of his faith and thought, but faith and thought cannot enter into his love and will. For that which a man loves he also loves to do, loves to know, loves to think about, loves to speak about, and loves to understand, and thus loves to have faith in. So if the will be taken in place of the love, that which a man wills he also wills to do, wills to know, wills to think about, wills to speak about, wills to understand, and thus wills to have faith in. Similar things may be said of the will as of the love, for the reason that the love is of the will, and the will is the receptacle of the love. From this it now follows that love produces faith as the will produces thought. And as faith, like thought, is produced, and love, like the will, produces, it follows that it is a perversion to say that faith produces love. From this it is now first evident that to believe that faith produces goods, which are called good works, as a tree produces fruits, is to believe what is contrary to order.
3.
[5] Similar things as have been said of faith and love are to be understood also of truth and good, for truth pertains to faith and faith to truth, since that which a man believes he calls truth; also good pertains to love and love to good, since that which a man loves be calls good. Truth regarded in itself is nothing but good in form; for while good may be made evident to the feeling it cannot be made evident to the sight except in some form; and the form in which it is made evident to the sight in the thought, and thus in the understanding and perception, is called truth. From this, too, it follows that love produces faith as good produces truth; consequently that faith does not produce the good of love as a tree does fruit.
4.
[6] Again, knowing and thinking and speaking therefrom are from the memory; but willing and doing from love are from the life. Man can think and speak about many things from the memory that are not from his life, which is love; this every hypocrite and flatterer can do; but when he is left to himself he cannot think and speak anything from the life that is not from his love, for love is the life of everyone, and such as the love is, such is the life. But the memory is only a storehouse, from which the life selects what it may think and speak, and what serves the life that it may be nourished by it. To say, therefore, that faith produces goods as a tree does fruits is to say that a man's thought and speech produce his life, and that his life does not produce his thought and speech; and yet the evil, even the very worst, can think and speak truths from the memory, while only the good can do so from the life.
5.
[7] That faith alone, or faith separated from goods in act, which are good works, is not possible, is evident from this, that the essence of faith is charity, and charity is the affection of doing the things that belong to faith; consequently faith without charity is like thought without affection; and as thought without affection is no thought, so faith without charity is no faith. Therefore to speak of faith without charity is to speak of thought without affection, of life without a soul, of existere without esse, of form without that which forms, of a product without that which produces, and of an effect without a cause; and for this reason faith alone is a nonentity; and from a nonentity to produce goods in act, which are good works, as a good tree produces fruits, is a contradiction, whereby what is believed to be something is not anything.
6.
[8] Because faith without charity is not possible; and yet the thought and persuasion that a thing is so appears as if it were faith, and is called faith; but it is not saving faith, it is historical faith, because it is from the mouth of another. For one who believes anything from another whom he thinks worthy of belief, and who receives this, stores it in his memory, and from the memory thinks and speaks about it without seeing whether it be false or true, has no other hold upon it than as something historical. But if he confirms this in himself by appearances from the Word and by reasonings, from historical faith it becomes to him persuasive faith, which faith is like the sight of an owl, which sees objects in darkness and nothing in the light. Such persuasive faith exists from every confirmation of what is false. For every falsity can be confirmed until it seems to be a truth; and a falsity so confirmed shines with a fatuous lumen. From this also it is clear that such a faith cannot produce what is good.
7.
[9] As faith of thought is nothing but historical faith or persuasive faith, it follows that it is merely natural faith. For spiritual faith is produced from spiritual love, which is charity, just as light is produced from the sun; and it does not produce that love, as light does not produce the sun. Therefore merely natural faith is produced from merely natural love, which derives its soul from the love of self, and the delight of that love is a delight of the flesh, which is called pleasure, lust, or lewdness, from which evils of every kind gush forth, and from evils falsities. Thence it is clear that faith proceeding from these cannot produce goods as a tree does good fruits, and if it produces any goods they are goods from what is man's own [proprium] which are in themselves evils, and at the same time are meritorious goods which are in themselves iniquitous. But it is otherwise with spiritual faith, which shall be treated of in the following article.
Footnotes:
1. The photolithograph has truths for goods.
789 [Vers. 4.] "Et adoraverunt draconem, qui dedit potestatem bestiae." Quod significat agnitionem salvationis et justificationis per solam fidem firmatam et corroboratam per inventos illos conjunctionis modos, et inde receptam in doctrina, constat ex significatione "adorare", quod sit agnoscere et colere sicut Divinum, et inde recipere in doctrina quae pro ecclesia nam qui Divinum agnoscunt et ex agnitione colunt illud, illi adorant, et quoque recipiunt [in] doctrina quae pro ecclesia: ex significatione "draconis", quod sint qui in fide separata a charitate sunt, doctrina et vita, ita qui agnoscunt salvationem et justificationem per solam fidem (de qua supra, n. 714): et ex significatione "potestatis bestiae ex dracone", quod sit firmatio et corroboratio illius dogmatis per inventas conjunctiones fidei cum operibus (de quibus supra, n. 786): inde constat quod per "Adoraverunt draconem, qui dedit potestatem bestiae", significetur agnitio salvationis et justificationis per solam fidem, firmata et corroborata per inventos modos conjungendi illam cum bonis operibus, et inde receptio in doctrina. Dicitur quod dogma de salvatione et justificatione per solam fidem firmatum et corroboratum sit per inventos modos conjunctionis ejus cum bonis operibus; sed intelligitur quod illud dogma nullatenus per illos firmatum et corroboratum sit, nam id per "draconem" intelligitur, et confirmatio ejus per ratiocinia ex naturali homine per hanc "bestiam" traditur, et per "draconem" et ejus "bestiam" significatur tale quod cum Verbo discordat, et non conjungi potest.
[2] Ut pateat quod non conjungi possit, velim hic ostendere quod sola fides nusquam possit aliquod bonum producere, seu quod ex sola fide aliquis bonus fructus dari. Putatur quod fides sit credere quod Dominus passus sit crucem pro nostris peccatis, et per id redemerit nos ab inferno, et quod horum fides imprimis justificet et salvet; et praeter illa, quod fides sit credere quod Deus triunus sit, credere illa quae in Verbo sunt, credere vitam aeternam, et resurrectionem die ultimi judicii, et cetera quae ecclesia docet: et quoniam separant fidem a vita charitatis, quae est bona facere, putant plerique hodie quod scire illa, cogitare illa, et loqui illa, sit fides quae salvat, ideo nihil attendunt ad velle illa et facere illa; immo nec sciunt quid debent velle et facere: haec nec docet ecclesia, quia doctrina ecclesiae est doctrina solius fidei, et non doctrina vitae; doctrinam vitae vocant theologiam moralem, quam vilipendunt, quia virtutes vitae moralis, quae in se sunt bona opera, credunt nihil ad salutem conferre.
[3] Quod autem scire, cogitare et loqui illa quae supra dicta sunt, non sit fides; et si vocantur fides quod usque non producant bona, sicut arbor fructus, constare potest ex his.
(1.) Homo omnia quae scit, cogitat et loquitur, quantum intelligit illa, vocat vera; et omnia quae vult et facit, quantum amat illa, vocat bona: inde vera sunt fidei hominis, et 1
bona sunt amoris ejus. Ex eo patet quod vera quae sunt fidei distincta sint a bonis quae sunt amoris, sicut scire et cogitare a velle et facere. Quod distincta sint, et in quantum, homo nosse potest ex eo, quod homo possit multa scire, cogitare et loqui, immo intelligere, quae non vult et facit, quia non amat: at vice versa, quod quicquid homo vult et facit ex amore, hoc cogitet et loquatur ex fide, si non coram mundo, usque apud se cum solus est et sibi relictus.
[4] Ex his sequitur,
(2.) Quod amor et voluntas hominis intrent in omnia fidei et cogitationis ejus, at quod fides et cogitatio non possint intrare in ejus amorem et voluntatem; homo enim quod amat, hoc quoque amat facere, amat scire, amat cogitare, amat loqui, et amat intelligere, ita quoque amat ejus fidem habere: similiter si loco amoris sumitur voluntas, homo quod vult, hoc quoque vult facere, vult scire, vult cogitare, vult loqui, vult intelligere, ita quoque vult ejus fidem habere. Causa quod simile dicatur de voluntate quod de amore, est quia amor est voluntatis, et voluntas est receptaculum amoris. Inde nunc sequitur quod amor producat fidem, sicut voluntas cogitationem. Quia fides sicut cogitatio producitur, et amor sicut voluntas producit, sequitur quod inversum sit dicere quod fides producat amorem. Ex his primum constare potest quod credere quod fides producat bona, quae vocantur bona opera, sicut arbor fructus, sit contra ordinem.
[5] (3.) Similia quae de fide et amore dicta sunt, etiam intelligenda sunt de vero et bono, nam verum est fidei et fides est veri, quod enim homo credit hoc verum vocat; ac bonum est amoris, et amor est boni, nam quod homo amat hoc bonum vocat. Verum in se spectatum non est nisi quam bonum in forma, bonum enim se quidem sistere potest sentiendum, sed non videndum nisi in aliqua forma; et forma in qua se sistit videndum in cogitatione, ita in intellectu et perceptione, vocatur verum. Ex his etiam sequitur quod amor producat fidem, sicut bonum producit verum; proinde quod non fides producat bonum amoris, sicut arbor fructum.
[6] (4.) Etiam scire et inde cogitare et loqui sunt ex memoria, at velle et facere ex amore sunt ex vita. Homo potest multa cogitare et loqui ex memoria, quae non sunt ex vita ejus, quae est amor; hoc potest omnis hypocrita et assentator; at nihil potest cogitare et loqui, cum sibi relictus est, ex vita, quod non sit ex amore ejus; amor enim est vita cujusvis, et qualis amor talis vita. At memoria est modo promptuarium, ex quo vita desumit quod cogitet et loquatur, et quae inservit vitae ut inde nutriatur. Quare dicere quod fides producat bona sicut arbor fructus, est dicere quod cogitatio et loquela hominis producat vitam ejus, et non vita illam; cum tamen mali, immo pessimi, possunt cogitare et loqui vera ex memoria, sed non nisi quam boni ex vita.
[7] (5.) Quod sola fides, seu fides separata a bonis actu, quae sunt bona opera, non sit dabilis, constare potest ex fidei essentia, quae est charitas; et charitas est affectio faciendi illa quae fidei sunt; quare fides absque charitate est sicut cogitatio absque affectione, et cogitatio absque affectione est nulla cogitatio, ita fides absque charitate: quare dicere fidem absque charitate est dicere cogitationem absque affectione, tum vitam absque anima, existere absque esse, formam absque formante, productum absque producente, et effectum absque causa; quare fides sola est non ens; et ex non ente producere bona actu, quae sunt bona opera, sicut bona arbor fructus, est contradictio, ex qua id quod creditur esse aliquid non est aliquid.
[8] (6.) Quia fides absque charitate non datur, et usque cogitatio et persuasio quod ita sit, apparet sicut sit fides, et quoque vocatur fides; sed non est fides salvifica, verum est fides historica, quia ex alterius ore est; qui enim aliquid credit ex alio, quem putat fide dignum esse, ac id recipit, in memoria recondit, et inde id cogitat et loquitur, nec videt num falsum sit aut verum, is possidet id non aliter quam sicut historicum; si autem id confirmat apud se, per apparentias ex Verbo, et per ratiocinia, fit ei ex fide historica fides persuasiva, quae fides est similis visui noctuae, quae objecta in tenebris videt, et nulla in luce. Talis fides persuasiva existit ex omni confirmatione falsi: omne enim falsum potest confirmari usque ut appareat sicut verum, et falsum confirmatum lucet lumine fatuo. Ex his quoque patet quod talis fides nec producere possit bona.
[9] (7.) Quia fides cogitativa non aliud est quam fides historica aut persuasiva, sequitur quod sit fides mere naturalis: fides enim spiritualis producitur ex amore spirituali qui est charitas, sicut lux ex sole; et non producit illum amorem, sicut non lux solem: quare fides mere naturalis producitur ex amore mere naturali, qui animam trahit ex amore sui, cujus amoris jucundum est jucundum carnis, quod vocatur volupe, cupidum [et] lascivum, ex quibus scaturiunt mala omnis generis, et ex malis falsa: inde constare potest quod fides ex illis procedens non bona possit producere, sicut arbor fructus bonos; et si aliqua producit, sunt bona ex proprio hominis, quae in se sunt mala, et simul bona meritoria, quae in se sunt iniqua. Aliter vero fides spiritualis, de qua in nunc sequente articulo.
Footnotes:
1. The editors made a correction or note here.