418# 善之所以是邻舍，是因为善属于意志，而意志是人生命的存在。理智中的真理也是邻舍，但只在它由意志之善而发出的限度内才是；因为意志之善在理智中形成自己，并在那里显现出来，在理性之光中被看见。
善就是邻舍，这一点由一切经验都可看明。谁爱一个人，不是由于他意志与理智的品质，也就是由于他里面的善与公正呢？例如，谁爱君王、贵胄、将帅、长官、执政官、任何行政官员或任何审判者，不是由于他们行事说话所凭的公义与判断吗？谁爱首席圣职者、某位教会圣职人员或教会法政人员，不是由于他们的学识、生活的正直，以及为灵魂得救所有的热忱吗？谁爱军队统帅，或其下属军官，不是由于其勇敢并且同时具有审慎吗？谁爱商人，不是由于他的诚实吗？谁爱工匠和仆人，不是由于他的忠信吗？甚至，谁爱树木，不是由于其果实？谁爱土地，不是由于其肥沃？谁爱石头，不是由于其宝贵？诸如此类。
并且，奇妙的是，不仅正直人爱他人里面的善与公正，连不正直的人也是如此；因为与这样的人相处，他并不惧怕丧失名声、尊荣和财富。然而，不正直者对于善的爱，并不是爱邻舍；因为不正直者在内心并不爱他人，除非此人在某种程度上服务于自己。
但从自己里面的善出发，去爱他人里面的善，这才是对邻舍真正的爱；因为这样，诸善便彼此亲吻，并彼此结合。
418# 良善就是邻舍，因为良善属于意愿，而意愿是人生命的存在（实体）。理解力的真理只要是从意愿的良善发出的，也是邻舍；因为意愿的良善在理解力中取得形式，在那里使自己在理性之光中变得可见。日常经验表明，良善是邻舍。因为一个人是照着其意愿和理解力的品质，也就是照着他的良善和正直而被爱的。例如，谁会爱一个国王、王子、将军、官员、领事、任何地方法官或法官，除非因其言行的智慧或判断力？谁会爱一个教会的领袖、牧师及其助手，除非因其学识或知识、生活的诚实正直和对灵魂救赎的热情？谁会爱一支军队的将领和他手下的指挥官，除非因其兼具勇敢和谨慎？谁会爱一个商人，除非因其诚实？谁会爱一个工人或仆人，除非因其忠诚？甚至一棵树因其果实而被爱，土壤因其丰产而被爱，宝石因其价值而被爱，等等。值得注意的是，不仅正直的人爱别人的良善和公义，不正直或没有原则的人也爱，因为与一个良善而公义的人打交道，他不用怕丧失名声、荣誉或财富。然而，对一个不正直或没有原则的人来说，对良善的爱不是对邻舍的爱；因为只有别人对他有用，他才从内在爱别人。但真正的对邻之爱是出于自己的良善而爱别人的良善，因为那时，这些良善彼此亲吻，并相互结合。
418. The reason goodness is our neighbor is that goodness belongs to our will and the will is the underlying reality of our life. Truth is our neighbor, too, but only to the extent that it emanates from something good in our will. Goodness that belongs to the will takes shape in our intellect and visibly presents itself there in the light of reason.
All our experience shows that goodness is our neighbor. We love people for the quality of their will and intellect, that is, the goodness and justness in them. For example, we love monarchs, princes, generals, officials, consuls, civic leaders, and judges for the judgment they show in their words and actions. We love church leaders, ministers, and their assistants for their knowledge, integrity of life, and passion for the well-being of souls. We love army generals and commanders under them for their fortitude and prudence. We love retailers for their honesty. We love workers and servants for their faithfulness. For that matter, we love a given species of tree for its fruit; the soil for its level of fertility; a stone for its preciousness; and so on.
Strange as it may seem, it is not just honest people who love goodness and justness in others. Dishonest people do too, because they do not fear losing reputation, respect, or wealth at the hands of honest people. The love that dishonest people have for goodness is not love for their neighbor, however - dishonest people do not inwardly love any others outside themselves unless those others serve them somehow.
Loving goodness in another person from goodness in ourselves is genuine love for our neighbor. In that situation the two goodnesses embrace and form a partnership.
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418. The reason why good is the neighbour is that good belongs to the will, and the will is the being (esse) of a person's life. The truth in the understanding is also the neighbour, but only so far as it is the product of good in the will. For good in the will takes on form in the understanding and there makes itself visible in the light of reason. All experience goes to show that good is the neighbour. Does anyone love a person except for what his will and understanding are like, that is, for the goodness and righteousness in him? For example, does anyone love a king, a prince, a duke, a provost or governor or magistrate of any rank, or any kind of judge, except for the [righteousness and] 1 judgment they display in speech or action? Does anyone love a bishop or any church minister or a person in holy orders, except for his learning, uprightness of life and zeal for saving souls? Does anyone love the general of an army, or any of the officers under his command, except for a combination of bravery and prudence? Does anyone love a trader except for his honesty? Or a workman or servant except for his faithfulness? To go further, does anyone love a tree except for its fruit, a piece of ground except for its fertility, a stone except for its value, and so on? The extraordinary thing is that not only does an upright man love goodness and fairness in another, but so does a dishonest man, because he knows that in dealing with him he need have no fear of losing his reputation, rank or wealth. But the dishonest man's love of good is not love of the neighbour, for the dishonest man does not inwardly love any other, except in so far as they serve his purposes. Loving the good in another out of the goodness in oneself is the real love for the neighbour; then the goodness in each kisses the other and establishes a mutual bond.
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1. It would appear that the text is incomplete at this point.
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418. Good is the neighbor, because good belongs to the will, and the will is the being [esse] of man's life. The truth of the understanding is also the neighbor, but only so far as it proceeds from the good of the will; for the good of the will take form in the understanding, and makes itself visible there is the light of reason. That good is the neighbor is evident from all experience. Who loves a person except from the quality of his will and understanding, that is, from what is good and just in him? For example, who loves a king, a prince, a general, a governor, a consul, any magistrate or judge, except for the judgment from which they act and speak? Who loves a primate, a minister of the church, or a canon, except for his learning, his integrity of life, and his zeal for the salvation of souls? Who loves the general of an army or any officer over him, except for bravery combined with prudence? Who loves a merchant except for his honesty? Who loves a workman or a servant, except for his fidelity? Nay, who loves a tree except for its fruit, the soil except for its fertility, a precious stone except for its value? and so on. And what is remarkable, it is not only the upright man who loves what is good and just in another, the man who is not upright does so also, because with him he is in no fear of losing reputation, honor, or wealth. But the love of good in one who is not upright, is not love of the neighbor; for he loves another interiorly only so far as he is of service to him. But loving what is good in another from the good in oneself is genuine love to the neighbor; for the goods then kiss and mutually unite with each other.
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418. Good is the neighbor because good is of the will, and the will is the being of a man's life. Truth in the understanding is also the neighbor, but only so far as it proceeds from good in the will; since the good of the will takes form in the understanding, and there renders itself visible in the light of reason. Common experience shows that good is the neighbor; for a person is loved according to the quality of his will and understanding, that is, according to what is good and upright in him. A king, prince, general, praetor, consul, magistrate, or judge, of whatever rank, is loved only for the wisdom of his respective actions and speech; a prelate, minister, or canon of the Church for his learning, for the integrity of his life, and his zeal for the salvation of souls; the general of an army, or any officer under him, for his courage and skill; a merchant for his honesty; a workman, or a servant for his fidelity; nay, a tree for its fruit, soil for its fertility, a stone for its precious character, and so on.
It is remarkable that not only does the upright man love what is good and just in another, but so also does the unprincipled man; for in his dealings with a good and just person he is in no fear of losing his reputation, his honor or his wealth. With an unprincipled man, however, the love of good is not the love of the neighbor, for he does not love another interiorly, but only so far as he can make use of him. Genuine love towards the neighbor is to love the good in another from the good in oneself, for then these are united in mutual affection.
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418. Quod Bonum sit Proximus, est quia Bonum est voluntatis, ac Voluntas est Esse vitae hominis; Verum Intellectus etiam est proximus, sed quantum id procedit a bono voluntatis, nam bonum voluntatis format se in intellectu, et ibi se sistit videndum in luce rationis. Quod bonum sit proximus, constat ex omni experientia; quis amat personam nisi ex qualitate voluntatis et intellectus ejus, hoc est, ex 1 bono et justo in illa; ut pro exemplo, 2 Quis amat Regem, Principem, Ducem, Praetorem, Consulem, ullam Magistratus personam, et ullum Judicem, nisi ex Judicio, ex quibus agunt et loquuntur; quis amat Primatem, aliquem Ministrum Ecclesiae, aut Canonicum, nisi ex eruditione, integritate vitae, et zelo pro animarum salute: quis amat Ducem exercitus ac aliquem Praefectum sub illo, nisi ex fortitudine et simul prudentia: quis amat Mercatorem nisi ex sinceritate: quis amat operarium et famulum nisi ex fidelitate: imo quis amat arborem nisi ex fructu, humum nisi ex fertilitate, lapidem nisi 3 ex pretiositate, et sic porro. Et, quod mirum est, non modo probus amat bonum et justum in altero, sed etiam improbus, quia cum illo non est in ullo timore jacturae famae, honoris et opum; sed amor boni apud improbum, non est Amor proximi, nam improbus non alium interius amat, nisi quantum sibi inservit. Ast amare bonum in altero ex bono in se, est genuinus amor erga proximum, tunc enim Bona osculantur se mutuo et se conjungunt.
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