3158、“就告诉我；若不然，也告诉我”表示他们自由考虑的状态，这从这些话本身清楚可知。至此的整个讨论清楚表明，本章的字义论述了利百加和以撒订婚和结婚，内义则论述了真理被引入良善并与其结合，因为真理被引入良善并与其结合是属灵的订婚和属灵的结婚。在这两个层面，自由考虑的状态都是有必要的。人们都知道，订婚和结婚需要自由考虑；但人们却不十分清楚，真理被引入良善并与其结合也需要自由考虑。这是因为属世人看不见这个过程，并且这种引入和结合是那种无需人的反思就实现的事之一。然而，当人正在被改造和重生时，这种活动每时每刻都在他里面进行；也就是说，当真理正在与良善结合时，他享有一种自由的状态。
只要仔细想想，谁都能知道，任何事物都不会作为一个人自己的东西存在，除非它形成他的意愿部分。只属于理解力的东西不会变成人自己的，直到它也变成他意愿的一部分，因为属于意愿的东西构成一个人生命的本质存在，而属于理解力的东西则构成那本质存在的显现或实存。只来自理解力的同意不是同意，相反，一切同意都来自意愿。因此，除非属于理解力的信之真理被属于意愿的爱之良善接受，否则它决不是被承认的真理，因而决不是信。为使真理可以被属于意愿的良善接受，自由状态的存在是有必要的。意愿所参与的一切看上去都是自由的；意愿的状态本身就是自由；事实上，我所意愿的，我会选择并渴望，因为我爱它，承认它是良善。由此可见，信之真理决不会变成人自己的，直到它被意愿接受，也就是被引入那里的良善并与其结合；这一切只有在自由的状态下才能发生。
Potts(1905-1910) 3158
3158. Tell me; and if not, tell me. That this signifies their free state of deliberation, is evident from the sense of the words. From all that precedes it is evident that the words which in the sense of the letter in this chapter treat of the betrothal and marriage of Rebekah with Isaac, in the internal sense treat of the initiation and conjunction of good and truth; for the initiation and conjunction of good and truth are spiritual betrothal and spiritual marriage. In each there is required a free state of deliberation. That this is necessary in betrothal and marriage, is well known; but that it is required in the initiation and conjunction of good and truth, is not so well known, because it is not apparent to the natural man, and because such initiation and conjunction are among the things that are accomplished without man's reflecting upon them; nevertheless during every moment when man is being reformed and regenerated, it comes to pass that he is in a state of freedom when truth is being conjoined with good. [2] Everyone may know, if he only considers, that nothing is ever man's, as his, unless it is of his will; what is only of the understanding does not become man's until it becomes of the will also; for what is of the will constitutes the being [esse] of a man's life; but what is of the understanding constitutes the coming forth [existere] of his life thence derived. Consent from the understanding alone is not consent, but all consent is from the will; wherefore unless the truth of faith which is of the understanding is received by the good of love which is of the will, it is not at all truth which is acknowledged, and thus it is not faith. But in order that truth may be received by the good which is of the will, it is necessary that there be a free state. All that is of the will appears free; the very state of willing is liberty; for that which I will, that I choose, that I long for, because I love it and acknowledge it as good. All this shows that truth, which is of faith, never becomes man's as his until it has been received by the will, that is, until it has been initiated and conjoined with the good there; and that this cannot be effected except in a free state.
Elliott(1983-1999) 3158
3158. 'Tell me; and if not, tell me' means a state in which they are free to deliberate. This is evident from the sense of the words themselves. From all that has gone before it is clear that while the sense of the letter in this chapter is dealing with the betrothal and marriage of Rebekah to Isaac, the internal sense is dealing with the introduction and joining together of truth and good, for the introduction and joining together of truth and good is spiritual betrothal and spiritual marriage. In both instances a free state to deliberate is necessary. The necessity for it in betrothal and marriage is well known, but the necessity for it in the introduction and joining together of truth and good is not so well known because it is not visible to the natural man and belongs among the things that go on quite apart from any reflecting on them. Yet this activity continues moment by moment in one who is being reformed and regenerated, that is to say, he experiences a free state when truth is being joined to good.
[2] Everyone may know, if he merely stops to think, that nothing ever exists as a person's own unless it forms part of his will. That which belongs solely to the understanding does not become a person's own until it belongs also to his will, for what belongs to the will constitutes the essential being (esse) of a person's life, whereas what belongs to the understanding constitutes the manifestation (existere) of that essential being. Consent flowing from the understanding alone is not consent, but all consent springs from the will. Unless therefore the truth of faith which belongs to the understanding is received by the good of love which belongs to the will it is in no sense truth that has been acknowledged, and so is not faith. In order that it may be received by good that belongs to the will it is necessary that a free state should exist. Everything that belongs in the will looks to be free. The state itself of the will is freedom, for what I will, I choose and desire since that is what I love and acknowledge as that which is good. From this it becomes clear that the truth of faith in no sense becomes a person's own until it has been accepted by the will, that is, introduced and joined to the good there, which cannot happen except in a free state.
Latin(1748-1756) 3158
3158. `Indicate mihi, et si non, indicate mihi': quod significet deliberationis eorum statum liberum, patet ex sensu verborum. Ex omnibus quae praecedunt, constat quod quae in sensu litterae in hoc capite agunt de desponsatione et conjugio Rebeccae cum Jishako, in sensu interno agant de initiatione et conjunctione (t)boni et veri, est enim initiatio et conjunctio veri et boni spiritualis desponsatio et spirituale conjugium: utrobivis requiritur deliberationis status liber; quod in desponsatione et conjugio, notum est, at quod in initiatione et conjunctione boni et veri, non ita notum est, quia non ad naturalem hominem apparet et quia inter illa sunt quae fiunt absque quod homo reflectat, usque tamen unoquovis momento existit, cum homo reformatur et regeneratur, nempe quod in statu libero sit, cum verum conjungitur bono. [2] Unusquisque scire potest, si modo expendat, quod nusquam aliquid sit hominis, ut ipsius, nisi sit ejus voluntatis; quod solum est intellectus, non fit hominis priusquam etiam fit ejus voluntatis, nam quae voluntatis sunt, constituunt hominis esse vitae, quae autem intellectus, constituunt ejus existere vitae inde; consensus ex solo intellectu non est consensus, sed omnis consensus est ex voluntate; quapropter nisi verum fidei quod est intellectus, recipiatur a bono amoris quod est voluntatis, nusquam est verum quod agnitum, ita non est fides; ut vero recipiatur a bono quod voluntatis, necessum est ut sit status liber; omne quod voluntatis est, hoc apparet liberum, ipse status voluntatis est libertas, nam quod volo, hoc eligo, hoc desidero, quia hoc amo et agnosco ut bonum; inde constare potest quod verum quod fidei, nusquam fiat hominis ut ipsius priusquam receptum est a voluntate, hoc est, initiatum et conjunctum bono ibi, et quod id non fieri possit nisi in statu libero.