3849.“拉班又将他的婢女辟拉给女儿拉结，给她作婢女”表作为服务纽带或手段的外层情感。这从前面所述（3835节）清楚可知。之所以拉结的婢女“辟拉”表示外层情感，而利亚的婢女“悉帕”表示外在情感，是因为“拉结”代表对内在真理的情感，而“利亚”代表对外在真理的情感。外层情感是服务内在情感的属世情感。这些外层情感是服务于真理与良善结合的手段，其原因在于，若不藉着情感，教义事物，甚至记忆知识的事物根本无法进入到任何人里面。因为情感含有生命在里面，而属于教义与记忆知识的真理若没有这些情感，就没有生命在里面。很明显，这就是真相；因为没有情感，人甚至无法思考，事实上一个也说不出来。人若思考这个问题，就会发现，没有情感的声音就像机器人的声音，因而只不过是毫无生命的声音；当当它有了情感时，这情感的质和量就决定了它里面生命的质和量。这表明真理若没有良善会是什么样，并且存在于真理中的情感源自良善。
人若思考这个问题，还能从以下事实意识到这一点，即：认知若没有意愿在其中，就不是认知，因为认知的生命来自意愿。这再次表明真理若没有良善会是什么样，即：它们根本就不是真理，并且良善是它们获取生命的源头；因为真理属于心智的认知部分，而良善属于意愿部分。谁都能由此判断出，本为真理的信若没有本为良善的仁会是什么样；并且没有仁之善的信之真是死的；因为如前所述，真理里面情感的质和量决定了它们里面生命的质和量。但是，甚至当仁之善不存在时，真理似乎仍拥有生命。可这种表象出于自我之爱和尘世之爱的情感，而这些情感除了在属灵意义上被称为死亡的生命，也就是地狱的生命外，并没有任何生命。所用的词是情感，情感是指某种爱的延伸。
由此可见，情感是服务于真理与良善结合的手段；而且情感就是那引入真理，并将它们整理成序的。对主之爱和对邻之仁所具有的纯正情感将它们引入天堂的秩序；而自我之爱和尘世之爱所具有的邪恶情感则将它们引入地狱的秩序，也就是天堂秩序的对立面。
最外在的情感就是肉体的情感，被称作情欲和快感。接下来的内层情感是低层心智或属世心智的情感，被称作属世情感。而内在情感是理性心智的情感，被称作属灵情感。真理通过外层和最外在的情感，也就是属世和肉体情感被引入后者，即高层心智的属灵情感。因此，这些情感是服务的手段，由拉班给拉结和利亚的婢女来表示。当她们被称为拉班的婢女时，意思是，这些情感源于拉班所代表的良善，这种良善在前面已描述过。因为先学到的真理一开始无法通过任何其它情感被注入。随着时间推移，纯正的情感会到来，不过，必须等到人出于良善行事之后。
Potts(1905-1910) 3849
3849. And Laban gave to Rachel his daughter Bilhah his handmaid to be to her for a handmaid. That this signifies the exterior affections, which are the bonds or subservient means, is evident from what was said above (n. 3835). The reason why by "Bilhah" the handmaid of Rachel are signified exterior affections; and by "Zilpah" the handmaid of Leah, external affections, is that by Rachel is represented the affection of internal truth, and by Leah the affection of external truth. Exterior affections are natural affections which are subservient to internal ones. The reason why these exterior affections are means serviceable to the conjunction of truth with good, is that nothing which is of doctrine, and indeed nothing which is of memory-knowledge, can enter into man, save by means of affections; for in affections there is life, but not in the truths of doctrine and of memory-knowledge without affections. That this is the case is very plain; for a man cannot even think, nor so much as utter a syllable, without affection. He who pays attention to the matter will perceive that a voice without affection is like the voice of an automaton, and thus is but a lifeless sound; and that in proportion to the amount and the quality of the affection therein, such is the amount and the quality of the life in it. This shows what truths are without good; and that the affection is in the truths from the good. [2] He who pays attention may also know, from the nature of man's understanding, that it is no understanding unless the will is in it; the life of the understanding being from the will. This again shows what truths without good are, namely, that they are no truths at all; and that truths derive their life from good; for truths belong to man's intellectual part, and good to his will part. From all this anyone can judge what faith (which is of truth) is without charity, which is of good; and that the truths of faith without the good of charity are dead; for as before said the amount and the quality of the affection in truths, determine the amount and the quality of the life in them. But that truths nevertheless appear animated, even when there is no good of charity, is from the affections of the love of self and the love of the world, which have no life, except that which in the spiritual sense is called death, that is, infernal life. It is said affection, and thereby is meant that which is continuous of love.* [3] From all this we can see that affections are means subservient to the conjunction of truth with good; and that affections are what introduce truths, and also dispose them into order-genuine affections, which are of love to the Lord and love toward the neighbor, into heavenly order; but evil affections, which are of the love of self and the love of the world, into infernal order; that is, into the opposite of heavenly order. [4] The most external affections are those of the body, and are called appetites and pleasures; the next interior affections are those of the natural mind, and are called natural affections; but the internal affections are those of the rational mind, and are called spiritual affections. To these last-spiritual affections of the mind-doctrinal truths are introduced by means of exterior and most external, or natural and bodily affections. Hence these affections are subservient means, and are signified by the handmaids given by Laban to Rachel and to Leah. Their being called "Laban's" handmaids, signifies that they derived their origin from the good which is represented by Laban, which good has been described above. For the truths that are first learned cannot be at first insinuated by means of any other affections than these; genuine affections come in course of time, but not until the man acts from good. * Amoris continuum.
Elliott(1983-1999) 3849
3849. 'And Laban gave to Rachel his daughter, Bilhah his servant-girl - to her to be a servant-girl' means exterior affections which are subservient bonds or means. This is clear from what has been stated above in 3835. The reason 'Bilhah the servant-girl' means exterior affections, and 'Zilpah, Leah's servant-girl' external affections, is that 'Rachel' represents the affection for internal truth and 'Leah' the affection for external truth. Exterior affections are natural affections subservient to internal. The reason these exterior affections are means that serve in the joining of truth to good is that no matter of doctrine, nor indeed any item of knowledge, can enter anyone except by means of affections. For affections hold life within themselves, but truths which belong to doctrine and knowledge do not without those affections hold it within themselves. The truth of this is quite evident, for without affection no one can even think, or indeed utter a single word. Anyone who gives this matter any consideration will perceive that a voice devoid of affection is the voice of an automaton and so simply a sound with no life to it; but that when it does have affections present in it the amount and the nature of that affection determines the amount and the nature of the life present in it. This shows what truths are without good, and that the affection present in truths springs from good.
[2] Anyone who gives the matter any consideration may also be aware of the same point from the fact that the human understanding is no understanding unless the will is present in it, for the life of the understanding is received from the will. This consideration too shows what truths are without good, namely that they are not truths at all, and that good is the source from which they draw their life; for truths belong to the understanding part of the mind and good to the will part. From this anyone is able to judge for himself what faith, which essentially is truth, is when devoid of charity, which essentially is good, and to judge that the truths of faith when devoid of the good of charity are dead, for as has been stated, the amount of affection present in truths, and the nature of it, determine the amount and nature of the life present there. But what give truths the appearance of still possessing life even when the good of charity is absent are the affections that go with self-love and love of the world, which possess no other life than that which in the spiritual sense is called death and is the life of hell. The word affection is used, and by that is meant that which is an extension from some love.
[3] From these considerations it may now be seen that affections are meant that serve in the joining of truth and good, and that affections are the means by which truths are introduced and also by which these are arranged into order. Genuine affections which go with love to the Lord and charity towards the neighbour bring them into a heavenly order, but evil affections which go with self-love and love of the world bring them into a hellish order, that is, into that which is the contrary of heavenly order.
[4] The most external affections of all are those which belong to the body and are called appetites and desires. Those immediately interior to these belong to the lower mind (animus) and are called natural affections. But internal affections belong to the rational mind find are called spiritual affections. To the latter, that is to say, to spiritual affections which belong to the higher mind (mens), truths expressed in matters of doctrine are introduced by means of the more external and the most external affections, that is, by natural and bodily ones. These are consequently subservient means and are meant by the servant-girls given by Laban to Rachel and to Leah. When they are called Laban's servant-girls the meaning is that those affections had their origin in the good represented by Laban, a good dealt with already. For the truths that are learned first cannot at first be instilled by means of any other affections. Genuine affections arrive in the process of time, but not until a person is acting from good.
Latin(1748-1756) 3849
3849. `Et dedit Laban Racheli filiae suae Bilham ancillam suam illi ad ancillam': quod significet exteriores affectiones, quae vincula seu media inservientia, constat ex illis quae supra n. 3835 dicta sunt; quod per `Bilham ancillam' significentur exteriores affectiones, et per `Zilpam ancillam Leae' externae affectiones, est quia per `Rachelem' repraesentatur affectio veri interni, et per `Leam' affectio veri externi; exteriores affectiones sunt affectiones naturales inservientes internis. Quod affectiones illae sint media inservientia conjunctioni veri cum bono, inde est quia nihil quod doctrinae est, immo nec quicquam quod scientiae est, intrare possit apud hominem, nisi per affectiones; in affectionibus enim est vita, non autem in veris doctrinae ac scientiae absque illis; quod ita sit, patet manifeste; absque affectione enim ne quidem cogitare potest homo, immo nec potest ullam vocem eloqui; {1}qui attendit, percipiet quod vox absque affectione sit quasi vox automati, ita modo sonus absque vita, {2}et quantum affectionis et quale affectionis inest, tantum vitae et tale vitae insit; inde patet quid vera sunt absque bono, et quod veris insit affectio ex bono; [2]idem quoque {3}scire potest ab intellectu hominis quod nullus sit nisi ei voluntas insit, vita enim intellectus est ex voluntate; inde quoque patet quid vera absque bono, quod nempe nulla sint, et quod a bono trahant suam vitam, nam ad intellectualem partem pertinent vera, et ad voluntariam bonum; judicare inde quisque potest quid fides sit quae veri, absque charitate quae boni, et quod fidei vera absque charitatis bono mortua sint, (m)nam, ut dictum, quantum affectionis et quale affectionis veris inest, tantum vitae et tale vitae inest(n) sed quod {4}vera usque animata appareant tametsi non est bonum charitatis, est ex affectionibus amoris sui et mundi, quae non aliam vitam habent quam quae in spirituali sensu vocatur mors et est vita infernalis. Affectio dicitur, et per illam intelligitur amoris continuum. [3]Ex his nunc constare potest quod affectiones sint media inservientia conjunctioni veri cum bono; et quod affectiones sint quae introducunt vera, et quoque quae disponunt vera in ordinem, affectiones genuinae quae sunt amoris in Dominum et amoris erga proximum, in ordinem caelestem, at affectiones malae quae sunt amoris sui et mundi, in ordinem infernalem, hoc est, in oppositum ordini caelesti. [4]Extimae affectiones sunt quae sunt corporis, et vocantur appetitus et voluptates; quae proxime interiores sunt, sunt animi, et vocantur affectiones naturales;internae autem sunt mentis rationalis, et vocantur affectiones spirituales; ad has affectiones, nempe ad mentis spirituales, introducuntur vera quae sunt doctrinalium, per affectiones exteriores et extimas, seu per naturales et corporeas; hae inde sunt media inservientia, et significantur per ancillas datas Racheli et datas Leae a Labane: quod illae Labanis ancillae dicantur {5}, significat quod originem {6}duxerint a bono quod per Labanem repraesentatur, de quo bono prius actum est; vera enim quae primum discuntur, non per affectiones alias primum insinuari possunt; affectiones genuinae tempore veniunt, nec nisi quam cum homo ex bono agit. @1 i constare hoc potest cuivis, si attendat,$ @2 at$ @3 sciri$ @4 A had sicut animata appareant, est ex and c. but altered absque illis usque vivere appareant est ex and c.$ @5 i fuisse$ @6 i affectiones illae$