----中文待译----
789. ( (Verse 4)) And they worshipped the dragon, which gave power unto the beast. By these words is signified the acknowledgment of salvation and justification by faith alone, strengthened and confirmed by those modes of conjunction that were devised, and thence received in doctrine. This is evident from the signification of worshipping, as denoting to acknowledge and worship as Divine, and thence to receive in the doctrine which is for the church. For those who acknowledge, and from such acknowledgment worship it as Divine, adore it, and also receive it in doctrine which is for the church. The same is evident from the signification of the dragon, as denoting those who are in faith separate from charity both in doctrine and in life, thus, such as acknowledge salvation and justification by faith alone (concerning which see above, n. 714); also from the signification of the power of the beast from the dragon, as denoting the strengthening and confirmation of that dogma by the devised conjunctions of faith with works (concerning which see above, n. 786). It is evident, therefore, that by the words "they worshipped the dragon who gave power to the beast," is signified the acknowledgment of salvation and justification by faith alone, strengthened and established by the devised modes of conjoining it with good works; and thence reception in doctrine.
It is said that the dogma concerning salvation and justification by faith alone is strengthened and confirmed by the devised modes of conjunction thereof with good works; but it must be understood that that doctrine cannot by any means be so strengthened and confirmed. For that dogma is meant by the dragon; and the confirmation of it by reasonings from the natural man is described by this beast; and by the dragon and his beast is signified such as are not in accordance with the Word, and cannot be conjoined with it.
[2] In order that it may be clear that it cannot possibly be conjoined, it shall here be shown that faith alone cannot produce any good; in other words, from faith alone good fruit cannot possibly be produced. It is supposed that faith consists in believing that the Lord suffered on the cross for our sins, and thereby redeemed us from hell; and that a faith in these things is what principally justifies and saves. And, besides this, it is supposed that faith consists in believing that God is triune; also in believing those things that are in the Word; in believing in eternal life, and a resurrection on the day of the Last Judgment, and the other things which the church teaches. Now because they separate faith from the life of charity, which is to do good works, most persons at this day suppose, that to know these things, to think and speak of them, is the faith which saves. They therefore pay no attention to willing them and doing them; nor do they even know that they ought to will and do them. Neither does the church teach this, because the doctrine of the church is a doctrine of faith alone, and not a doctrine of life. The doctrine of life they call moral theology, which they regard as of little account, because they believe that the virtues of a moral life, which in themselves are good works, contribute nothing to salvation.
[3] But that to know, think, and speak of the things above mentioned, is not faith, and, even although they are called faith, that still they do not produce goods, as a tree its fruits, is evident from the following:
1. Everything that a man knows, thinks, and speaks, so far as he understands it, he calls truths; and everything that he wills and does, so far as he loves it, he calls goods. Hence truths pertain to a man's faith, and goods to his love. From this it is evident that the truths of faith are distinct from the goods of love; just as knowing and thinking are from willing and doing.
That they are distinct, and how far they are so, can be known from this fact. It is possible for a man to know, think, speak, and even understand, many things that he neither wills nor does, because he does not love. On the other hand, whatever a man wills and does from love, this he also thinks and speaks of from faith, if not before the world, yet when he is by himself and left to himself. From this it follows:
[4] 2. That the love and will of man enter into everything pertaining to his faith and thought; but that faith and thought cannot enter into his love and will. For what a man loves, he also loves to do, know, think about, speak of, and understand, thus also to believe. Similarly if the will be assumed in the place of the love, what a man wills, he also wills to do, know, think about, speak of, and understand, thus also to believe. The reason why the same things are said of the will as of the love is, that the love is of the will, and the will is the receptacle of love. It follows, therefore, that love gives rise to faith, as the will to thought. And because faith, like thought, is produced, and love like the will produces, it follows that to say that faith produces love is an inversion. From these things it first becomes evident that to believe that faith produces goods, which are called good works, as a tree produces fruit, is contrary to order.
[5] 3. What is said here concerning faith and love, is also to be understood of truth and good, since truth pertains to faith and faith to truth; for what a man believes, he calls truth. Good also pertains to love and love to good; for what a man loves, he calls good. Truth, regarded strictly, is nothing else but good in form; for good may indeed present itself in such a way as to be felt, but not seen, except in some form. And the form in which it presents itself so as to be seen in the thought that is in the understanding and perception, is called truth. From these considerations also it follows, that love produces faith, as good produces truth; consequently that faith does not produce the good of love, as a tree does fruit.
[6] 4. Moreover, to know and thence to think and speak are from the memory; but to will and to do from love are from the life. Man can think and speak many things from the memory which are not from his life - which is love - as is the case with every hypocrite and flatterer. He cannot, however, when left to himself, think and speak anything from the life which is not from his love. For love is the life of every one; and according to the quality of the love such is the life; but the memory is only the storehouse, from which the life selects what it thinks and speaks, and what may serve it for nourishment. To say therefore that faith produces goods as a tree does fruit, is to say that a man's thought and speech produce his life, and not that the life produces these; when, yet, the wicked, even the very worst, can think and speak truths from the memory, but only the good can do so from the life.
[7] 5. That faith alone, or a faith separate from goods in act, which are good works, is not possible, is evident from the essence of faith, which is charity. Charity, moreover, is the affection for doing those things that pertain to faith. Therefore faith without charity is like thought without affection; and thought without affection is not thought; consequently faith without charity [is not faith]. To speak, therefore, of faith without charity is to speak of thought without affection, also of life without a soul, of manifestation (existere) without being (esse), of a form without that which forms, of a product without that which produces, and of an effect without a cause. Faith alone therefore is a nonentity; and from a nonentity to produce goods in act, which are good works, as a good tree does fruit, is a contradiction, from which what is believed to be something turns out to be nothing.
[8] 6. Because faith without charity is not possible, and yet the thought and persuasion that it is so seems to be faith, and is also called faith, but is not saving faith; it is merely an historical faith, because it proceeds from the mouth of another. For he who believes any thing from another whom he supposes worthy of credit, and so accepts it, stores it in his memory, and thence thinks and speaks of it, without seeing whether it be false or true, possesses it merely as something historical. If, however, he confirms it in himself, by appearances from the Word, and by reasonings, then from an historical faith it becomes a persuasive faith; and this is like the sight of an owl, which sees objects in darkness, and not in the light. Such a persuasive faith exists from every confirmation of what is false. For every falsity can be confirmed, until it appears to be like truth; and falsity when confirmed shines with a fatuous light (lumen).
From these things also it is clear that such a faith cannot produce good works.
[9] 7. Because the faith that is only thought is nothing but an historical or persuasive faith, it follows that it is merely natural. For spiritual faith is produced from spiritual love - which is charity - just as light is caused by the sun; it does not produce that love, just as the light does not produce the sun. A faith, therefore, merely natural is produced by a love merely natural, which derives its soul from the love of self; the delight of this love is a delight of the flesh, which is called pleasure, lust, and wantonness; from these flow evils of every kind, and from these evils, falsities. It is evident, therefore, that the faith proceeding therefrom cannot produce goods as a tree does good fruits. And even if it does produce any, they are goods from the man's proprium; and these in themselves are evils, and at the same time merit-seeking goods, which are in themselves iniquitous. It is different, however, with spiritual faith, of which we shall speak in the following article.
789. Verse 4. And they worshipped the dragon which gave authority unto the beast, signifies the acknowledgment of salvation and justification by faith alone, established and corroborated by these devised modes of conjunction, and thus received in doctrine. This is evident from the signification of "to worship," as being to acknowledge and revere as Divine, and thus to receive in doctrine that is for the church; for such as acknowledge the Divine and from such acknowledgment revere it, these worship it, and also receive it in doctrine which is for the church. Also from the signification of "the dragon," as being those who are in faith separated from charity in doctrine and in life, thus who acknowledge salvation and justification by faith alone (of which see above, n. 714). Also from the signification of "the authority of the beast" from the dragon, as being the establishment and corroboration of that dogma by devised conjunctions of faith with works (See above, n. 786). From this it is clear that "they worshipped the dragon which gave authority to the beast" signifies the acknowledgment of salvation and justification by faith alone, established and corroborated by devised modes of conjoining it with good works, and thus its reception in doctrine. It is said that the dogma of salvation and justification by faith alone is established and corroborated by devised modes of conjoining it with good works; but it must be understood that this doctrine can in no way be established and corroborated by such means, for this dogma is meant by "the dragon," and the confirmation of it by reasonings from the natural man is represented by this "beast;" and "the dragon and its beast" signify what is discordant with the Word and cannot be conjoined with it.
[2] To make clear that it cannot be conjoined, I will here show that faith alone can in no way produce any good, that is, that from faith alone no good fruit can come. It is supposed that faith is to believe that the Lord suffered the cross for our sins, and thereby redeemed us from hell, and that it is mainly a faith in this that justifies and saves. It is supposed, moreover, that faith is a believing that God is triune, a believing of what is taught in the Word, a believing in eternal life and in the resurrection on the day of the Last Judgment, and the other things that the church teaches. And as they separate faith from the life of charity, which is doing what is good, most persons at this day suppose that to know these things and to think and speak about them is the faith that saves; consequently they pay no attention to willing them and doing them; they do not even know what they ought to will and do. Nor does the church teach this, because the doctrine of the church is the doctrine of faith alone, and not the doctrine of life. The doctrine of life they call moral theology, which they make of little account, because they believe that the virtues of a moral life, which in themselves are good works, contribute nothing to salvation.
[3] But that knowing, thinking, and speaking about these things is not faith, and even if this be called faith it does not bring forth what is good, as a tree its fruits, can be seen from the following.
1. All things that a man knows, thinks about, and talks about so far as he understands them, he calls truths; and all things that he wills and does so far as he loves them, he calls goods; thus truths belong to man's faith, and truths 1to his love. From this it is clear that the truths, which pertain to faith, are distinct from the goods, which pertain to love, as knowing and thinking are distinct from willing and doing. That they are distinct, and how far they are distinct, man can know from this, that it is possible for a man to know, to think about, speak about, and even to understand, many things that he does not will and do because he does not love them; but on the other hand, whatever a man wills and does from love, that he thinks and speaks about from faith; if not before the world yet with himself when he is alone and left to himself.
[4] From this it follows, 2. that a man's love and will enter into all things of his faith and thought, but faith and thought cannot enter into his love and will. For that which a man loves he also loves to do, loves to know, loves to think about, loves to speak about, and loves to understand, and thus loves to have faith in. So if the will be taken in place of the love, that which a man wills he also wills to do, wills to know, wills to think about, wills to speak about, wills to understand, and thus wills to have faith in. Similar things may be said of the will as of the love, for the reason that the love is of the will, and the will is the receptacle of the love. From this it now follows that love produces faith as the will produces thought. And as faith, like thought, is produced, and love, like the will, produces, it follows that it is a perversion to say that faith produces love. From this it is now first evident that to believe that faith produces goods, which are called good works, as a tree produces fruits, is to believe what is contrary to order.
3.
[5] Similar things as have been said of faith and love are to be understood also of truth and good, for truth pertains to faith and faith to truth, since that which a man believes he calls truth; also good pertains to love and love to good, since that which a man loves be calls good. Truth regarded in itself is nothing but good in form; for while good may be made evident to the feeling it cannot be made evident to the sight except in some form; and the form in which it is made evident to the sight in the thought, and thus in the understanding and perception, is called truth. From this, too, it follows that love produces faith as good produces truth; consequently that faith does not produce the good of love as a tree does fruit.
4.
[6] Again, knowing and thinking and speaking therefrom are from the memory; but willing and doing from love are from the life. Man can think and speak about many things from the memory that are not from his life, which is love; this every hypocrite and flatterer can do; but when he is left to himself he cannot think and speak anything from the life that is not from his love, for love is the life of everyone, and such as the love is, such is the life. But the memory is only a storehouse, from which the life selects what it may think and speak, and what serves the life that it may be nourished by it. To say, therefore, that faith produces goods as a tree does fruits is to say that a man's thought and speech produce his life, and that his life does not produce his thought and speech; and yet the evil, even the very worst, can think and speak truths from the memory, while only the good can do so from the life.
5.
[7] That faith alone, or faith separated from goods in act, which are good works, is not possible, is evident from this, that the essence of faith is charity, and charity is the affection of doing the things that belong to faith; consequently faith without charity is like thought without affection; and as thought without affection is no thought, so faith without charity is no faith. Therefore to speak of faith without charity is to speak of thought without affection, of life without a soul, of existere without esse, of form without that which forms, of a product without that which produces, and of an effect without a cause; and for this reason faith alone is a nonentity; and from a nonentity to produce goods in act, which are good works, as a good tree produces fruits, is a contradiction, whereby what is believed to be something is not anything.
6.
[8] Because faith without charity is not possible; and yet the thought and persuasion that a thing is so appears as if it were faith, and is called faith; but it is not saving faith, it is historical faith, because it is from the mouth of another. For one who believes anything from another whom he thinks worthy of belief, and who receives this, stores it in his memory, and from the memory thinks and speaks about it without seeing whether it be false or true, has no other hold upon it than as something historical. But if he confirms this in himself by appearances from the Word and by reasonings, from historical faith it becomes to him persuasive faith, which faith is like the sight of an owl, which sees objects in darkness and nothing in the light. Such persuasive faith exists from every confirmation of what is false. For every falsity can be confirmed until it seems to be a truth; and a falsity so confirmed shines with a fatuous lumen. From this also it is clear that such a faith cannot produce what is good.
7.
[9] As faith of thought is nothing but historical faith or persuasive faith, it follows that it is merely natural faith. For spiritual faith is produced from spiritual love, which is charity, just as light is produced from the sun; and it does not produce that love, as light does not produce the sun. Therefore merely natural faith is produced from merely natural love, which derives its soul from the love of self, and the delight of that love is a delight of the flesh, which is called pleasure, lust, or lewdness, from which evils of every kind gush forth, and from evils falsities. Thence it is clear that faith proceeding from these cannot produce goods as a tree does good fruits, and if it produces any goods they are goods from what is man's own [proprium] which are in themselves evils, and at the same time are meritorious goods which are in themselves iniquitous. But it is otherwise with spiritual faith, which shall be treated of in the following article.
Footnotes:
1. The photolithograph has truths for goods.
789 [Vers. 4.] "Et adoraverunt draconem, qui dedit potestatem bestiae." Quod significat agnitionem salvationis et justificationis per solam fidem firmatam et corroboratam per inventos illos conjunctionis modos, et inde receptam in doctrina, constat ex significatione "adorare", quod sit agnoscere et colere sicut Divinum, et inde recipere in doctrina quae pro ecclesia nam qui Divinum agnoscunt et ex agnitione colunt illud, illi adorant, et quoque recipiunt [in] doctrina quae pro ecclesia: ex significatione "draconis", quod sint qui in fide separata a charitate sunt, doctrina et vita, ita qui agnoscunt salvationem et justificationem per solam fidem (de qua supra, n. 714): et ex significatione "potestatis bestiae ex dracone", quod sit firmatio et corroboratio illius dogmatis per inventas conjunctiones fidei cum operibus (de quibus supra, n. 786): inde constat quod per "Adoraverunt draconem, qui dedit potestatem bestiae", significetur agnitio salvationis et justificationis per solam fidem, firmata et corroborata per inventos modos conjungendi illam cum bonis operibus, et inde receptio in doctrina. Dicitur quod dogma de salvatione et justificatione per solam fidem firmatum et corroboratum sit per inventos modos conjunctionis ejus cum bonis operibus; sed intelligitur quod illud dogma nullatenus per illos firmatum et corroboratum sit, nam id per "draconem" intelligitur, et confirmatio ejus per ratiocinia ex naturali homine per hanc "bestiam" traditur, et per "draconem" et ejus "bestiam" significatur tale quod cum Verbo discordat, et non conjungi potest.
[2] Ut pateat quod non conjungi possit, velim hic ostendere quod sola fides nusquam possit aliquod bonum producere, seu quod ex sola fide aliquis bonus fructus dari. Putatur quod fides sit credere quod Dominus passus sit crucem pro nostris peccatis, et per id redemerit nos ab inferno, et quod horum fides imprimis justificet et salvet; et praeter illa, quod fides sit credere quod Deus triunus sit, credere illa quae in Verbo sunt, credere vitam aeternam, et resurrectionem die ultimi judicii, et cetera quae ecclesia docet: et quoniam separant fidem a vita charitatis, quae est bona facere, putant plerique hodie quod scire illa, cogitare illa, et loqui illa, sit fides quae salvat, ideo nihil attendunt ad velle illa et facere illa; immo nec sciunt quid debent velle et facere: haec nec docet ecclesia, quia doctrina ecclesiae est doctrina solius fidei, et non doctrina vitae; doctrinam vitae vocant theologiam moralem, quam vilipendunt, quia virtutes vitae moralis, quae in se sunt bona opera, credunt nihil ad salutem conferre.
[3] Quod autem scire, cogitare et loqui illa quae supra dicta sunt, non sit fides; et si vocantur fides quod usque non producant bona, sicut arbor fructus, constare potest ex his.
(1.) Homo omnia quae scit, cogitat et loquitur, quantum intelligit illa, vocat vera; et omnia quae vult et facit, quantum amat illa, vocat bona: inde vera sunt fidei hominis, et 1
bona sunt amoris ejus. Ex eo patet quod vera quae sunt fidei distincta sint a bonis quae sunt amoris, sicut scire et cogitare a velle et facere. Quod distincta sint, et in quantum, homo nosse potest ex eo, quod homo possit multa scire, cogitare et loqui, immo intelligere, quae non vult et facit, quia non amat: at vice versa, quod quicquid homo vult et facit ex amore, hoc cogitet et loquatur ex fide, si non coram mundo, usque apud se cum solus est et sibi relictus.
[4] Ex his sequitur,
(2.) Quod amor et voluntas hominis intrent in omnia fidei et cogitationis ejus, at quod fides et cogitatio non possint intrare in ejus amorem et voluntatem; homo enim quod amat, hoc quoque amat facere, amat scire, amat cogitare, amat loqui, et amat intelligere, ita quoque amat ejus fidem habere: similiter si loco amoris sumitur voluntas, homo quod vult, hoc quoque vult facere, vult scire, vult cogitare, vult loqui, vult intelligere, ita quoque vult ejus fidem habere. Causa quod simile dicatur de voluntate quod de amore, est quia amor est voluntatis, et voluntas est receptaculum amoris. Inde nunc sequitur quod amor producat fidem, sicut voluntas cogitationem. Quia fides sicut cogitatio producitur, et amor sicut voluntas producit, sequitur quod inversum sit dicere quod fides producat amorem. Ex his primum constare potest quod credere quod fides producat bona, quae vocantur bona opera, sicut arbor fructus, sit contra ordinem.
[5] (3.) Similia quae de fide et amore dicta sunt, etiam intelligenda sunt de vero et bono, nam verum est fidei et fides est veri, quod enim homo credit hoc verum vocat; ac bonum est amoris, et amor est boni, nam quod homo amat hoc bonum vocat. Verum in se spectatum non est nisi quam bonum in forma, bonum enim se quidem sistere potest sentiendum, sed non videndum nisi in aliqua forma; et forma in qua se sistit videndum in cogitatione, ita in intellectu et perceptione, vocatur verum. Ex his etiam sequitur quod amor producat fidem, sicut bonum producit verum; proinde quod non fides producat bonum amoris, sicut arbor fructum.
[6] (4.) Etiam scire et inde cogitare et loqui sunt ex memoria, at velle et facere ex amore sunt ex vita. Homo potest multa cogitare et loqui ex memoria, quae non sunt ex vita ejus, quae est amor; hoc potest omnis hypocrita et assentator; at nihil potest cogitare et loqui, cum sibi relictus est, ex vita, quod non sit ex amore ejus; amor enim est vita cujusvis, et qualis amor talis vita. At memoria est modo promptuarium, ex quo vita desumit quod cogitet et loquatur, et quae inservit vitae ut inde nutriatur. Quare dicere quod fides producat bona sicut arbor fructus, est dicere quod cogitatio et loquela hominis producat vitam ejus, et non vita illam; cum tamen mali, immo pessimi, possunt cogitare et loqui vera ex memoria, sed non nisi quam boni ex vita.
[7] (5.) Quod sola fides, seu fides separata a bonis actu, quae sunt bona opera, non sit dabilis, constare potest ex fidei essentia, quae est charitas; et charitas est affectio faciendi illa quae fidei sunt; quare fides absque charitate est sicut cogitatio absque affectione, et cogitatio absque affectione est nulla cogitatio, ita fides absque charitate: quare dicere fidem absque charitate est dicere cogitationem absque affectione, tum vitam absque anima, existere absque esse, formam absque formante, productum absque producente, et effectum absque causa; quare fides sola est non ens; et ex non ente producere bona actu, quae sunt bona opera, sicut bona arbor fructus, est contradictio, ex qua id quod creditur esse aliquid non est aliquid.
[8] (6.) Quia fides absque charitate non datur, et usque cogitatio et persuasio quod ita sit, apparet sicut sit fides, et quoque vocatur fides; sed non est fides salvifica, verum est fides historica, quia ex alterius ore est; qui enim aliquid credit ex alio, quem putat fide dignum esse, ac id recipit, in memoria recondit, et inde id cogitat et loquitur, nec videt num falsum sit aut verum, is possidet id non aliter quam sicut historicum; si autem id confirmat apud se, per apparentias ex Verbo, et per ratiocinia, fit ei ex fide historica fides persuasiva, quae fides est similis visui noctuae, quae objecta in tenebris videt, et nulla in luce. Talis fides persuasiva existit ex omni confirmatione falsi: omne enim falsum potest confirmari usque ut appareat sicut verum, et falsum confirmatum lucet lumine fatuo. Ex his quoque patet quod talis fides nec producere possit bona.
[9] (7.) Quia fides cogitativa non aliud est quam fides historica aut persuasiva, sequitur quod sit fides mere naturalis: fides enim spiritualis producitur ex amore spirituali qui est charitas, sicut lux ex sole; et non producit illum amorem, sicut non lux solem: quare fides mere naturalis producitur ex amore mere naturali, qui animam trahit ex amore sui, cujus amoris jucundum est jucundum carnis, quod vocatur volupe, cupidum [et] lascivum, ex quibus scaturiunt mala omnis generis, et ex malis falsa: inde constare potest quod fides ex illis procedens non bona possit producere, sicut arbor fructus bonos; et si aliqua producit, sunt bona ex proprio hominis, quae in se sunt mala, et simul bona meritoria, quae in se sunt iniqua. Aliter vero fides spiritualis, de qua in nunc sequente articulo.
Footnotes:
1. The editors made a correction or note here.