485、⑸奸淫分为四个等级，这些等级决定了奸淫的定性，定罪和死后的归罪。这些等级不是种类，但适用于各个种类，并区分它们的邪恶或良善是更大还是更小。在这种情况下，它们根据环境和突发事件确定每种奸淫应算为更温和，还是算为更严重。众所周知，环境和突发事件使一切事千差万别。然而，一个人凭其理性微光以一种方式看待它们，一个法官则出于法律以另一种方式来看待，而主出于此人的心智状态又以一种方式来看待。正因如此，我们才说到罪的定性、宣布，以及死后的归罪。人照其理性微光决定罪的定性；法官照法律决定罪的宣布；主照这个人的心智状态决定归罪。无需解释就能看出，这三种情况彼此截然不同。人根据环境和突发事件凭理性评估可能会判某人无罪，而坐在法庭上的法官根据法律可能会判他有罪；而法官也有可能会判一个死后下地狱的人为无罪。原因在于，法官照着行为做出判决；但死后，每个人皆照其在意愿、因而在理解力中所形成的意图，以及他的理解力、因而意愿的确认程度而受审判。而法官无法看到这些。然而，这两种审判都是公正的，因为一种关注世间社会的利益，另一种关注天堂社会的利益。
485、（5）通奸有四种程度，它的程度决定了它的性质，罪状及死后的定罪。这些程度与种类不同，它们会使不同种类的通奸相区别并决定其罪恶的程度。
每一种情况都是不同的。但是，任何事都一方面通过人的理性受到判断，一方面通过法官得到判断，还会基于人的思想状态由主做出判断。因此我们要区分它们的性质，罪状和死后的定罪几方面，因为性质是可以根据人的理性而判断的，罪状是由法官按法律判断的，而死后的定罪是由主根据人思想状态所决定的。
这三种判断在性质上是非常不同的。因为人通过思考可以认为什么是无可厚非的，在死后可能会被视为有罪。后者的原因是，法官按人的行为做判断，而死后主根据人的意愿，才智以及由才智产生的意愿而做出判断。而法官却看不到这些，但是两种判断都是公证的，一者是出于人类社会的利益而考虑，另一者是出于天国社会的利益而考虑。
485. (v) There are four degrees of adultery, and these determine what they are called, how culpable they are, and how far they are imputed after death.
These degrees are not types, but apply to each type, making them more or less evil or good. In this case they determine whether adultery of each type is to be regarded as milder or more serious by reason of circumstances and contingent events. It is well known that circumstances and contingent events cause differences in every case.
However, these are regarded in one way by a person acting by the feeble light of his reason, in another by a judge following the law, and in another by the Lord judging the state of a person's mind. This is why we speak of what they are called, how culpable they are and how far they are imputed after death. For what they are called depends upon a person acting by the feeble light of his reason; culpability is determined by a judge following the law; and imputation is by the Lord judging the state of a person's mind. It can be seen without explanation that these three cases are very different. For a person acting on his rational conviction may, depending on circumstances and contingent events, acquit someone, whom a judge sitting in court may not acquit by law. The judge too may acquit someone who is damned after death. The reason is that a judge makes his decision in accordance with the facts, but after death everyone is judged in accordance with the intention formed in the will and thus in the intellect, and the extent to which the will and thus the intellect endorses them. Neither of these can be seen by the judge. But still either judgment is just, one on the basis of the good of the civil community, the other on the basis of the good of the heavenly community.
485. 5. There are four degrees of adultery, which affect accordingly subsequent attributions of it, convictions, and, after death, imputations. These degrees are not kinds, but they enter into the several kinds and create distinctions in them between greater and lesser levels of evil or good, determining in the present instance whether adultery of any one kind is by reason of circumstances and contingent factors to be regarded as more mild or more grave.
That circumstances and contingent factors vary every case is something people know. However, events are still regarded in one way by a person on the basis of his rational sight, in another way by a judge on the basis of the law, and in another way by the Lord on the basis of the state of the person's mind. Therefore we distinguish between attributions, convictions, and, after death, imputations. For attributions are determined by a person in accordance with his rational sight; convictions by a judge in accordance with the law; and imputations by the Lord in accordance with the person's state of mind.
These three judgments are very different in nature, as can be seen without need for explanation. For a person may, from a rational evaluation in accordance with the circumstances and contingent factors, exonerate one whom a judge while sitting in judgment cannot on the basis of the law exonerate; and a judge, too, may exonerate one who after death is condemned. The reason for the latter is that a judge determines his verdict in accordance with a person's deeds, whereas everyone is judged after death in accordance with the intentions of his will and consequent intellect, and in accordance with the persuasions of his intellect and consequent will. Neither of these does a judge see. Yet each judgment is nevertheless just, the one looking to the good of civil society, the other to the good of heavenly society.
485. 5. There are four levels of adultery. Accusation, guilt, and (after death) blame for them depends on the level of the adultery. These levels are not types, but they apply to each of the types and make the difference in them between more or less evil or good - here whether an adultery of any kind should be considered mild or serious because of circumstances and contingencies. It is well known that circumstances and contingencies make a difference in everything.
Yet the person considers them one way by his rational lights, a judge another way by law, and the Lord another way by the person's state of mind. This is why I said "accusation, guilt, and (after death) blame." For people make accusations of them by their rational lights, a judge condemns them by the law, and the Lord lays blame for them according to the person's state of mind.
Without any explanation, these three things can be seen to be very different, for by rational convictions according to circumstances and contingencies, a person can excuse someone whom a judge sitting in judgment cannot excuse under the law. And also a judge can excuse someone who, after death, is condemned. The reason is that the judge gives a sentence according to what was done, but after death each one is judged according to the intentions of his will and therefore his understanding of it, and according to his intellectual convictions and therefore his will. A judge does not see either of these things. And yet both kinds of judgment are just - one for the good of civil society, the other for the good of heavenly society.
485. V. THAT THERE ARE FOUR DEGREES OF ADULTERIES, AND THAT PREDICATIONS, PRONOUNCEMENTS OF GUILT, AND AFTER DEATH, IMPUTATIONS ARE MADE ACCORDING TO THESE DEGREES. These degrees are not kinds, but they enter into each kind and there make distinctions between the more and the less evil or good --here, whether, because of circumstances and of contingencies, an adultery of any kind should be accounted mild or more grievous; that circumstances and contingencies vary everything is well known. Yet they are accounted in one way by a man from his rational lumen, in another by a judge from the law, and in another by the Lord from the man's state of mind. It is for this reason that predications, pronouncements of guilt, and after death, imputations, are spoken of. Predications are made by a man according to his rational lumen. Pronouncements of guilt are made by a judge according to the law. Imputations are made by the Lord according to the man's state of mind. That these three greatly differ from each other can be seen without explanation. According to circumstances and contingencies, a man from rational conviction may absolve one whom a judge, sitting in judgment according to the law, cannot absolve; and a judge may absolve one who, after death, is condemned. The reason is because the judge pronounces sentence according to the deeds; but after death every one is judged according to the intentions of his will and thence of his understanding, and according to the confirmations of his understanding and thence of his will. Neither of these is seen by the judge. Still, both judgments are just, the one being for the good of civil society and the other for the good of heavenly society.
485. (v) There are four degrees of adulteries, in accord with which predications, inculpations and, after death, imputations of them are made. These degrees are not kinds, but enter into each kind and make the distinctions in it of more or less evil or good, determining whether the adultery of whatever kind is, by reason of circumstances and contingencies, to be deemed milder or more serious. That circumstances and contingencies do vary a case is well known. Even so, things are regarded in one way by a man from his rational light, in another by a judge from the law, and in another by the Lord with reference to the man's state of mind - hence we speak of "predications," "inculpations" and "imputations after death." Predications are made by a man according to his rational light; inculpations are made by a judge according to the law; and imputations are made by the Lord according to the man's state of mind. It will be seen without exposition that these three differ very much from each other. For in a rational conclusion according to circumstances and contingencies a man may absolve a person whom a judge, sitting as a court, cannot absolve under the law. A judge, too, may absolve a person who after death is condemned. The reason is that a judge determines sentence in accord with deeds, but after death every one is judged according to the intentions of the will and thence of the understanding, and according to confirmations of the understanding and thence of the will. Neither of these does a judge see. Nevertheless each judgment is just, the one for the sake of civic society's good, and the other for the good of heavenly society.
485. (5) That there are four degrees of adultery, according to which the predications, inculpations, and after death the imputations of them are made. These degrees are not kinds, but they enter into each kind and make its differences of more and less evil or good. Here, where an adultery of either kind by reason of the circumstances and contingencies should be accounted milder or more grievous. That circumstances and contingencies do vary everything is known. And yet they are accounted in one way by man from the light of his rational lumen, in another by a judge from the law, and in another by the Lord from the man's state of mind; and therefore, predications, inculpations, and after death, imputations are spoken of. For predications are made by man according to the light (lumen) of his reason; inculpations are made by a judge according to the law; and imputations are made by the Lord according to the man's state of mind. That these three greatly differ from each other can be seen without exposition; for man, by rational conviction according to circumstances and contingencies, may absolve one whom a judge sitting in judgment according to the law cannot absolve; and also a judge may absolve one who after death is condemned. The reason is that the judge pronounces sentence according to the facts; but after death everyone is judged according to the intentions of his will and thence of his understanding, and according to the confirmations of the understanding and thence of the will. Neither of these does the judge see; and yet both judgments are just, one for the good of civil society, the other for the good of heavenly society.
485. V. Quod quatuor gradus adulteriorum sint, secundum quos fiunt illorum praedicationes, inculpationes, et post mortem imputationes. Hi Gradus non sunt genera, sed intrant in unumquodvis, et faciunt discrimina ejus inter plus et minus malum aut bonum, hic num Adulterium cujusvis generis ex ratione circumstantiarum et contingentium, reputandum sit mitius aut gravius; quod circumstantiae et contingentia unumquamque rem varient, notum est. At usque aliter reputantur ab homine ex rationali ejus lumine, aliter a judice ex lege, et aliter a Domino ex statu mentis hominis; quare dicuntur praedicationes, inculpationes, et post mortem imputationes; nam ab homine secundum rationale ejus lumen fiunt praedicationes, a judice secundum legem fiunt inculpationes, et a Domino secundum statum mentis hominis fiunt imputationes; quod haec tria inter se valde differant, sine expositione videri potest: homo enim ex rationali evictione secundum circumstantias et contingentia potest aliquem absolvere, quem judex, dum judicium sedet, ex lege non potest, et quoque judex potest absolvere, qui post mortem damnatur; causa est, quia judex secundum facta sententiam statuit, at post mortem quisque judicatur secundum intentiones voluntatis et inde intellectus, et secundum confirmationes intellectus et inde voluntatis; 1has et illas judex non videt; at usque utrumque judicium est justum, unum propter Societatis civilis bonum, alterum propter Societatis coelestis bonum.
Footnotes:
1. Prima editio: vo untatis;