490、⑽三级奸淫出于理性；犯这种奸淫的，是那些凭其理解确认奸淫不是罪恶的人。人人都知道意愿和理解力的存在，因为在说话的时候，他会说：“我想这样，我是这样理解的。”然而，他没有将它们分开，而是把它们当成一回事。原因在于，他只反思与出于理解力的思维有关的事，而不去反思与出于意愿的爱有关的事；因为意愿不像理解力那样显现在光中。然而，人若不区分意愿和理解力，就无法区分邪恶与良善，因而丝毫不知因罪所招致的谴责。不过，谁不知道良善与真理完全是两码事，就像爱与智慧那样？凭理性之光，谁不能由此推断出，人拥有两种官能，这两种官能分别接受这些，并将它们归给自己？其中一个是意愿，一个是理解力。因为凡意愿所接受并再生之物都被称为良善，凡理解力所接受之物都被称为真理。事实上，凡意愿所爱、所行的一切都被称为良善，凡理解所觉知并思考的一切都被称为真理。
在本书第一部分，我们论述了良善与真理的婚姻，还详细说明了意愿和理解力，以及每一个的各种属性和品质。我想，即便那些没有区分意愿和理解力的人也能明白这些内容，因为人类理性具有这样的性质：它能凭自己的光理解真理，哪怕它以前没有区分它们。因此，我要作一些说明，以便意愿和理解力之间的区别显得更清楚，好叫人们先凭理性或理解力，后凭意愿来了解奸淫的性质。以下几点有助于认识意愿和理解力：
①唯独意愿凭自己什么也做不了，凡它所行的，都是通过理解力来行的。
②另一方面，唯独理解力凭自己什么也做不了，凡它所行的，都是出于意愿而行的。
③意愿流入理解力，而不是理解力流入意愿。但理解力指教何为良善与邪恶，并向意愿提供建议，以便它能在二者之间作出选择，然后行它所乐意的事。
④之后，它们以两种方式联结。一种是：意愿从内作用，理解力从外作用；另一种是：理解力从内作用，意愿从外作用。这就是区分本节所论述的理性奸淫和下面（492节主题）所论述的意愿奸淫的方式。它们必须被区分开，因为这一种比那一种更严重。事实上，理性奸淫不如意愿奸淫那么严重。这是因为，在理性奸淫中，理解力从内作用，意愿从外作用；而在意愿奸淫中，意愿从内作用，理解力从外作用。意愿才是这个人自己，理解力只有出于意愿时才是这个人；并且从内作用之物掌控从外作用之物。
490、（10）第三种程度的通奸是指理性的通奸，这是指那些让自己确认通奸不是一种罪过的情况。每个人都会认为那种任何时候都说“我要或我想”的人是有意愿和才智的。但他却是对这二者不加区分，而是认为二者相同。这是因为他只想到了与才智有关的事物，却没有想到来自于意愿的爱；因为后者并不象前者那样可以看得见。因此不区分意愿和才智的人也就知道什么是罪恶。
有谁不知道，善和真理是两个不同的东西，爱和智慧也同样。意愿接收或产生与善相关的事物，而才智接收或产生与真理相关的东西。
善与真理的结合在本书第一部分讲过。用以下几点做一下概括：
1、意愿本身不能完成任何事情，它要通过才智来实现。
2、同样才智自身也不能完成任何事情，它所做的一切都来自于意愿。
3、意愿会流入到才智中，而并非才智流入到意愿中；但才智会指明什么是善什么是恶，并指令意愿，使意愿能从二者中做出选择并按其选择而行为。
4、其后又做了双重讨论，即其一意愿起内在作用而才智起外在作用，其二才智起内在作用而意愿起外在作用，最后一点就是我们接下来要讲的。
理性上的通奸没有意愿上的通奸严重。在理性上的通奸中，才智起内在作用而意愿起外在作用；而在意愿上的通奸中，意愿起内在作用而才智起外在作用。意愿就是人身，而才智是意愿的延伸。内在起作用的东西决定了外在。
490. (x) Adultery in the third degree is adultery approved by reason, when committed by those who convince themselves intellectually that it is not a sinful evil.
Everyone knows of the existence of the will and the intellect. For in speaking he says 'I want this' and 'I understand this.' Yet he fails to keep them apart and treats them as identical. The reason is that he only reflects on what is to do with thought coming from the intellect, not on what is to do with love coming from the will, since this is not visible in such bright light as the other. Yet someone who fails to distinguish between will and intellect is unable to distinguish evil from good, so that he cannot know anything about the blame incurred by sin. But is there anyone who does not know that good and truth are two different things, just as love and wisdom are? Can anyone fail to conclude by the light of his reason that a person has two faculties, which separately receive and latch on to these, one being the will, the other the intellect? Because what the will receives and reproduces we call good, and what the intellect receives we call truth. For what the will loves and does is called good, and what the intellect perceives and thinks is called truth.
[2] In the first part of this book we spoke about the marriage of good and truth, and also had much to say about the will and the intellect and the various attributes and qualities of each. (It is my belief that these can be perceived even by those who have no distinct notion of the intellect and the will, for human reason is such as to be able to understand truths by their own light, even if it had not previously distinguished them.) I shall therefore make some remarks to render clearer the distinction between the will and the intellect, with the intention of making known first the nature of acts of adultery by the reason or the intellect, and then by the will.
[3] The following points may serve to make these known.
(a) The will alone does nothing of its own accord, but everything it does is done by means of the intellect.
(b) Again, the intellect alone does nothing of its own accord, but everything it does is done at the instigation of the will.
(c) The will influences the intellect, but the intellect does not influence the will; but the intellect lays down what is good and what is evil, and advises the will to choose from these two and to do what it pleases.
(d) Following this they become linked in two ways. In one the will acts from within and the intellect from without; in the other the intellect acts from within and the will from without. This is what makes the difference between adultery of the reason, the subject of this section, and adultery of the will, which will be treated next. They need to be kept apart, because one is more serious than the other. For adultery of the reason is less serious than that of the will. This is because in adultery of the reason the intellect acts from within and the will from without; but in adultery of the will the will acts from within and the intellect from without. The will is the real person, and the intellect is made a person by the will; and that which acts from within has power over that which acts from without.
490. 10. Adulteries of the third degree are adulteries of the reason, which are committed by people who intellectually persuade themselves that they are not sinful evils. Everyone knows that he is endowed with a will and intellect, for whenever he speaks, he says, this is what I want, and this is what I think. Yet despite that he does not distinguish between these two faculties, but makes one to be the same as the other. The reason for it is that he reflects only on such things as are matters of thought from the intellect, and not on such things as are matters of love from the will; for the latter are not visible to his sight in the way that the former are. Nevertheless, one who does not distinguish between the will and intellect cannot distinguish between evil things and good, and so cannot know anything at all about the guilt of sin.
Who, however, does not know that good and truth are two distinct things, as are love and wisdom? And whenever he is possessed of rational light, who cannot therefore conclude that there are two elements in man which separately receive and incorporate these into them; and that one is the will and the other the intellect, for the reason that what the will receives and reproduces is referred to in terms of good, and what the intellect receives is referred to in terms of truth? For what the will loves and does is called good, and what the intellect perceives and thinks is called truth.
[2] Now the marriage between good and truth was discussed in the first part of this work, and we presented there a number of points having to do with the will and intellect and the various attributes and characteristics of each - points which I am inclined to suppose even those people understand who have not had any distinct thought concerning the intellect and will; for human reason is such that it understands truths in the light of truth, even if it has not discerned them before. So, then, to make the differences between the intellect and will still more clearly perceptible, I will cite some of these points here, in order that it may be known what adulteries of the reason or intellect are, and afterward what adulteries of the will are. Let the following serve to provide a concept of them:
[3] 1. The will by itself accomplishes nothing on its own, but whatever it does it does through the intellect.
2. Conversely, too, the intellect by itself accomplishes nothing on its own, but whatever it does it does from the will.
3. The will flows into the intellect, and not the intellect into the will; but the intellect makes known what is good and what is evil and advises the will, in order that it may choose between the two and do that which it prefers.
4. After that a twofold conjunction of the two takes place, one in which the will operates inwardly and the intellect outwardly, the other in which the intellect operates inwardly and the will outwardly.
The last is what distinguishes adulteries of the reason, which we are considering here, from adulteries of the will, which we take up next.
There is a distinction between them, because one is more grave than the other. For adultery of the reason is not as grave as adultery of the will. That is because in adultery of the reason, the intellect operates inwardly and the will outwardly; but in adultery of the will, the will operates inwardly and the intellect outwardly, and the will is the person himself, while the intellect is the person only as an extension of the will. Whatever operates inwardly also predominates over that which operates outwardly.
490. 10. Adulteries of the third level are rationalized adulteries committed by people who intellectually demonstrate that adulteries are not sinful wrongs. Everyone knows that there is will and intellect, for in speech we say "I want this" and "I understand this." Yet we do not distinguish between them, but make one the same as the other.
The reason is that everyone reflects only on things that have to do with thought due to intellect and not on things that have to do with love due to will, for these do not appear in the open like intellectual matters. And yet someone who does not differentiate between will and intellect cannot distinguish between evil and good and therefore can certainly not know anything about the guilt of a sin. But who does not know that good and truth are two separate things, like love and wisdom? And who cannot conclude from that, when he is in rational light, that in a person there are two faculties that receive good and truth differently and assign them to themselves, and that one faculty is will and the other intellect? For that reason, what your will receives and in turn puts forth is called good, and what your intellect receives is called truth. For what will loves and does is called good, and what intellect notices and thinks is called truth.
Now the first part of this book dealt with the marriage of good and truth, and there many things were mentioned about will and intellect and the various attributes and qualities of each.
(Even those who have not thought about any difference between intellect and will, I may say, could grasp those statements, for human reason is such that it understands truths due to their light, even if it has not seen the difference before.) Therefore, to make the difference between intellect and will more clearly noticeable, I bring out some things here for the purpose of making known what adulteries of reason or intellect are like, and afterwards what adulteries of will are like.
These items will serve to give an idea about them.
(a) Will alone does not act by itself, but whatever it does it does through intellect.
(b) And on the other hand, intellect alone does not act by itself, but whatever it does it does due to will.
(c) Will flows into intellect, but not intellect into will, but intellect teaches what is good and bad and consults will to choose between these two and do will's pleasure.
(d) After this a double connection is formed - one where will acts from the inside and intellect from the outside, the other where intellect acts from inside and will from outside.
This is how reason's adulteries, dealt with here, are distinguished from will's adulteries, dealt with later. They are distinguished because one is worse than the other, for reason's adulteries are less serious than will's adulteries. The reason is that in reason's adultery intellect acts from inside and will from outside, but in will's adultery will acts from inside and intellect from outside, and will is the person himself, intellect the person due to will. And what acts within rules over what acts from outside.
490. X. THAT ADULTERIES OF THE THIRD DEGREE ARE ADULTERIES FROM THE REASON, WHICH ARE COMMITTED BY THOSE WHO BY THEIR UNDERSTANDING CONFIRM THEM AS NOT BEING EVILS OF SIN. Every man knows that there is will and understanding, for when he speaks he says, This I will, and This I understand. Still, he does not distinguish between them but makes the one the same as the other. The reason is because he reflects only upon those things which pertain to thought from the understanding, and not upon those which pertain to love from the will; for the latter, unlike the former, do not appear in light. Yet he who does not distinguish between will and understanding cannot distinguish between evil things and good, and so can know nothing whatever concerning blame for sin. But who does not know that good and truth are two distinct things like love and wisdom? and who, when in rational lumen, cannot conclude from this that there are two vessels in man which distinctly receive these and ascribe them to themselves? and that one is the will and the other the understanding? and this because that which the will receives and reproduces is called good, and that which the understanding receives is called truth, what the will loves and does being called good, and what the understanding perceives and thinks being called truth.
[2] Since the marriage of good and truth was treated of in the first part of this work; and since much was there adduced concerning will and understanding and the various attributes and predicates of each, which, I suppose, is perceived even by those who have had no distinct thought concerning understanding and will--human reason being such that it perceives truths from the light of truths even though it has not previously distinguished between them--therefore, in order that the distinction between will and understanding may be perceived more distinctly, to the end that the nature of adulteries from reason or understanding may be known, and after that the nature of adulteries from the will, I will here present something further.
[3] The following may serve for a knowledge concerning will and understanding: 1. That the will alone does nothing of itself, but whatever it does it does by the understanding. 2. On the other hand, the understanding alone does nothing of itself, but whatever it does it does from the will. 3. That the will flows into the understanding, not the understanding into the will. But the understanding teaches what is good and evil, and consults the will that the latter may choose which of the two is pleasing to it and may do it. 4. That after this a twofold conjunction is effected, one in which the will act from within and the understanding from without, the other in which the understanding acts from within and the will from without.
Thus the adulteries from reason here treated of are distinguished from adulteries from will, of which hereafter. They are distinguished because the one is more grievous than the other, adultery from reason being less grievous than adultery from will. In adultery from reason, the understanding acts from within and the will from without, while in adultery from will, the will acts from within and the understanding from without--the will being the man himself, and the understanding the man from the will--and that which acts within dominates over that which acts without.
490. (x) Adulteries of the third degree are adulteries of the reason, done by those who with the understanding confirm themselves in the position that adulteries are not evils of sin. Every one knows that there are will and understanding, for we refer in ordinary speech to willing or understanding something. Still the two may not be distinguished but made the same. For while there is reflection on what is of the thought from the understanding, there is not on what is of love from the will, for this, unlike the other, does not appear in light. Yet one who does not distinguish between will and understanding cannot distinguish between evils and goods, and consequently cannot know anything of the blameworthiness of sin. But who does not know that good and truth are two distinct things like love and wisdom? And who, when he is in rational light, cannot thence conclude that there are two faculties in man which receive and appropriate good and truth respectively, and that the one faculty is will and the other understanding, for what the will receives and reproduces is called good, and what the understanding receives is called truth? For what the will loves and does is denominated good, and what the understanding perceives and thinks is denominated truth.
[2] We treated of the marriage of good and truth in Part I of this work and adduced many things about will and understanding and the various attributes and predicates of each, things which, I think, those, too, perceive who had not thought distinctly of will and understanding (for the human reason is such that it understands truths from their light though it had not previously distinguished them). In order that the distinctions between understanding and will may be still more clearly perceived, I shall therefore present some particulars to make plain what adulteries of the reason or understanding are, and afterwards what adulteries of the will are.
[3] The following points will serve for better knowledge about them: 1. The will does nothing by itself, but does what it does through the understanding. 2. In turn, the understanding does nothing by itself, but does whatever it does from the will. 3. The will flows into the understanding, but not the understanding into the will; the understanding does, however, teach what is good or evil, and advises the will in choosing between the two and doing what is pleasing to it. 4. A twofold conjunction then takes place: in one, the will acts from within and the understanding from without, and in the other, the understanding acts from within and the will from without. Adulteries of the reason, of which we are treating now, are thus distinguished from adulteries of the will, which we shall consider next. They are to be distinguished because one is more serious than the other; adultery of the will is more serious than adultery of the reason. For in an adultery of the reason the understanding acts from within and the will from without, but in an adultery of volition the will acts from within and the understanding from without. The will, moreover, is the man himself, whereas the understanding is the man only so far as it is from the will. Furthermore, that which acts within dominates over that which acts without.
490. (10) That adulteries of the third degree are adulteries of the reason, committed by those who by the understanding confirm that they are not evils of sin. Every man knows that there is will and understanding, for in speech he says, 'This I will,' and 'This I understand.' And yet he does not distinguish them, but makes one the same with the other. The reason is that he only reflects upon the things which are of thought from the understanding, and not upon those which are of the love from the will; for these do not, like those, appear in the light. And yet he who does not distinguish between will and understanding cannot distinguish between things evil and good, and hence can know nothing at all about the blame for sin. But who does not know that good and truth are two distinct things, as love and wisdom are? And who, when he is in rational light, (lumen) cannot thence conclude that there are two faculties in man which distinctly receive and appropriate these to themselves, and that one is the will and the other the understanding, for the reason that what the will receives and reproduces is called good, and what the understanding receives is called truth? For what the will loves and does is called good, and what the understanding perceives and thinks is called true.
Now, as the marriage of good and truth has been treated of in the First Part of this work, and as many things were there adduced respecting the will and the understanding, and respecting the various attributes and predicates of each, which as I think are perceived even by those who had not thought distinctly about the understanding and the will (for human reason is such that it understands truths from the light of them, even though it has not distinguished them before), therefore, in order that the distinctions of the understanding and the will may be more clearly perceived I will here present some truths, to the end that it may be known of what quality adulteries of the reason or the understanding are, and after that of what quality adulteries of the will are. The following may serve for the cognizance of them:
(1) That the will does nothing of itself alone, but whatever it does it does by the understanding.
(2) And on the other hand the understanding does nothing of itself alone, but that whatever it does it does from the will.
(3) That the will in-flows into the understanding, but not the understanding into the will; but that the understanding teaches what is good and evil, and consults the will, in order that of the two it may choose and do what is pleasing to it.
(4) That after this a twofold conjunction results, one in which the will acts from within and the understanding from without, another in which the understanding acts from within and the will from without. Thus are the adulteries of the reason, here treated of, distinguished from the adulteries of the will, to be considered hereafter. They are distinguished because one is more grievous than the other; for adultery of the reason is less grievous than adultery of the will, because in adultery of the reason the understanding acts from within and the will from without; while in adultery of the will, the will acts from within and the understanding from without, and the will is the very man, and the understanding is the man from the will, and that which acts from within dominates over that which acts from without.
490. X. Quod Adulteria tertii gradus sint adulteria rationis, quae fiunt ab illis, qui intellectu confirmant quod non mala peccati sint. Omnis homo scit, quod detur voluntas et intellectus, nam dum loquitur, dicit, hoc volo et hoc intelligo; at usque non distinguit, sed unum facit idem cum altero; causa est, quia solum reflectit super illa quae cogitationis ex intellectu sunt, et non super illa quae amoris ex voluntate sunt, haec enim non apparent in luce sicut illa. Attamen qui non discriminat Voluntatem et Intellectum inter se, non potest discriminare mala et bona inter se, et inde prorsus non scire aliquid de culpa peccati. Sed quis non scit, quod bonum et verum duo distincta sint, sicut amor et sapientia, et quis, dum in rationali lumine est, inde non concludere potest, quod duo sint in homine, quae distincte recipiunt et addicant sibi illa, et quod unum sit Voluntas, ac alterum Intellectus, ex causa quia id quod voluntas recipit et reproducit dicitur Bonum, ac id quod Intellectus recipit dicitur Verum, nam quod Voluntas amat et facit appellatur Bonum, et quod Intellectus percipit et cogitat, appellatur Verum.
[2] Nunc quia de Conjugio boni et veri in Parte prima hujus Operis actum est, ac ibi de Voluntate et Intellectu, ac de utriusque variis attributis et praedicatis, plura adducta sunt, quae, ut autumo, percipiuntur etiam ab illis, qui non aliquid distincte de intellectu et voluntate cogitaverant; ratio enim humana talis est, ut vera ex luce illorum, tametsi illa non prius distinxit, intelligat: ut ergo discrimina intellectus et voluntatis clarius percipiantur, aliqua hic tradam, propter finem, ut sciatur, qualia sunt Adulteria rationis seu intellectus, et postea qualia sunt adulteria Voluntatis;
[3] pro cognitione de his, inserviant haec: 11. 2Quod Voluntas sola ex se nihil agat, sed quod quicquid agit per intellectum agat. 2. Vicissim etiam, quod Intellectus solus ex se nihil agat, sed quod quicquid agit ex voluntate agat. 3. Quod Voluntas in intellectum influat, non autem Intellectus in voluntatem, sed quod Intellectus doceat quid bonum et malum est, et consulat voluntatem ut ex duobus illis eligat et faciat quod placiti ejus est. 4. Quod post haec fiat conjunctio dupla, una in qua voluntas ab intra agit et intellectus ab extra; altera, in qua intellectus ab intra agit, et voluntas ab extra: ita distinguuntur Adulteria rationis, de quibus hic, ab Adulteriis voluntatis, de quibus sequitur: distinguuntur, quia unum est gravius altero; est enim Adulterium rationis minus grave quam adulterium voluntatis; causa est, quia in Adulterio rationis agit intellectus ab intra, et voluntas ab extra; at in Adulterio voluntatis agit voluntas ab intra ac intellectus ab extra, ac voluntas est ipse homo, ac intellectus est homo ex voluntate; ac id quod intra agit, dominatur super id quod extra agit.
Footnotes:
1. Prima editio: haec,
2. Prima editio: I.