489、⑼这些人所犯的奸淫照着事后理解力赞成或不赞成奸淫而被归罪于他们。人的理解力越赞成罪恶，他就越将其归给自己，并把它们变成自己的。赞成就是同意，同意会诱使心智热爱它们。那些一开始未经理解力同意而犯下，后来又得到赞成的奸淫也一样。如果后来它们没有得到赞成，情况则相反。原因在于，理解力盲目的情况下所犯的罪恶或奸淫是出于肉体的情欲犯下的，和动物所具有的本能差不多。就人类而言，当犯下这些罪行的时候，理解力固然存在，但它的力量处于休眠状态，或是死的，而非处于活跃状态，或是活的。由此自然可知，这类行为被归罪与否要视后来它们被赞成或不被赞成的程度而定。我们在此所说的归罪是指死后所受的指控、因而审判；这取决于此人灵的状态。我们所说的指控不是指人在法官面前所受的指控；因为这并非取决于其灵的状态，而取决于其身体行为。如果这两种状态没有区别，那么在世被宣告无罪的人死后也会被宣告无罪，而在世被宣告有罪的人死后也会被宣告有罪；如此，后者就没有得救的希望了。
489、（9）这种人根据其事后是否认可其行为而会被定罪。
人的才智意愿认可罪恶的程度就决定了罪恶是属于这个人的自身的程度。因为认可罪恶就是同意罪恶行为，会使思想产生对罪恶的爱。有些通奸者最初并没认可它，但后来会认可自己的行为。
相反，若事后不认可所发生的行为。即通奸者的罪恶是在盲目情况下，没有通过意志思考出于躯体的色欲而发生的，就象我们在动物身上看到的本能行为一样。而在人类身上，人的才智是起到作用的。
所以这种行为会根据事后是否认可自己的行为而被定罪。所说的定罪是指死后，这样的人将会受到惩罚。这是根据人的精神状态而定的。这里所指的定罪并非指被法官所定罪。因为法官不是按人的精神的状态而做判断，只是通过人的行为来判断。若在世间认为无罪的，死后也无罪。世间有罪的，死后也有罪，那么对于后者来讲，也就没有被拯救的希望了。
489. (ix) Adultery by these persons is imputed, depending on whether their intellect afterwards approves or disapproves.
The more the intellect approves of evils, the more a person takes them to himself and makes them his own. Approval is consent, and consent induces the mind to love them. It is much the same with adultery, if to begin with committed without the consent of the intellect, and approved [afterwards]. The reverse happens, if afterwards they are not approved. The reason is that evils or acts of adultery committed while the intellect is blinded are due to bodily desire, being much like the instincts which animals have. In the case of human beings the intellect is admittedly present while the acts are being committed, but its powers are dormant or dead, not active or alive. It is the automatic consequence of this that such deeds are not imputed, except so far as they are subsequently approved or not. We mean by imputation here incurring blame and so judgment after death, and this depends on the state of a person's spirit. We do not mean being blamed by a person before a judge; this is not dependent on the state of his spirit, but on the deeds of the body. If this difference did not exist, those who are acquitted in the world would be acquitted after death, and those who are damned then would be condemned here. So they would not have any hope of being saved.
489. 9. Adulteries committed by such people are imputable to them according as their intellect afterwards sanctions them or does not sanction them. In the measure that the intellect sanctions evils, in the same measure does the person assimilate them into himself and make them his own. To sanction them means to assent to them, and the assent induces on the mind a state of love for those evils. It is the same with adulteries which in the beginning were committed without the assent of the intellect, but which are afterwards sanctioned.
The contrary is the case if they are not afterwards sanctioned. That is because evils or adulteries which are committed blindly without the assent of the intellect are prompted by a lust of the body, and are much like instinctive actions such as we find in the case of animals. In the human being the intellect is indeed present when they are committed, but having a passive or lifeless force, not an active or operative one.
It follows of itself from this that such actions are not imputed except in the measure that they are afterwards sanctioned or not sanctioned. By imputation we mean here an indictment and judgment after death, which proceeds in accordance with the state of the person's spirit. We do not mean an indictment by man before a judge. The latter does not proceed in accordance with the state of the person's spirit, but in accordance with that of his body in the deed. If the two proceedings were not to differ, after death those people would be exonerated who are exonerated in the world, and those would be condemned who are condemned in the world; and in that case the latter would be without any hope of salvation.
489. 9. People are to blame for these adulteries precisely as their intellect does or does not favor them afterwards. A person takes on evils and makes them his own to the extent that he intellectually favors them. Favor is agreement, and agreement puts him in a frame of mind to love them. It is this way with adulteries that were originally committed without consent, and that come to be relished. It is the opposite if they are not relished afterwards. The reason is that evils, or adulteries, committed with the intellect blind are committed due to the body's desire. These come close to being like the instincts that animals have. In a person, intellect is indeed present when he does evils, but with inactive or dead force, not with active or living force. From these observations the concept emerges by itself that acts like that are only blamed on a person in the measure that he does or does not relish them afterwards.
Attributing here means blame after death and a judgment from it - which is done in keeping with the state of the person's spirit - but it does not mean an accusation by a person before a judge. This is not done in keeping with the state of his spirit, but his body, in the act. If these states were not different things, whoever is acquitted in the world would be absolved after death, and whoever is condemned there would be damned, and therefore there would be no hope of salvation for him.
489. IX. THAT ADULTERIES COMMITTED BY THESE ARE IMPUTABLE ACCORDING AS THE UNDERSTANDING AFTERWARDS DOES OR DOES NOT FAVOR THEM. So far as his understanding favors evils, man appropriates them to himself and makes them his own. Favor is consent, and consent induces on the mind a state of love of them. It is the same with those adulteries which in the beginning were committed without the consent of the understanding, and are afterwards favored. The contrary is the case if they are not afterwards favored. The reason is, because evils or adulteries committed during blindness of the understanding are committed from the concupiscence of the body, and in likeness these approach to instincts such as beasts have. With man, the understanding is indeed present when they are committed, but present in passive or dead force and not in active or living force. From this it follows of itself that such adulteries are [imputed or] not imputed in the degree that they are afterwards favored or not favored. By imputation is here meant accusation after death and thence adjudication; this is made according to the state of the man's spirit. Accusation by a man before a judge is not meant; this is not made according to the state of his spirit but according to that of his body in the deed. If the two states were not different, then after death those would be absolved who are absolved in the world, and those would be condemned who are condemned in the world, and thus, for the latter there would be no hope of salvation.
489. (ix) Adulteries committed by these are imputable according as the understanding afterwards favors or does not favor them. A person appropriates evils to himself and makes them his as far as his understanding favors them. Favor means consent, and consent induces on the mind a state of love for the evils. It is similar with adulteries which were first done without the understanding's consent but later are countenanced. The contrary results if they are not afterwards favored. The reason is that evils or adulteries which are done in blindness of the understanding are done from the body's concupiscences, which begin to resemble instincts in animals. In a man understanding is present, of course, when the deeds are done, but as a passive or dead force, not as an active and living force. It follows of itself that such adulteries are not imputed except as they are afterwards favored or not favored. By imputation we mean accusation and judgment therefrom after death, which is made according to the state of the man's spirit; but not human inculpation before a judge, which is made not according to the state of a man's spirit but of the body in the deed. If these judgments did not differ, those men would be acquitted after death who were acquitted in the world, and those would be condemned who were condemned here, and thus the latter would be without hope of salvation.
489. (9) That adulteries committed by these are imputable according as the understanding afterwards favors them, or does not favor them. So far as his understanding favors evils, man appropriates them to himself and makes them his own. Favor is consent, and consent induces in the mind a state of love of them. It is similar with adulteries that in the beginning were committed without the consent of the understanding, and are favored. If they are not favored afterwards the contrary results. The reason is, that evils or adulteries that are committed in blindness of the understanding are done from the lust of the body; in likeness they approach to instincts such as are with beasts. With man, it is true, the understanding is present when they are committed, but with a passive or dead force, and not in active or living force.
From these considerations it follows of itself, that such deeds are not imputed except as they are afterwards favored, or are not favored. By imputation here is meant, accusation, and thence adjudication after death, which takes place according to the state of the spirit of the man. But inculpation by man before a judge is not meant. This is not pronounced according to the state of his spirit, but of the body, in the deed. If these did not differ, they would be absolved after death who are absolved in the world, and they would be condemned who are there condemned; and thus for these there would be no hope of salvation.
489. IX. Quod Adulteria ab his facta, imputatoria sint, sicut postea intellectus illis favet vel non favet. Quantum intellectus favet malis, tantum homo appropriat sibi illa, ac facit sua; favor est consensus, ac consensus inducit menti statum amoris illorum; simile est cum adulteriis, quae principio absque consensu intellectus facta sunt, et faventur; contrarium fit, si postea non faventur: causa est, quia mala aut adulteria, quae fiunt in occaecatione intellectus, fiunt ex concupiscentia corporis, quae similitudine accedunt ad instinctus, quales sunt apud bestias: apud hominem quidem intellectus adest dum fiunt, sed in vi passiva seu mortua, non autem in vi activa seu viva: ex his a se sequitur, quod talia non imputentur, nisi quantum postea faventur vel non faventur. Per imputationem intelligitur hic incusatio post mortem, et inde judicatio, quae fit secundum statum spiritus hominis; non autem intelligitur inculpatio ab homine coram judice; haec non fit secundum statum spiritus ejus, sed corporis in facto; quae nisi differrent, post mortem absolverentur qui absolvuntur in Mundo, et condemnarentur qui damnantur ibi, et sic non his foret aliqua spes salutis.