361、每个人都拥有这二者，即意愿和理解力，它们就像爱和智慧那样彼此不同；这一事实既为世人所知，也不为世人所知。这一事实是从普遍的感知得知的，而不是从思维，尤其理论化的思维得知的。出于普遍感知，谁不知道意愿和理解力在人里面是两个截然不同的实体？因为每个人在被告知这一点时都能感知到，他或许还会对别人说：“这个人的心意是好的，但他不是很聪明或没有弄清楚；另一方面，这个人很聪明，或这个人理解得很好，但他心意不好，或他的意愿不好。我喜欢又聪明心意又好的人，不喜欢虽然聪明，但心意很坏的人。”然而，当这个人对意愿和理解力进行理论化，或思想它们时，他没有把它们一分为二，加以区分，反而混淆了它们。原因在于，那时他的思维与其肉体视觉紧密相联。当他写下来时，更不明白意愿和理解力是两个截然不同的实体。这是因为那时他的思维与感官层，也就是此人自己的东西紧密相联。正因如此，有些人想得很好，说得也很好，但写得不好，这是女性的共同特征。
其它例子也一样。出于普遍感知，谁不知道一个过着良善生活的人会得救，一个过着邪恶生活的人会被定罪？或一个过着良善生活的人会进入天使社群，在那里作为一个人去看、去听、去说？又或者，一个出于公义而行公义，出于公平而行公平的人拥有良心？但是，如果一个人背离了普遍感知，并将这些事交给思维或理论，那么他就不知道：何为良心；或灵魂能看、能听、能说，和人一样；或良善的生活除了施舍穷人外还会是什么。你若出于思维或通过把它们理论化去写这些事，就是在用表象和谬误，以及有声音无实质的词语来证实自己的理论。因此，在有大量思想，或广泛理论化，尤其大量写下来，或将自己的理论写下来的学者当中，许多人已经削弱并模糊，甚至摧毁了自己的普遍感知；反倒是简单人比那些自以为超级智慧的人更清楚地看到何为良善和真理。
这种普遍感知是由于来自天堂的流注，该流注降至思维，甚至视觉。不过，思维一旦脱离普遍感知，就会陷入由视觉和人自己的东西所产生的幻想。你会发现事实的确如此。将某个真理告诉拥有普遍感知的任何人，他就会明白；告诉他，我们从神那里并在神里面拥有存在、生命和动作(使徒行传17:28)，他就会明白；告诉他，神在爱和智慧里面与人同住，他就会明白；进一步告诉他，意愿是接受爱的容器，理解力是接受智慧的容器，并稍加解释，他就会明白；告诉他，神是爱本身和智慧本身，他就会明白；问他何为良心，他就会告诉你。不过，把同样的话说给某个不从普遍感知，而是从原则，或从通过视觉由世界那里所获得的观念中获得思维的学者，他就不明白。然后，请想一想，究竟哪一个更有智慧。
361. It is both known and unknown in the world that we all have volition and discernment and that they can be distinguished from each other the way love and wisdom can. We know this from common sense, but not from our considered thinking and even less from written works. Judging the matter simply on common sense, would anyone not realize that the volition and discernment within us are distinguishable? Everyone grasps this on first hearing. We can say to someone, "That individual means well but does not understand things well," or "That individual understands things well but does not mean well. I like people who understand and mean well but not people who understand well and mean harm." When people start thinking about volition and discernment, though, they do not regard them as two distinguishable functions but mix them together. This is because their thinking is in touch with their physical sight. They understand even less about the distinct difference between volition and discernment when they start writing, which is because then their thinking is in touch with the sensory level that is our own human possession. This is why some people can think and talk well but still not write well, as is frequently the case with the female sex. The same holds in many other cases.
Does anyone fail to realize, simply on the basis of common sense, that people who live good lives are saved and people who live evil lives are damned? That people who live well come to be with angels and see, hear, and talk there like people? Or that the people who have a conscience are the ones who do what is fair because it is fair and what is right because it is right? If people step back from common sense, though, and give the matter serious thought, they do not know what conscience is or that the soul can see, hear, and talk the way we can or that a good way to live is anything more than giving to the poor. Then if you start writing on the basis of this thinking, you support these opinions with superficial and deceptive observations and with words that are all sound and no substance. This is why many of the scholars who have given much thought to this--and even more, the ones who have written about it--have undermined, obscured, and even destroyed their common sense. This is also why simple people see what is good and true more clearly than people who believe they are wiser.
This common sense comes from an inflow from heaven and descends through thought all the way to sight; but thought separated from common sense fades into fantasy based on sight and on self-importance.
You may test the truth of this. Say something true to people who have common sense and they will see it; tell them that we exist and move and live from God and in God and they will see it; tell them that God is living within us in our love and wisdom and they will see it; say even that volition is the dwelling of love, and discernment the dwelling of wisdom, and explain it a little and they will see it; say that God is love itself and wisdom itself and they will see it; ask them what conscience is and they will tell you. But say these same things to scholars who have not been thinking on the basis of common sense but on principles derived either from preconceptions or from what they observe in the world, and they will not see.
Then figure out who are the wiser.
361. The fact that every person possesses these two components, will and intellect, which are as distinct from each other as love and wisdom are from each other, is something that is known and not known in the world. It is known from common perception, and not known from theorizing, still less from theorizing in writing about them.
Who indeed does not know from common perception that the will and intellect are two distinct entities in a person? For everyone perceives this when he is told it, and he may also say to another, "This one means well, but he is not very intelligent. On the other hand, this one is very intelligent, but he does not mean well. I like someone who is intelligent and means well, but I do not like someone who is intelligent and means ill."
However, when the same person theorizes about the will and intellect, he does not make them two and distinguish them, but confuses them. The reason is that his thinking is then bound up with his physical sight. Still less does he comprehend that the will and intellect are two distinct entities when he is engaged in writing about them. That is because his thinking is then bound up with his sensual nature, which is a person's native character. (It is because of this that some people can think and speak well, but yet not write well - a characteristic common in the feminine sex.)
[2] The case is the same in many other instances. Who does not know from common perception that a person who leads a good life is saved, and that a person who leads an evil life is condemned? Or that a person who leads a good life enters into the company of angels, and there sees, hears and speaks as a person? Or further, that he has a conscience who acts justly from a just motive, or uprightly from an upright motive?
But if one parts with common perception and submits these matters to theorizing, he then does not know what conscience is, or that the soul can see, hear and speak as a person, or that goodness of life is anything other than giving to the poor. And if from theorizing about them you commit them to writing, you confirm your theories with appearances and misconceptions, and with words having sound but no substance.
For this reason, among the learned who have theorized extensively, and still more who have committed their theories to writing, many have enfeebled and obscured the common perception in them, indeed have destroyed it. And consequently the simple see more clearly what is good and true than those who believe themselves to be wiser than they.
[3] This common perception is due to influx from heaven, and it descends into thought even to the sight. But thought apart from common perception sinks into an imagination arising from the sight and from one's native character.
You may discover for yourself the reality of this. Tell someone who has common perception some truth, and he will see it. Tell him that we have our being and live and move from God and in God, 1 and he will see it. Tell him that God dwells in the love and wisdom in a person, and he will see it. Tell him further that the will is the recipient vessel of love, and the intellect the recipient vessel of wisdom, and with a little explanation he will see it. Tell him that God is love itself and wisdom itself, and he will see it. Ask him what conscience is, and he will tell you.
But tell the same things to some learned person who has not thought from common perception, but from principles or ideas seized on by his sight from the world. He will not see.
Consider after that who is the wiser.
Footnotes:
1. Acts of the Apostles 17:28.
361. That every man has these two, will and understanding, and that they are distinct from one another, as are love and wisdom from one another, is known and yet not known in the world. It is known by perception, and it is not known by thought, and still less from thought put into writing. For who does not know by common perception that will and understanding are two distinct things in man? Indeed, everyone perceives it when he hears, and possibly also says to another, "This man means well, but does not understand well; but the other man's understanding is good, but not his will. I like him whose understanding and will are both good, but I do not like him who understands well and wills wickedly." Yet when he thinks about the will and the understanding, he does not make them two and distinguish them, but confuses them, because his thought acts in common with the sight of the body. Still less does he perceive that will and understanding are two distinct things when he writes, since his thought then acts in common with the sensual, which is the man's proprium. Hence it is that some are able to think and speak clearly, yet cannot write well; this is common with the female sex. It is the same with many other things. Who does not know by common perception that the man who lives a good life is saved, and he who leads a bad life condemned? Also that a man whose life is good will enter the society of angels, and will see, hear, and speak there, just as man does? And that one who does what is just from justice, and what is right from rectitude, has a conscience? But if one gets away from common perception and submits these things to thought, one then does not know what conscience is; nor does one know that the soul can see, hear, and speak as man does, nor that goodness of life is anything else than giving to the poor. And if you write about such things from your thought, you confirm them by appearances and errors, and by words of sound but of no substance. This accounts for the fact that many learned men and great thinkers, especially among writers, have weakened and obscured, yea, have destroyed their common perception; while the simple see what is good and true more clearly than those who fancy themselves their superiors in wisdom. This common perception comes by influx from heaven and descends into the thought even to sight, but thought, separated from common perception, falls into the imagination, which comes from sight and man's proprium. That this is so, you may put to the test. Tell anyone in common perception something true, and he will see it; tell him that from God and in God we are, we live and are moved, and he will see it; tell him that God dwells with man in love and wisdom, he will see it; tell him further that the will is the receptacle of love, and the understanding the receptacle of wisdom, and explain it a little, he will see it; tell him that God is Love itself and Wisdom itself, and he will see it; ask him what conscience is, and he will tell you. But say the same things to any learned man who has not thought from common perception, but from principles or ideas obtained from the world through sight, and he will not see. Then consider which is the wiser.
361. That every man has these two, will and understanding, and that they are distinct from each other, as love and wisdom are distinct, is known and is not known in the world. It is known from common perception, but it is not known from thought and still less from thought when written out; for who does not know from common perception that the will and the understanding are two distinct things in man? For every one perceives this when he hears it stated, and may himself say to another, This man means well, but does not understand clearly; while that one's understanding is good, but his will is not; I like the man whose understanding and will are both good; but I do not like him whose understanding is good and his will bad. Yet when he thinks about the will and the understanding he does not make them two and distinguish them, but confounds them, since his thought then acts in common with the bodily sight. When writing he apprehends still less that will and understanding are two distinct things, because his thought then acts in common with the sensual, that is, with what is the man's own. From this it is that some can think and speak well, but cannot write well. This is common with women. It is the same with many other things. Is it not known by everyone from common perception that a man whose life is good is saved, but that a man whose life is bad is condemned? Also that one whose life is good will enter the society of angels, and will there see, hear, and speak like a man? Also that one who from justice does what is just and from what is right does right, has a conscience? But if one lapses from common perception, and submits these things to thought, he does not know what conscience is; or that the soul can see, hear, and speak like a man; or that the good of life is anything except giving to the poor. And if from thought you write about these things, you confirm them by appearances and fallacies, and by words of sound but of no substance. For this reason many of the learned who have thought much, and especially who have written much, have weakened and obscured, yea, have destroyed their common perception; while the simple see more clearly what is good and true than those who think themselves their superiors in wisdom. This common perception comes by influx from heaven, and descends into thought even to sight; but thought separated from common perception falls into imagination from the sight and from what is man's own. You may observe that this is so. Tell some truth to any one that is in common perception, and he will see it; tell him that from God and in God we are and live and are moved, and he will see it; tell him that God dwells with man in love and in wisdom, and he will see it; tell him further that the will is the receptacle of love, and the understanding of wisdom, and explain it a little, and he will see it; tell him that God is Love itself and Wisdom itself, and he will see it; ask him what conscience is, and he will tell you. But say the same things to one of the learned, who has not thought from common perception, but from principles or from ideas obtained from the world through sight, and he will not see. Then consider which is the wiser.
361. Quod duo illa, Voluntas et Intellectus, sint cuivis homini, et inter se distincta sicut amor et sapientia inter se, scitur et non scitur in Mundo; scitur ex communi perceptione, et non scitur ex cogitatione, et minus ex hac in descriptione: quis enim non ex communi perceptione scit, quod voluntas et intellectus sint duo distincta apud hominem; quisque enim id percipit dum audit, et quoque dicere potest alteri, "Hic bene vult, sed non bene intelligit; at hic bene intelligit, sed non bene vult; amo illum qui bene intelligit et bene vult, sed non amo illum qui bene intelligit et male vult:" at cum ille cogitat de voluntate et intellectu, non illa duo facit et distinguit, sed confundit; causa est quia cogitatio communicat cum visu corporis; ille adhuc minus comprehendit quod voluntas et intellectus duo distincta sint, cum scribit; causa est, quia tunc cogitatio communicat cum sensuali, quod est proprium hominis: inde est, quod quidam possint bene cogitare et loqui, sed usque non bene scribere; hoc commune est apud sexum foemininum.
[2] Simile est cum rebus aliis multis. Quis non ex communi perceptione novit, quod homo qui bene vivit, salvetur, et qui male vivit condemnetur; tum quod homo qui bene vivit inter angelos veniat, et ibi videat, audiat, et loquatur sicut homo: ut et, quod illi conscientia sit, qui facit justum ex justo, ac rectum ex recto: at si recedit a communi perceptione, et submittit illa cogitationi, tunc non scit quid conscientia, nec quod anima possit videre, audire et loqui sicut homo, nec quod bonum vitae sit nisi quam dare pauperibus: ac si ex cogitatione scribis illa, confirmas illa per apparentias et fallacias, ac per verba soni et nullius rei: inde est, quod plures eruditi, qui multum cogitaverunt, et plus qui scripserunt, communem perceptionem apud se debilitaverint et obscuraverint, imo destruxerint; et quod simplices clarius videant, quid bonum et verum, quam qui credunt se super illos sapere.
[3] Communis illa perceptio est ex influxu e Coelo, ac cadit in cogitationem usque ad visum, at cogitatio separata a communi perceptione cadit in imaginationem, ex visu et ex proprio. Quod ita sit, experiaris; dic alicui, qui in communi perceptione est, aliquod verum, et videbit; dic quod simus, vivamus et moveamur a Deo et in Deo, et videbit; dic quod Deus habitet in amore et in sapientia apud hominem, et videbit; dic porro, quod voluntas sit receptaculum amoris, et intellectus receptaculum sapientiae, et explica paulum, et videbit; dic quod Deus sit ipse Amor et ipsa Sapientia, et videbit; interroga quid conscientia, et dicet: at dic eadem alicui Erudito, qui non ex communi perceptione cogitaverat, sed ex principiis vel ex ideis captis per visum e mundo[;] is non videbit. Expende postea, quis sapientior.