78、⑶凡一个人出于自由照他的思维所行的，都会成为他永久的一部分。这是因为人的自我和自由构成一体。人的自我属于他的生命；凡一个人出于其生命所行的，都是出于自由而行的。再者，人的自我属于他的爱，因为每个人的生命都是他的爱；凡一个人出于其生命之爱所行的，都是出于自由而行的。人出于其自由照其思维行动，因为凡属于人的生命或爱的，都会变成思维的对象，并被他的思维所确认；当它被确认时，这个人就会出于自由照着他的思维去做它。
这是因为凡一个人所行的，都是出于意愿通过理解力而行的。自由属于意愿，思维属于理解力。此外，人能出于自由、违背理性行动，也能照着理性、不出于自由行动。不过，如此所行的一切，都不会归给这个人。这些行为只是他的口唇和身体的产物，而非他的灵和心的产物。不过，他的灵和心的产物，当也成为口唇和身体的产物时，就会归给他。这一事实可通过许多例子来说明，但此处不宜论述它。
归给人意味着进入他的生命，成为他生命的一部分，因而成为他自己的。然而，在下文我们会看到，没有任何东西是人自己的，它只是在他看来似乎是。在此只需说明，人出于自由照着理性所行的一切良善都会归给他，当作是他的，因为在思考、意愿、说话和行动的过程中，这良善在他看来，似乎是他的。然而，良善并不属于人，而是属于人里面的主（可参看76节）。我们将在适当地方看到邪恶如何归给人。
78. (3) Whatever a person does in freedom in accordance with his thought becomes attached to him as his and remains. That is because a person's character and his freedom are bound up together. A person's character has to do with his life, and what a person makes a part of his life, this he does in freedom. So, too, a person's character has to do with his love, for love is everyone's life, and what a person is moved to do by his life's love, this he does in freedom.
We say that what a person does in freedom he does in accordance with his thought, and that is because what is part of someone's life or love, this he also thinks about and justifies in thought, and when he has justified it, he then does it in freedom in accordance with his thought. For whatever a person does he does from the will by means of the intellect, and freedom is connected with the will, and thought with the intellect.
[2] A person can also act in freedom contrary to his reason, or in accordance with his reason without being in freedom. But what he does then does not attach itself to the person, being the product only of his mouth and body and not of his spirit or heart. Products of his spirit and heart, however, when they become ones also of his mouth and body - these do attach themselves to the person. The reality of this can be illustrated by many examples, but this is not the place for it.
[3] By something's attaching itself to a person we mean its entering into his life and becoming part of his life, so as to become his own. In subsequent discussions, however, we will see that nothing is a person's own, but that it only appears to him as if it were. Here we will say only that every good that a person does in freedom in accordance with his reason becomes attached to him as his, because in his thinking, willing, speaking and acting it appears to him as attributable to him. Nevertheless, the good is not the person's but the Lord's in the person, as may be seen in no. 76 above.
As for evil, how it becomes attached to a person will be seen in its own discussion.
78. 3. Whatever we have done from our freedom in accord with our thinking becomes a permanent part of us. This is because our sense of who we are and our freedom are integral to each other. Our sense of who we are is part of our life, and whatever we do from our life we do freely. Then again, our sense of who we are includes everything that comes from our love, because our love is our life; and whatever we do because of our life's love, we do freely.
We act freely and in keeping with our thought because we do think about whatever arises from our life or our love. We validate it in our thought; and once it is validated, we do it freely and in keeping with our thought.
[2] This is because everything we do, we do from our volition by means of our discernment, and freedom is a matter of volition and thought a matter of discernment.
We can also act freely and irrationally, and rationally but not freely. These actions do not become a permanent part of us, though. They come only from our mouths and our bodies, not from our spirits and our hearts. The things that come from our spirits and our hearts become part of us when they are owned by our mouths and our bodies. I could provide any number of examples, but this is not the place for it.
[3] "Becoming part of us" means entering our life and becoming a matter of life and therefore becoming part of our sense of who we are. However, I will be explaining later that there is really no "who we are," even though there does seem to be. At this point I will say only that everything good that we do freely, in keeping with reason, is incorporated into us as though it were ours, because it seems to us that it is ours when we think and intend and speak and act. Still, the goodness is not ours but the Lord's within us (see 76 above). There will be a separate section on how this incorporation takes place.
78. III. WHATEVER A MAN DOES FROM FREEDOM ACCORDING TO HIS THOUGHT, IS APPROPRIATED TO HIM AS HIS OWN, AND REMAINS WITH HIM. The reason is that man's proprium and his freedom make one. Man's proprium is of his life; and what a man does from his life he does from freedom. Further, man's proprium is what is of his love, for love is the life of everyone, and what a man does from his life's love that also he does from freedom. Man acts from freedom according to thought, because whatever is of the life or love of anyone is also an object of thought and is confirmed by thought; and when it has been confirmed then he does it from freedom according to his thought.
[2] For whatever a man does, he does from the will by means of the understanding; and freedom is of the will, and thought is of the understanding.
Moreover, man can act from freedom contrary to reason, and he can also act according to reason and not from freedom; but such acts are not appropriated to the man, being only the acts of his lips and of his body, and not of his spirit or heart; but the acts of his spirit and heart, when they also become the acts of his lips and of his body, are appropriated to him. That this is so could be shown by many illustrations; but this is not the place for them.
[3] By being appropriated to man is meant to enter his life and become part of it, consequently to become his own. However, it will be seen in what follows that there is nothing that is man's own: it merely seems as if it were. Here it needs only to be said that all the good which a man does from freedom according to reason is appropriated to him as his own, because in thinking, willing, speaking and doing it appears to him to be his own; and yet, the good is not man's but belongs to the Lord in him, as may be seen above (n. 76). But how evil is appropriated to man will be seen in the proper article.
78. (3) Whatever a man does from freedom in accordance with his thought is appropriated to him as his, and remains. This is because man's own (proprium) and his freedom make one. Man's own belongs to his life; and what a man does from his life he does from freedom. Again, man's own belongs to his love, for every one's life is his love; and what a man does from his life's love he does from freedom. From his freedom man acts in accordance with his thought, for the reason that whatever belongs to one's life or love becomes a subject of thought and is confirmed by his thought; and when it has been confirmed he does it from freedom in accordance with his thought.
[2] For whatever a man does, he does from the will by means of the understanding; and freedom belongs to the will, and thought to the understanding. Moreover, from freedom man is able to act contrary to reason, also to act in accordance with reason and not from freedom; but what is so done is not appropriated to the man; it belongs merely to his lips and body, not to his spirit and heart. But whatever is from his spirit and heart, when it comes to be also of the lips and body, is appropriated to him. That this is so could be shown by many illustrations; but this is not the place for them.
[3] To be appropriated to man means to enter into his life, and to become a part of his life, consequently to become his own. Yet there is nothing, as will be shown in what follows, that is man's own, it merely seems to him as if it were. Here it needs only to be said that every good that a man does from freedom in accordance with reason is appropriated to him as his, because in the thinking, the willing, the speaking, and the doing, it appears to him to be his; nevertheless, the good is not man's but the Lord's in man (as may be seen above,76). How evil is appropriated to man will be seen in the proper place.
78. III. Quod quicquid homo ex libero secundum suam cogitationem facit, approprietur ei sicut ejus, et remaneat; causa est, quia proprium hominis et liberum ejus unum faciunt; proprium hominis est vitae ejus, et quod homo ex vita facit, hoc ex libero facit; tum proprium hominis est quod est amoris ejus, nam amor est vita cujusvis, et quod homo ex amore vitae suae facit, hoc ex libero facit. Quod homo ex libero faciat secundum cogitationem, est causa, quia id quod vitae seu amoris alicujus est, hoc etiam cogitatur, et cogitatione confirmatur, et cum confirmatum est, tunc ex libero secundum 1cogitationem id facit;
[2] nam quicquid homo facit, ex voluntate per intellectum facit, ac liberum est voluntatis, et cogitatio est intellectus. Potest etiam homo ex libero contra rationem agere, 2tum ex non libero secundum rationem; sed haec non appropriantur homini; sunt modo oris et corporis ejus, et non spiritus seu cordis ejus; at quae spiritus et cordis ejus sunt, dum etiam fiunt oris et corporis, illa appropriantur homini: quod ita sit, per multa illustrari potest, sed hoc hujus loci non est.
[3] Per appropriari homini intelligitur intrare vitam ejus, et fieri vitae ejus, consequenter fieri proprium ejus. Quod autem non sit aliquod proprium hominis, sed quod appareat ei sicut sit, in sequentibus videbitur: hic solum, quod omne bonum, quod homo ex libero secundum rationem agit, approprietur ei sicut suum, quia in cogitando, volendo, loquendo et faciendo, apparet ei sicut suum, attamen bonum non est hominis, sed est Domini apud hominem, videatur supra [n.] 76. Quomodo autem malum homini appropriatur, in suo Articulo videbitur.
Footnotes:
1 Prima editio: secundnm
2 Prima editio: agere;