Life44.前面说明（27-28节），一个人可能知道、思想并理解许多事，却仍没有智慧。由于知道和思想，乃至理解某事是真的，属于信的范畴，所以一个人有可能自以为有信，其实却没有。他之所以没有信，是因为他陷入生活的邪恶，而生活的邪恶与信之真理永远不可能行如一体。生活的邪恶会摧毁信之真理，因为生活的邪恶与意愿有关，信之真理与理解力有关；意愿引导理解力，并使它与自己行如一体。因此，如果意愿里面有任何东西与意愿不一致，那么当人独自一人，并出于他的邪恶和对这邪恶的爱思考时，他要么将其理解力中的真理逐出，要么通过歪曲它而迫使它合一。而那些处于生活的良善之人则截然不同。当独自一人时，他们会出于良善思考，并热爱理解力中的真理，因为它与意愿一致。像真理与良善的结合那样的信仰与生活的结合便以这种方式产生了，这两种结合（译注：即真理与良善的结合并信仰与生活的结合）都类似于理解力与意愿的结合。
44. I explained in 27-28 above that we can know a great deal, can think and understand, and still not be wise; and since faith involves knowing and thinking and especially understanding that something is so, we can believe that we have faith although in fact we do not. The reason we do not have faith is that we are leading an evil life, and there is no way that an evil life and the truth we believe can act in unison. The evil we practice destroys the truth we believe. This is because the evil we practice resides in our will, but the truth we believe resides in our understanding; and will leads understanding and makes it act in unison with itself. So if there is anything in our understanding that does not agree with our will, when we are left to ourselves and are thinking on the basis of our evil and its love, then we either discard the truth that is in our understanding or make it cooperate by distorting it.
It is different if we are leading a good life. Then when we are left to ourselves we think on the basis of what is good, and love the truth that is in our understanding because it agrees. So there is a union of faith and life like the union of what is true and what is good, and both the former and the latter are like the union between understanding and will.
44. We have shown, in nos. 27 and 28 above, that a person may know, think and understand many things and yet not be wise. And because it is the function of faith to know and think, and still more to understand, that something is the case, a person may accordingly believe he has faith and yet not have it. The reason he does not is that he is caught up in the practice of evil, and the practice of evil and faith’s truth can never go together. The practice of evil destroys faith’s truth, because the practice of evil is a matter of the will, and faith’s truth a matter of the intellect, and the will leads the intellect and causes it to function in harmony with it. If, therefore, there is something in the intellect that is not in harmony with the will, then, when the person is left to himself and thinks in accord with his evil and his love of it, he either dismisses the truth he has in his intellect or compels it to be in harmony by a falsification of it.
The case is different with people engaged in the practice of good. When left to themselves, they think in accord with the goodness, and love the truth in their intellect, because it is in harmony with it.
Thus is formed a union of faith and life, a union like the union of truth and goodness, and both of these like the union of intellect and will.
44. It was shown above, Nos. 27, 28, that a man may know, think and understand many things, and yet not be wise; and since it is of faith to know and to think, and still more to understand that a thing is so, it is possible for a man to believe that he has faith, and yet not to have it. Such a man does not have faith because he is in evil of life: and the evil of life and the truth of faith can never act as one. Evil of life destroys the truth of faith, because evil of life has relation to the will and the truth of faith to the understanding, and the will leads the understanding and causes it to act in unity with itself. Therefore if there is anything in the understanding that is not in harmony with the will, when man is left to himself and thinks from his evil and its love, he either casts out the truth which is in his understanding, or by falsification forces it into unity. It is otherwise with those who are principled in the good of life. They, when left to themselves, think from good, and they love the truth which is in the understanding because it harmonises with the will. Thus there is effected a conjunction of faith and life, like the conjunction of truth and good, each resembling the conjunction of the understanding and the will.
44. It has been shown above (n. 27-28) that a man may know many things, may think them over, may understand them, and yet may not be wise. And as it is the province of faith to know and to think, and still more to understand, that a thing is true, a man may well believe that he has faith and yet not have it. The reason why he has it not, is that he is in evil of life, and evil of life and truth of faith cannot possibly act as a one. The evil of life destroys the truth of faith, because the evil of life is of the will and the truth of faith is of the understanding, and the will leads the understanding and makes it act as a one with itself, so that if there is anything in the understanding that is not in accord with the will, and the man is left to himself, and thinks from his own evil and the love of it, he then either casts out the truth that is in the understanding, or else by falsifying it forces it into oneness. Quite different is it with those who are in the good of life: such when left to themselves think from what is good, and love the truth that is in the understanding because it is in accord. In this way there takes place a conjunction of faith and life such as is that of truth and good, and both these conjunctions are like that of the understanding and the will.
44. Quod homo possit multa scire, cogitare, et intelligere, et tamen non sapere, supra (27, 28) ostensum est; et quia fidei est scire et cogitare, et magis adhuc intelligere quod ita sit, ita potest homo credere quod fidem habeat, et tamen non habet. Causa quod non habeat, est quia in malo vitae est, ac malum vitae et verum fidei nusquam possunt unum agere. Malum vitae destruit verum fidei, quia malum vitae est voluntatis, et verum fidei est intellectus, ac voluntas ducit intellectum, ac facit ut unum secum agat; quare si aliquid in intellectu est quod non concordat cum voluntate, hoc quando homo sibi relictus est, et ex suo malo et ejus amore cogitat, tunc verum, quod est in intellectu, vel ejicit, vel cogit ut unum sit per falsificationem. Aliter apud illos qui in bono vitae sunt; hi sibi relicti ex bono cogitant, et verum, quod in intellectu est, amant, quia concordat. Ita fit conjunctio fidei et vitae, sicut est conjunctio veri et boni, atque haec et illa sicut est conjunctio intellectus et voluntatis.