682. So it is also with a Rainbow, in which nothing but the most general form appears, namely, bands of successive colors, when yet each color is made up of countless rays flowing into it separately and producing this most general effect. The eye perceives the myriads of rays only as a unit, and even then indistinctly. That indistinct unit appears simply as some one color which is [actually] an indistinctness thus made up of many shades.
Since the sight perceives myriads of myriads as only a single entity, and an indistinct one at that, why should it be any different in the case of the earthly mind, whose sight is no deeper than the sight of the eye? That mind, consequently, does not understand where mental images come from, which are likewise [composed of] myriads of more inward ones.
If these latter were not flowing forth in distinct forms from an innermost life, and this from the Lord, nothing distinct could ever be conceived of in a mental picture. But since a mental image is not in itself a matter of understanding, but does come forth as it is by the agency of the understanding, it can therefore be understood by means of mental images.
Therefore it is evident how general, in fact most general or most vague, that is which one thinks to be clear, sharp, wise, ingenious - which, however, is anything but intelligent and wise.
682. As also the rainbow, in which nothing except what is most general appears, namely, the planes of successive colors; when yet each single color consists of an indefinite number of rays which flow thither distinctly, and produce this most general plane. The eye only perceives the myriads of rays together, and indeed obscurely. That obscurity appears only by some color, which is something obscure variegated in this way. Since the sight thus perceives myriads of myriads of rays only as one, and that as something obscure, how then can it be otherwise with the natural mind, which is a more interior sight than the sight of the eye? Consequently the natural mind does not understand whence come the ideas of the imagination, which likewise are myriads of more interior things, and unless they flowed forth distinctly from an inmost life, and this from the Lord, nothing distinct in an idea could ever be conceived. Nevertheless, since an imaginative idea is not in itself an intellectual idea, but exists as such from intellectual things, it can thence be understood by means of [intellectual] ideas. Thus it is evident how general, yea most general and most obscure, is that which man supposes to be distinct, acute, wise, and ingenious, which, nevertheless, is anything but intelligent and wise.
682. Sicut etiam Iris, in qua nihil nisi communissimum apparet, nempe plana colorum succedentium, cum tamen unusquisque color consistat a radiis indefinitis, qui distincte illuc alluunt, et communissimum hoc efficiunt, myriades radiorum simul oculus modo percipit, et quidem obscure, obscuritas ista apparet solum per aliquem colorem, qui est obscurum variegatum ita; cum visus ita modo myriades myriadum ut unum, et id obscurum, percipit, quid tunc aliter in mente naturali? quae est visus non 1
interior quam visus oculi, proinde non intelligit, unde imaginationis ideae, quae similiter sunt myriades intimiorum, quae nisi distincte a vita intima, et haec a Domino, effluerent, nusquam aliquid distinctum in idea potest concipi, cum tamen idea imaginativa, non sit in se intellectualis, sed ab intellectualibus existit talis, inde potest intelligi, per ideas; sic quam commune, imo communissimum seu obscurissimum est, quod homo putat distinctum, acutum, sapiens, ingeniosum, constat, quod tamen nihil minus est quam intelligens et sapiens.
Footnotes:
1. in J.F.I. Tafel's edition omisit