4574.“必有一个民族和一群民族从你而来”表良善和良善的神性形式。这从“民族”和“一群民族”的含义清楚可知：“民族”是指教会的良善（参看1259，1260，1362，1416，1849节）；“一群民族”是指源于良善的真理，或也可说，良善的形式；就论述主的至高意义而言，是指源于神性良善的神性真理，也就是良善的神性形式。
我首先要说明何为良善的形式，然后说明“一群民族”表示这类形式。之所以说源于良善的真理是良善的形式，是因为它们无非是被赋予表面形式的良善。凡以其它方式设想真理的人，尤其将它们与良善分离的人，都不知道何为真理。真理的确看似与良善分离，因而似乎是独自的形式。然而，它们只是在那些没有处于良善的人，或那些不按自己的意愿思考和说话，并由此行事的人看来是这样。因为人是如此被造的，他的理解和意愿可以构成一个心智；当理解与意愿行如一体，也就是此人按自己的意愿思考和说话，并由此行事时，它们就构成一个心智；在这种情况下，其理解中的思维就是其意愿的形式。理解中的思维被称为真理，因为真理其实属于理解；而意愿中的渴望则被称为良善，因为良善其实属于意愿。由此可知，就本身而言，理解无非是被赋予表面形式的意愿。
不过，由于“形式”这个术语带有人类哲学的意味，所以举一个例子有助于说明真理就是良善所到的形式。日常生活（无论公众的还是私人的）的两种美德，是正直和得体。正直是指在日常生活中衷心渴望别人好，而得体是指在言谈举止中表明这种正直。因此，就本身而言，得体无非是正直所取的形式，因为这是得体的起源。既如此，那么当正直通过得体，也就是通过言谈举止以得体的方式来表现自己时，正直可见于得体行为的每一个细节，以致凡通过言谈所说的，或通过举止所展现的，都被看作正直，因为一切都是形式或形像，正直便通过这些形式或形像来显现。正直和得救以这种方式如同本质及其形式，或本质之物与形式之物那样构成一体。但是，如果有人把正直与得体割裂开来，也就是向同伴意愿邪恶，却又在言谈举止上向其示好，那么他的言谈举止中就不再有任何正直了，无论他如何试图通过得体来表现正直的形式。这是缺乏正直，凡有洞察力的人都如此称呼它，因为这种正直要么是伪装的，要么是虚夸的，要么是诡诈或骗人的
由此可见，真理与良善是何情形。因为属灵生活中的真理好比日常生活中的得体，属灵生活中的良善好比日常生活中的正直。由此明显可知，真理是良善的形式时是何性质，与良善分离时又是何性质。它们若不来自良善，就是来自某种邪恶，是邪恶的形式，无论它们如何伪装成良善的形式。至于“一群民族”表示良善的形式，这从“民族”的含义可以看出来，“民族”是指良善，如刚才所述。因此，“一群民族”或民族的会众，表示它们的一种集合，这种集合无非是一种形式；这就是真理，如前所示。由于所表示的是真理，而“民族”表示良善，故经上不仅说“一个民族”从他而来，还说“一群民族”从他而来。否则，只采用一种说法就足够了。此外，在圣言中，“一群”、“会众”和“增多”论及真理。关于“增多”或“繁多”，可参看前文（参看43，55，913，983，2846，2847节）。
Potts(1905-1910) 4574
4574. A nation and a company of nations shall be from thee. That this signifies good and the Divine forms of good, is evident from the signification of a "nation," as being the good of the church (see n. 1259, 1260, 1362, 1416, 1849); and from the signification of a "company of nations," as being the truths which are from good, or what is the same, the forms of good; and in the supreme sense, in which the Lord is treated of, the Divine truths which are from Divine good, or the Divine forms of good. [2] I will first state what the forms of good are, and then show that a "company of nations" signifies them. The truths that are from good are said to be the forms of good because they are nothing else than goods formed. He who conceives of truths in any other way, and especially he who separates them from good, does not know what truths are. Truths do indeed appear as if separate from good, thus as a form by themselves, but only to those who are not in good, or to those who think and speak otherwise than as they will and thence act. For man is so created that his understanding and will may constitute one mind, and they do constitute one mind when the understanding acts as one with the will, that is, when the man thinks and speaks as he wills and thence acts, for in this case the things of his understanding are forms of his will. The things of the understanding are what are called truths, for truths are properly of the understanding, whereas the things of the will are what are called goods, for goods are properly of the will. From this it follows that regarded in itself the understanding is nothing but the will formed. [3] But as the term "form" savors of human philosophy, the matter shall be illustrated by an example, from which will be seen that truths are the forms of good. In civil and moral life there exist what is honorable [honestum] and what is becoming [decorum]. What is honorable is to will well to others from the heart in the affairs of civil life, and what is becoming is to testify this in speech and gesture. Thus regarded in itself what is becoming is nothing but the form of what is honorable, for this is its origin, and therefore when what is honorable shows itself by what is becoming (that is, in a becoming manner by speech and gesture), that which is honorable appears in every detail of that which is becoming, insomuch that whatever is uttered in the speech or shown in the gesture appears honorable, and is the form or image through which that which is honorable shines forth. In this way the two things make a one, like an essence and its form, or like what is essential and what is formal. But if anyone separates what is honorable from what is becoming, that is, if anyone wills evil to a companion, and yet speaks well and behaves himself well toward him, there is then no longer anything of what is honorable in the speech and gestures, however much he may study to make a show of the form of what is honorable by what is becoming; for it is really dishonorable, and every discerning person so calls it, because it is either feigned, or fraudulent, or deceitful. [4] From all this we can see how the case is with truths and goods; for truths in spiritual life are circumstanced as is what is becoming in civil life; and hence it is evident what is the quality of truths when they are the forms of good, and what when separated from good; for when they are not from good they are from some evil, and are its forms, however much they may counterfeit the forms of good. That a "company of nations" denotes the forms of good, may be seen from the signification of "nations," as being goods, of which just above. Hence a "company" or congregation of them denotes a collection of them, which is nothing else than a form; and that this is truth has been shown. And as truths are what are signified, and by a "nation" is signified good, it is therefore said not only that a "nation" shall be from him, but also a "company of nations;" otherwise one expression would have sufficed. Moreover in the Word a "company," a "congregation," and a "multitude" are said of truths. (Regarding "multitude" and "being multiplied" see n. 43, 55, 913, 983, 2846, 2847).
Elliott(1983-1999) 4574
4574. 'A nation and a company of nations will be from you' means good and Divine forms of good. This is clear from the meaning of 'a ration' as the good of the Church, dealt with in 1259, 1260, 1362, 1416, 1849, and from the meaning of 'a company of nations' as truths which spring from good, or what amounts to the same, which are forms of good, and as - in the highest sense in which the Lord is the subject - Divine Truths which spring from Divine Good, which are Divine forms of Good.
[2] What forms of good are must be stated first, and after this the fact that 'a company of rations' means such forms. Truths which spring from good are called forms of good because they are nothing else than goods that have been given outward form. Anyone who conceives of truths in any other way, more so anyone who separates them from good, does not know what truths are. Truths do indeed seem to be separate from good and so seem to be forms that exist unconnected to anything else. Yet they seem to be so only to those who have no affection for what is good, that is, people whose thought and speech are at variance with what they will and therefore do. For the human being has been so created that his understanding and will may constitute a united mind; and they do constitute a united mind when the understanding acts in unison with the will, that is, when his thought and speech are in keeping with what he wills and therefore does, in which case also the thoughts in his understanding are the forms which give expression to his will. Thoughts present in the understanding are called truths, for truths belong properly to the understanding, whereas desires present in the will are called goods, for goods belong properly to the will. Consequently, regarded in itself that which exists in the understanding is nothing else than the form taken by that which exists in the will.
[3] But since the expression 'forms' smacks of human philosophy, let an example serve to show that truths are the forms taken by good: Two virtues of everyday life, public or private, are integrity and propriety. Integrity consists in the heartfelt desire for another person's good within everyday life, whereas propriety consists in the demonstration of that integrity in speech and gestures, so that regarded in itself propriety is nothing other than the form which integrity takes, for this is what gives rise to propriety. This being so, when integrity displays itself through propriety, that is, through proper and appropriate speech and gestures, integrity is seen in every aspect of proper behaviour. This is so much the case that everything uttered through speech or expressed through gestures is seen as integrity, for everything is a form or image by means of which integrity shines forth. Integrity and propriety accordingly go together like essence and its form, or what is essential and what is formal. But if anyone severs integrity from propriety - that is, if he bears ill- will towards his fellow man, yet speaks well of him and behaves well towards him - there is no longer any integrity at all in his words or actions, no matter how much he tries to present through propriety an outward form that looks like integrity. It is absence of integrity, and one who is clear-sighted calls it this, because it is either pretentious, fraudulent, or deceitful.
[4] From all this one may see what the situation is with truths and goods. Truths in spiritual life may be likened to propriety in everyday life, and good in spiritual life to integrity in everyday life. This comparison shows what truths are like when they are the forms assumed by good, and what they are like when severed from good. When they are not extensions from good, they are extensions from something bad and are forms assumed by this, no matter how much they may be spoken of as forms assumed by good. As regards 'a company of nations' meaning forms of good, this becomes clear from the meaning of 'nations' as goods, dealt with immediately above. Hence a company or assembly of them is a gathering together of them, which is nothing other than the form they receive; and this, as has been shown, is truth. Since truths are meant, yet 'a ration' means good, not only 'a nation'- it is said - will descend from him but also 'a company of nations'. Otherwise one of the expressions would be sufficient. Furthermore 'company', 'assembly', and 'multitude', when used in the Word, have reference to truths. For 'multitude' or 'being multiplied', see 43, 55, 913, 983, 2846, 2847.
Latin(1748-1756) 4574
4574. `Gens et coetus gentium erit a te': quod significet bonum et boni Divinas formas, constat ea significatione `gentis' quod sit bonum Ecclesiae, de qua n. 1259, 1260, 1362, 1416, 1849; et a significatione `coetus gentium' quod sint vera quae ex bono, seu quod idem, boni formae, et in supremo sensu in quo agitur de Domino, Divina Vera quae ex Divino Bono, seu Boni Divinae formae. [2] Quid boni formae, primum dicendum, postea quod `coetus gentium' illas significent: vera quae ex bono, dicuntur formae boni quia non aliud sunt quam bona formata; qui aliter capit vera, et magis qui separat illa a bono, non scit quid vera; apparent quidem vera sicut separata a bono, ita {1} sicut formae {2} per se, sed modo illis qui non in bono sunt, seu illis qui aliter cogitant et loquuntur quam volunt et (o)inde agunt; homo enim ita creatus est ut intellectus et voluntas unam mentem constituant, et tunc unam mentem constituunt quando intellectus unum agit cum voluntate, hoc est, quando homo ita cogitat et loquitur, sicut vult et inde agit;tunc etiam intellectualia ejus sunt formae voluntatis ejus;
intellectualia sunt quae vera dicuntur, nam vera (t)sunt proprie' intellectus, voluntatis (o)autem sunt quae bona vocantur, nam bona sunt proprie voluntatis; inde sequitur quod intellectuale in se spectatum non sit nisi quam voluntarium formatum. [3] Sed quia vox formae sapit ex philosophia humana, illustrabitur per exemplum {3}, inde patebit quod vera sint formae boni: in vita civili (o)et morali datur honestum et decorum, honestum est ex corde alicui bene velle in illis quae sunt vitae civilis, decorum autem est testari illud per loquelam et gestus, ita decorum in se spectatum non aliud est quam forma honesti, inde enim est origo decori; quapropter cum honestum se exserit per decorum, seu decore, per loquelam et gestus, tunc in singulis decori apparet honestum, adeo ut quicquid per loquelam pronuntiatur et per gestus ostenditur, honestum appareat, (o)est forma seu imago, per quam honestum elucet; ita unum faciunt, sicut essentia et ejus forma, seu essentiale et formale {4}: at si quis separat honestum a decoro, hoc est, si quis vult male socio et tamen loquitur bene, ac gerit se adversus illum bene, tunc non amplius est aliquid honesti in loquela et in gestibus utcumque formam sicut honesti per decorum inducere studet, sed est inhonestum, et qui perspicax est, etiam inhonestum vocat, quia simulatorium, vel fraudulentum, vel dolosum. [4] Ex his constare potest quomodo se habet cum veris et bonis; vera enim in vita spirituali se habent sicut decora [in vita civili, et bonum in vita spirituali se habet sicut honestum] in vita civili; inde patet qualia vera sunt quando sunt formae boni, et qualia sunt cum separata a bono; sunt enim cum non a bono, a quodam malo, et ejus formae, utcumque mentiuntur formas boni {5}. Quod `coetus gentium' sint formae boni, constare potest a significatione `gentium' quod sint bona, de qua (o)mox supra, inde illarum coetus seu congregatio, est collectio illarum, quae non aliud est quam forma, quae quod sit verum, {6} ostensum est; et quia vera {7} sunt quae significantur, et per `gentem' significatur bonum, ideo non modo dicitur quod `gens ex illo erit' sed etiam `coetus gentium' alioquin unum satis esset: praeterea `coetus, congregatio et multitudo in Verbo de veris praedicantur; quod `multitudo' seu `multiplicari', videatur n. 43, 55, 913, 983, 2846, 2847. @1 i ac$ @2 forma I$ @3 i quid sit, et$ @4 i ejus$ @5 bonum$ @6 inde coetus illarum, seu congregatio illarum, sunt collectiones illarum quae non aliud sunt quam (formationes del.) formae illarum, quae quod sint vera$ @7 illa$