1970. It was said that truths cannot be learned, either, and are therefore rejected as theories. Take, for example, just this one truth, which hardly anyone would believe, when yet it is a truth of nature:
That the least thought and feeling touches all the organic beginnings of the brain that form the heads of the fibrils, namely, the cortical substances. And because it touches those very beginnings, it also affects all of the fibrils arising from those beginning ones, which number myriads of myriads-therefore the whole body. Also, that of those myriads, not a single cortical substance, not a single tissue, nor a single particle of a tissue, is entirely like another, but that there is a constant variation, so that the whole brain and the whole body, with all their countless differing parts, is involved in just one single, tiniest interval of our thought, which we suppose to be refined to the uttermost degree, when yet each and every particle of thought is composed of innumerable varieties of persuasion and feeling.
Who would believe all this, when yet it is merely a truth of nature that can be demonstrated both by familiar philosophy and by experiments? 1748, 16 May.
1970. That truths cannot be apprehended, but are rejected among idle conceits, is evinced by one example which, though a natural verity, would scarcely be believed, to wit, that the least degree of thought and affection produces an effect upon all the organic principles of the brain which are in front of the fibrils, namely, the cortical substances; and because it affects the principles, it affects also all things of the fibers arising from them, which are myriads of myriads, and thus the whole body. Moreover, that of all those myriads, there is no portion of cortical substance, no fiber, no point of a fiber, that is altogether like another, but a continual variety reigns throughout, and thus the whole brain and the whole body with its innumerable varieties constitute one single and most subtle act of our thought, which we indeed suppose to be of infinite subtlety, but which nevertheless consists of countless varieties of persuasion and affection in each minutest point of thought. Yet who would believe these things, when notwithstanding it is simply the statement of a natural truth, which can be demonstrated as well from known philosophy as from manifold experience? - 1748, May 16.
1970. Quod veritates nec apprehendi queant, quare inter hypotheses rejiciuntur, sicut modo unum, quod vix aliquis crederet, cum tamen est veritas naturalis: quod minimum cogitationis et affectionis, afficiat omnia principia organica cerebri, quae fibrillis praefixa sunt, nempe substantias corticales, et quia principia [afficit], etiam omnia fibrarum ex principiis oriundarum, quae myriades myriadum sunt, ita totum corpus, et quod [inter] myriades istas 1
, nulla substantia corticalis, et nulla fibra, nec ullum punctum fibrae, sit prorsus simile alteri, sed quod continua varietas, et quod sic universum cerebrum, et totum corpus, cum tot innumerabilibus varietatibus modo unicum momentum subtilissimum cogitationis nostrae constituat, quod putamus esse infinitae subtilitatis, et tamen ex innumerabilibus varietatibus persuasionis et affectionis in unoquovis minimo puncto cogitationis [consistit] 2
: quisnam haec crederet? cum tamen veritas mere naturalis est, et demonstrabilis tam ex philosophia cognita, quam ab experientiis. 1748, 16 Maj.
Footnotes:
1. The Manuscript has istae
2. sic in J.F.I. Tafel's edition