349.他们同样承认，普遍实体若不凭借它的最单个部分，绝不是普遍的；因此，绝无可能有一个不延伸到最小细节的普遍天命。（1747年12月15日）
349. They likewise agree that a universal entity [can] in no wise be universal but by virtue of its most single parts, consequently that there can in no wise be a universal Providence that does not extend to the very least details.
349. They in like manner acknowledge that the Universal Entity would never be universal except from its veriest singulars; consequently, that there can never be a universal Providence unless it be of the veriest single things. 1747, Dec. 15.
349. Similiter agnoscunt id quod ens universale, nusquam esse 1
universale 2
nisi a singularissimis, proinde quod nusquam dari possit Providentia 3
universalis, nisi sit singularissimorum. 1747, 15 Dec.
Footnotes:
1. sic manuscript; vide praefationem hujus editionis sub capite "Idiosyncrasies"
2. The Manuscript has universali
3. The Manuscript has Provdentia