3666. About the objects of people on earth
Spirits are extremely moved by the fact that objects cause people on earth to think about different things, randomly, supposing thus that the life of the Lord does not flow into all and every single one of us and into all things down to the very least which both people on earth and spirits think and do. For they assume that there should be the greatest regularity and that one mental image should flow in succession from another.
So when I spoke with spirits who entertain such doubts, on the street, I was first shown that there are general reflections that govern human thoughts, some general reflections implanted in such a way that one does not know one has them, such as when he only slightly notices any of the people he happens to meet, or the street along which he is walking.
[2] These objects arise from that general impression so that the person may take care not to bump into people and into obstructions on the streets. Then when one is absorbed in some other general mental image, such objects only slightly strike the eyes, so slightly, if one is steeped in some other profound mental picture, that one remembers nothing of them. That general impression is a kind of reflection, connate even to brute animals, lest we stumble and someone hurt us.
I looked at the moon, and to judge a distance, it is common knowledge that intervening objects enable us to know it. On this general principle neither a human being nor an animal reflects. Even distance is a matter of experience as to how far away something is, that being how the same general reflection is obtained. As for human mental images, they are nothing but general objects, and indeed, arising from human desires, and other factors.
3666. CONSEQUENTLY THE OBJECTS OF MEN.
Spirits are greatly moved by the fact that the objects of man cause him to think concerning a variety of things, and that without order, supposing thus that the life of the Lord does not flow into all and each [of persons], and into all and each [of the things] which both men and spirits think and do; for they assume that if this was so, it would be most regular [and unvarying], and one idea would flow in order from another. Thus when I spoke openly with spirits who make such things doubtful to themselves, it was first shown me that there are common [or general] things which govern the thoughts of man, and certain common [or general) things so implanted that he knows not that he has them, as that he slightly looks upon certain persons whom he incidentally meets, as also upon the street where he walks. These objects arise from that common [or general prompting] that leads a man to observe [and take care] that he does not run against another, or against the objects that occur in the streets. So also when he is in another common [or general] idea, such objects strike the eyes but lightly, so lightly indeed that if deeply absorbed in a different common [or general] idea, he recollects nothing at all of them. Such a common [or general thought] is a kind of reflection, innate in brutes also, prompting one to beware of stumbling against anything, or of receiving injury from anyone. To know, for instance, in regard to the moon and to distances, it is a common principle that intermediate objects enable one to judge of distance, upon which common principle neither man nor animal reflects, but distance is known from the simple perception that an object is more or less remote, from whence also the common property of the idea is acquired. As to what relates to the ideas of man, the things above spoken of are nothing else than generals [of thought], and are according to their cupidities and other things.
3666. De objectis hominum
Spiritus maxime movet, quod objecta hominis, faciunt eum cogitare de diversis, absque ordine, putantes sic quod vita Domini non influat in omnes et singulos, et in omnia et singula, quae cogitant et agunt tam homines quam spiritus, nam ponunt sic quod regularissimum foret, et una idea ab altera in ordine flueret: sic cum loquutus cum spiritibus, qui talia sibi dubia faciunt, in platea, ostensum mihi primum, quod communia sint quae regunt cogitationes hominis, et quaedam communia ita implantata, ut nesciat quod habeat, sicut quod homines quoscunque, quibus occurrit, leviter videat, tum plateam, ubi ambulat; haec objecta oriuntur ab eo communi, ut animadvertat homo, ne impingat in homines, et in obvia plateae, tum cum in alia communi idea est, tunc modo leviter talia objecta stringunt oculos, et tam leviter, si in profunda alia communi idea est, tunc modo leviter talia objecta stringunt oculos, et tam leviter, si in profunda alia communi idea, ut nihil eorum meminerit, tale commune est reflexionis genus, etiam brutis connatum, ut caveat ne impingat, et ne quis eum laedat. Inspexi lunam, et distantiam scire, est commune quod intermedia faciant scire distantiam, super quod commune nec homo reflectit, nec animal, etiam distantia noscitur ex cognitione, quod [tantum] absit, inde etiam idem commune comparatur. Quod ideas hominis attinet, ea [objecta] non nisi quam communia sunt, et quidem secundum eorum cupiditates, et alia.