5094.“酒政和膳长”表关于这两种感官能力。这从“酒政”和“膳长”的含义清楚可知：“酒政”是指受心智的理解力部分支配的感官能力（参看5077节）；“膳长”是指受意愿部分支配的感官能力（5078节）。这些被内层属世层抛弃了，如前所述（5083，5089节）。然而，要知道，感官的实际能力，即视觉、听觉、嗅觉、味觉和触觉的能力并未被抛弃，因为肉体的生命依赖于这些；被抛弃的是内视或思维，以及依赖于它的情感和欲望。属世界的物体一方面经由人的感官，另一方面经由他的理性思维进入他的外在或属世记忆。这些物体在他的记忆里会彼此分开；经由理性思维进入的占据更内在的位置，而经由感官进入的则占据更外在的位置；因此，如前所述，属世层具有两个部分，即内层和外层。
内层属世层就是埃及王法老所代表的，而外层属世层则由“酒政”和“膳长”所代表的。二者之间有何不同，可从他们看待事物的不同方式，也就是他们的思维和基于这思维所得出的结论清楚看出来。出于内层属世层思考并形成结论的人是理性的，并且在他吸收经由理性思维进入之物的程度内变得理性；而出于外层属世层思考并形成结论的人是感官的，并且在他吸收从感官事物进入之物的程度内而变得感官化。这种人被称为感官人，而另一种人被称为理性人或理性-属世人。当人死亡时，他会带走整个属世层；其形式仍和它在世时所取的一样。他也在从理性思维吸收观念的程度内而理性化，在从感官吸收观念的程度内而感官化。二者之间的区别在于，属世层从理性思维吸收观念并将它们变成自己的到什么程度，就通过贬低并抛弃由感官所形成的错觉而视属于外层属世层的感官在它之下，并掌控它们到什么程度。而它吸收身体感官所形成的观念并将它们变成自己的到什么程度，就通过贬低并抛弃理性思维而视理性思维在它之下到什么程度。
例如，理性属世人能明白人不是凭自己，而是凭经由天堂从主而来的生命流注活着；但感官人就不明白这一点，因为他说，他明明感受并发觉生命在他自己里面，说话违背感官证据是毫无意义的。再例如，理性属世人能明白天堂与地狱的存在，而感官人却否认这些的存在，因为他不明白，另一个世界比他用肉眼所看到的世界更纯净。理性属世人明白看不见的灵人和天使是存在的，而感官人不明白这一点，因为他以为他看不见、摸不着的东西不存在。
又例如，理性属世人明白，关注目的、预见并使得方法朝向某个最终目的是聪明人的标志。当他从一切事物的秩序来看待自然界时，会发现自然界是一个复杂的方法系统，然后意识到一个智慧的至高存在者赋予它们方向，不过是通向他若非变得属灵，就无法看见的最终目的。另一方面，感官人不明白，不同于自然界并与之分离的事物如何能存在，或在自然界之上、优越于自然界的某种存在或实体如何能存在。他不明白什么叫运用聪明、智慧，关注目的，或赋予方法以方向，除非所有这些活动作为属世活动被论及；当它们作为属世活动被论及时，他对这些运作便有了一个观念，这观念就像一个正在设计一台机器之人的观念。从这几个例子可以看出何谓内层属世层和外层属世层，以及感官能力被抛弃，不是身体的视觉、听觉、嗅觉、味觉和触觉被抛弃，而是它们对于内层事物所得出的结论被抛弃。
Potts(1905-1910) 5094
5094. The butler and the baker. That this signifies concerning the sensuous things of both kinds, is evident from the signification of a "butler," as being the sensuous subordinate to the intellectual part (see n. 5077); and from the signification of a "baker," as being the sensuous subordinate to the will part (n. 5078). That these were rejected by the interior natural has been said above (n. 5083, 5089). Be it known, however, that it was not the sensuous things themselves-namely, those of the sight, hearing, smell, taste, and touch-that were rejected, for from these the body lives; but it was the views or thoughts, and also the affections and desires, from them. Objects from the world enter into the external or natural memory of man through these sensuous things on the one hand, and objects through rational things on the other. These objects separate themselves in his memory. Those which have entered through rational things take a more interior place, but those which have entered through the sensuous things have a more exterior place; hence as before said the natural becomes twofold, interior and exterior. [2] The interior natural is what is represented by Pharaoh the king of Egypt, but the exterior natural by the butler and the baker. What the difference is may be seen from their respective views of things, or thoughts, and the conclusions thence derived. One who thinks and concludes from the interior natural is so far rational as he imbibes what enters through the rational; but one who thinks and concludes from the exterior natural, is so far sensuous as he imbibes what enters from sensuous things. Such a man is also called a sensuous man, but the other a rational man. When a man dies he takes with him all the natural; and such as it has been formed with him in the world, such it remains; insofar as he has become imbued with what is from the rational, insofar he is rational; and insofar as he has become imbued with what is from the sensuous, so far he is sensuous. The difference is that insofar as the natural has drawn and appropriated to itself what is from the rational, so far it looks at as beneath itself the sensuous things of the exterior natural, and insofar it has dominion over them, deeming worthless and rejecting the fallacies thence derived, whereas insofar as the natural has drawn and appropriated to itself anything from the sensuous things of the body, so far it looks at rational things as beneath itself, deeming them worthless and rejecting them. [3] For example, the rational natural man can comprehend that man does not live from himself, but by an influx of life through heaven from the Lord; but the sensuous man cannot comprehend this, for he says that he plainly feels and perceives that life is in himself, and that it is idle to speak contrary to the evidence of the senses. As another example: the rational natural man comprehends that there is a heaven and a hell, whereas the sensuous man denies this, because he does not apprehend that there is any purer world than that which he sees with his eyes. The rational natural man comprehends that there are spirits and angels who are unseen; but the sensuous man does not comprehend this, supposing that to be nothing which he does not see and touch. [4] As still another example: the rational natural man comprehends that it is the part of an intelligent man to look at ends, and to foresee and to dispose the means to some ultimate end. When he looks at nature from the order of things, he sees that nature is a complex of means, and he then perceives that a Supreme Being of intelligence has disposed them; but to what ultimate end he does not see unless he becomes spiritual. On the other hand the sensuous man does not comprehend that there can be anything distinct from nature, thus neither that there can be any Entity which is above nature. What it is to understand, to be wise, to look at ends, and to dispose means, he does not apprehend unless it is called natural; and when it is called natural, he has an idea of these operations like that which an artificer has of an automaton. From these few instances it may be seen what is meant by the interior natural and the exterior natural, and also what by sensuous things being rejected; namely, not the rejection of the things of sight, hearing, smell, taste, and touch, in the body, but of the conclusions therefrom concerning interior things.
Elliott(1983-1999) 5094
5094. 'The cupbearer and the baker' means regarding both kinds of sensory powers. This is clear from the meaning of 'the cupbearer' as the sensory powers subordinate to the understanding part of the mind, dealt with in 5077, and from the meaning of 'the baker' as the sensory powers subordinate to the will part, dealt with in 5078, which, as stated above in 5083, 5089, were cast aside by the interior natural. But it should be realized that the actual powers of the senses were not cast aside - that is to say, sight, hearing, smell, taste, and touch, for the life of the body is dependent on these - but the insights or thoughts, as well as the affections and desires, that are dependent on them. Objects belonging to the world enter a person's external or natural memory by way of his senses on the one hand and by way of his rational thought on the other. These objects then divide themselves off from one another in that memory; those entering through rational thought place themselves in a more internal position, whereas those entering through the senses do so in a more external one, as a consequence of which the natural comes to have two parts - the interior part and the exterior - as has also been stated above.
[2] The interior natural is what 'Pharaoh king of Egypt' represents, while the exterior natural is what 'the cupbearer and the baker' represents. The nature of the difference between the two becomes clear from the different ways they look at things, that is, from their thoughts and their conclusions based on those thoughts. The person who uses the interior natural to think with and to form conclusions is rational, and is so insofar as he has absorbed what comes to him through rational thought; but the person who uses the exterior natural to think with and form conclusions is governed by his senses, and is so insofar as he has absorbed what comes to him from sensory evidence. Such a person is called one governed by his senses, whereas the other is called one who is rational-natural. When a person dies he has the entire natural with him; and its form remains the same as that which it took in the world. He is also rational-minded to the extent he has absorbed ideas from rational thought, but sensory-minded to the extent he has absorbed ideas from his senses. The difference between the two is that, to the extent it has absorbed ideas from rational thought and made them its own, the natural looks down on the senses belonging to the exterior natural and controls them by disparaging and casting aside illusions formed by the senses. But to the extent that it has absorbed ideas formed by the bodily senses and made them its own the natural looks down on rational thought by disparaging this and casting it aside.
[3] An example of the difference between the two may be seen in the ability of the rational-natural man to comprehend that no one's life is self-existent but that it comes to him through an influx of life from the Lord by way of heaven, and the inability of one governed by the senses to comprehend the same. For the latter says his senses tell him and he can plainly see that his life is self-existent and that it is pointless to contradict the evidence of the senses. Let another example be given. The rational-natural man comprehends the existence of a heaven and a hell; but one governed by his senses denies the existence of these because he has no conception of another world purer than the one he sees with his eyes. The rational-natural man comprehends the existence of spirits and angels who are not visible to him; but one governed by the senses cannot comprehend the same, for he imagines that what he cannot see or touch has no existence.
[4] Here is another example. The rational-natural man comprehends that it is the mark of an intelligent being to have ends in view, and with foresight to be directing means towards some final end. When he looks at the natural creation from the point of view of the order of everything, he sees the natural creation as a complex system of means and realizes that an intelligent Supreme Being has given them direction, though to what final end he cannot see unless he becomes spiritual. But a person governed by his senses does not comprehend how anything distinct and separate from the natural creation can exist or how some Being superior to the natural order can do so. He has no notion of what exercising intelligence, exercising wisdom, having ends in view, or giving direction to means may be unless all these activities are being spoken of as natural ones; and when they are spoken of as such, his idea of them is like that of one who is designing a machine. These few examples show what is meant by the interior natural and the exterior natural, and by the powers of the senses being cast aside - not sight, hearing, smell, taste, and touch in the body, but the conclusions reached by these about interior matters.
Latin(1748-1756) 5094
5094. `Pincerna et pistor': quod significet de sensualibus utriusque generis, constat ex significatione `pincernae' quod sit sensuale subordinatum parti intellectuali, de qua n. 5077; et ex significatione `pistoris' quod sit sensuale subordinatum parti voluntariae, de qua n. 5078; quod haec rejecta sint ab interiore naturali, supra n. 5083, 5089 dictum; at sciendum quod ipsa sensualia non rejecta sint, nempe quae sunt visus, auditus, olfactus, gustus, tactus, nam ex his vivit corpus, sed intuitiones seu cogitationes ex illis, tum affectiones ac cupidines ex illis;in memoriam externam seu naturalem hominis intrant objecta e mundo per sensualia illa ab una parte, et in illam intrant objecta per rationalia ab altera parte; haec se in memoria illa separant; quae intrarunt per rationalia, se locant interius, quae autem intrarunt per sensualia, se locant exterius; inde naturale fit duplex, nempe interius et exterius, ut quoque supra dictum; [2] naturale interius est quod repraesentatur per `Pharaonem regem Aegypti', naturale autem exterius per `pincernam et pistorem'; qualis differentia sit, constare potest ex intuitionibus rerum seu cogitationibus et inde conclusionibus; qui cogitat et concludit ex interiore naturali, is quantum per rationale hausit, tantum est rationalis; at qui cogitat et concludit ab exteriore naturali, is quantum ex sensualibus hausit, tantum est sensualis; talis homo etiam vocatur sensualis homo, alter vero rationalis naturalis. Homo cum moritur, omne naturale secum habet, et quale in mundo apud illum formatum est, tale quoque manet; quantum imbuerat ex rationali, tantum quoque rationalis est, et quantum ex sensuali tantum est sensualis;
differentia est quod naturale quantum hauserat et appropriaverat sibi ex rationali, tantum spectet sensualia quae sunt naturalis exterioris infra se, et tantum dominetur his, vilipendendo et rejiciendo fallacias quae inde; at naturale quantum hauserat et appropriaverat sibi ex sensualibus corporis, (o)quod tantum spectet rationalia sicut infra se, illa vilipendendo et rejiciendo; [3] sicut pro exemplo: rationalis naturalis homo potest comprehendere quod homo non vivat ex se, sed per influxum vitae per caelum a Domino; at sensualis homo hoc non potest comprehendere, dicit enim quod sentiat et appercipiat manifeste quod vita sit in se, et quod contra sensum loqui sit vanum. Sit etiam pro exemplo: rationalis naturalis homo comprehendit quod caelum et infernum sit, (o)at sensualis homo illa negat quia non capit quod purior mundus quam quem oculis videt, detur; rationalis naturalis homo comprehendit quod sint spiritus et angeli qui inconspicui; at sensualis homo non comprehendit, putando nihil esse quod non videt et tangit. [4] (o)Sit quoque pro exemplo: (m)rationalis naturalis homo comprehendit quod intelligentis sit intueri fines, ac praevidere et disponere media ad finem quendam ultimum; is cum spectat naturam ex ordine rerum, videt {1} quod natura sit complexus mediorum, (o)et tunc appercipit quod Supremum Ens intelligens disposuerit illa; sed ad quem finem ultimum, non videt nisi spiritualis fiat; at sensualis homo non comprehendit quod aliquid {2} distinctum a natura dari queat, ita nec quod aliquod Ens quod supra naturam {3};
quid intelligere, quid sapere, quid intueri fines, et disponere media, non capit nisi dicatur naturale, et cum dicitur naturale, ideam de illis habet qualem artifex de automato.(n) Ex his paucis constare potest quid intelligitur per interius naturale et exterius naturale; et per quod sensualia rejecta sint, quod nempe non illa quae sunt visus, auditus, olfactus, gustus et tactus in corpore, sed quod conclusiones inde de interioribus.
@1 i et$ @2 aliquod$ @3 i hanc enim videt et hanc sentit, non autem illud$