Faith11.由于信仰是对真理的内在承认，还由于信仰与真理是一体，或同一个，如前所述（2，4-6节），故可推知，没有一种内在承认的一种外在承认不是信，虚假的说服也不是信。没有一种内在承认的一种外在承认是一种对未知之物的信，对未知之物的信纯粹是记忆知识，这种知识若被确认，就会变成说服。那些持守这种知识和说服的人认为某事是真的，是因为某人就是这么说的，或相信它是真的，是因为他们已经确认它；然而，虚假能像真理那样被确认，甚至有时更容易被确认。出于确认而认为某事是真的，就是认为别人所说的话是真的，然后还没有先检查一下就确认它。
11. Since faith is an inner recognition that something is true, and since faith and truth are one and the same (as noted in 2, 4-6 above), it follows that an outward recognition without an inner one is not faith, and that being convinced of something false is not faith.
An outer recognition apart from an inner one is faith in the unknown, and faith in the unknown is nothing but information held in our memory that becomes a conviction if there are arguments to support it. People who hold to such convictions think something is true because someone else has said so, or believe it is true because they have convinced themselves; yet it is as easy to convince ourselves of something false as it is of something true, and sometimes such a conviction is even stronger.
Thinking something is true because we have convinced ourselves of it means thinking what someone else has said is true and looking for support for it without first examining it for ourselves.
11. Because faith is an internal acknowledgment of truth, and because faith and truth are bound up together, as said in nos. 2, 4-6 above, it follows that an outward acknowledgment without an internal one is not faith, and that being persuaded of some falsity is not faith. An outward acknowledgment without an internal one is a faith in the unknown, and a faith in the unknown is mere information, stored in the memory, which, if affirmed, becomes a persuasion. Moreover, people caught up in such persuasions think that something is true because someone else has said so, or think that it is true because they have been convinced of it. And yet one can be as convinced of falsity as he can be of truth, and sometimes more strongly so.
By thinking that something is true from having been convinced of it, we mean thinking that something someone else has said is true and not pondering it before then, but only affirming it.
11. Since the internal acknowledgment of truth is faith, and since faith and truth are one, as was said above Nos. 2, 4-6, it follows that an external acknowledgment without an internal acknowledgment is not faith; and also that a persuasion of what is false is not faith. An external acknowledgment without an internal acknowledgment is a faith in what is unknown; and faith in what is unknown is merely knowledge which is a matter of the memory; and if it is confirmed, it becomes a persuasion. Those who are in this faith and this persuasion think that a thing is true because someone has said so, or they think it is true from having confirmed it: and yet a falsity may be as easily confirmed as a truth, and sometimes more strongly. By thinking that something is true from having confirmed it, is meant thinking that what another says is true and merely confirming it without previous examination.
11. As the internal acknowledgment of truth is faith, and as faith and truth are a one (as was said above, n. 2, 4-6), it follows that an external acknowledgment without an internal one is not faith, and also that a persuasion of what is false is not faith. An external acknowledgment without an internal one is a faith in what is unknown, and a faith in what is unknown is mere memory-knowledge [scientia], which if confirmed becomes persuasion. They who are in such knowledge and persuasion think a thing true because somebody has said so, or they think it is true from their having confirmed it; and yet what is false can be confirmed just as well as what is true, and sometimes better. To think a thing true from having confirmed it is to think that something another says is true, and then to confirm it without previous examination.
11. Quia agnitio interna veri est fides, et quia fides et veritas unum sunt, (ut supra2, 4-6, dictum est,) sequitur quod agnitio externa absque interna non sit fides, nec quod persuasio falsi sit fides. Agnitio externa absque interna est fides ignoti; et fides ignoti est solum scientia, quae memoriae est, quae si confirmatur fit persuasio: et qui in illis sunt, cogitant quod verum sit, quia alius ita dixit, vel cogitant quod verum sit ex confirmato; et tamen falsum aeque confirmari potest quam verum, et quandoque fortius. Per cogitare quod verum sit ex confirmato, intelligitur cogitare illud Verum esse quod ab alio dicitur, et illud non prius explorare, sed modo confirmare.