423、首先谈谈理智与意志的结合——和良善与真理的结合是同一回事，这结合在灵人界实现。｛注1｝人有理智和意志，理智接受真理并从中形成，意志接受良善并从中形成。因此，无论一个人从理智中理解和思考什么，他都称之为真理；无论一个人从意志中意愿和思考什么，他都称之为良善。从人的理智中，人可以思考，因而感知什么是真理什么是良善；然而，只有当他意愿并行出真理和良善时，才是出于意志思考真理和良善。当他意愿并出于意志行出真理和良善时，真理和良善既在他的理智中，也在他的意志中，因而在此人的里面。因为唯独理智或唯独意志都不能构成人，而是理智和意志一起构成人。因此，凡在这二者里面的，就在此人里面，并属于他。仅仅在理智里面的，并不在他里面，那只是他记忆中的事物或知识，当他与他人在一起时，他能想到这些，在他之外而非在他之内，也就是说，他能谈论并推理它们，而且能模拟与之相一致的情感和姿势。
｛注1｝：【英252】这是史威登堡从多个角度解释的一个话题，也许是试图纠正他所认为的在同时代思想中的一个严重缺陷，即在信仰和仁爱（对他人的体谅）、真理和良善、理智和意志之间作出选择，二选一（参见上文第13节注释【英32】、第26节注释【英47】和第32节注释【英50】）。
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423. 首先说说理解力与意愿的结合, 它和良善与真理的结合是一回事, 因为它的确发生在灵人界. 人皆有一个理解力和一个意愿, 理解力接受真理, 从真理形成; 意愿接受良善, 从良善形成. 所以, 凡人所理解, 并出于其理解所思想的, 他都称之为真理; 凡人所意愿并出于其意愿所思想的, 他都称之为良善. 人能凭其理解力思考, 因而察觉何为真理, 何为良善; 然而, 只有当他意愿并行出真理与良善时, 才是出于意愿思考真理与良善. 当他意愿并出于意愿行出真理与良善时, 真理与良善既在他的理解力中, 也在他的意愿中, 因而在此人里面. 因为唯独理解力, 或唯独意愿都不能构成人, 而是理解力与意愿一起构成人. 这意味着凡在这二者里面的, 就在此人里面, 并归于他. 唯独在理解力里面的, 只是与人相关, 并不在他里面. 它只不过是当人与其他人同在, 而非独处时他能思想的记忆或记忆里的知识而已. 所以, 它是人能谈论并推理的某种东西, 甚至是能以其情感和行为来伪装的某种东西.
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423. 首先我得說說認知與意志的結合(相當於理與善的結合), 因為它正是發生於心靈世界。每個人皆有認知與意志, 認知接收理, 因理而形成認知;意志接收善, 因善而形成意志。所以, 但凡人們所認知並由認知而認定的, 稱其為"理;"但凡人們所意志並因意志而認定的, 便被其稱為"善"。人人都能憑自己的認知而思想, 並感知到何為理, 何為善;只有在願意並行出理和善時, 才是出自意志來思想。只有情願並奉行出來, 才能既在人的認知裡, 也在人的意志裡, 從而在人心裡。因為人非單由認知構成, 也非單由意志構成, 而是由認知與意志共同構成。這意味著, 既在人的認知裡又在意志裡的才在人的裡面, 從而屬於這人。僅停留在人的認知裡, 只是與其相關, 而非在其裡面, 只是留在記憶中的某些東西, 不過是人在交往時可以採用的資訊罷了, 或者說, 它只是人用來談論, 爭辯甚至偽裝情感和行為的東西而已。
423. First I need to say something about the union of intellect and will and its resemblance to the union of the good and the true, because this union does take place in the world of spirits. Each of us has an intellect and a will, the intellect being open to truths and formed from them and the will being open to things that are good and formed from them. So whatever we understand and therefore think, we call true; and whatever we intend and therefore think, we call good. We are capable of thinking from our intellect and thus observing what is true and also what is good, but we still do not think from our will unless we intend and do it. When we intend it and do it intentionally, then it is in both our intellect and our will and therefore in us. This is because the intellect alone is not what makes a person, nor the will alone, but the intellect and the will together. This means that anything that is in both intellect and will is in us and is therefore attributed to us. Whatever is only in the intellect is associated with us but is not in us. It is only a matter of our memory, an item of information in our memory that we can think about when we are not in private but are with other people. So it is something we can talk and argue about and even something we can imitate with our affections and behavior.
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423. First let something be said about the conjunction of the understanding and the will, and about its being the same thing as the conjunction of good and truth, since that conjunction is effected in the world of spirits. Man has an understanding and a will. The understanding receives truths and is formed out of them, and the will receives goods and is formed out of them; therefore whatever a man understands and thinks from his understanding he calls true, and whatever a man wills and thinks from his will he calls good. From his understanding man can think and thus perceive both what is true and what is good; and yet he thinks what is true and good from the will only when he wills it and does it. When he wills it and from willing does it, then it is both in his understanding and in his will, consequently in the man. For neither the understanding alone nor the will alone makes the man, but the understanding and will together. Therefore whatever is in both is in the man, and is appropriated to him. That which is in the understanding alone is with man, and yet not in him; it is only a thing of his memory, or a matter of knowledge in his memory about which he can think when in company with others and outside himself, but not in himself, that is, about which he can speak and reason, and can simulate affections and gestures that are in accord with it.
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423. Let something first be said about the conjunction of the understanding and the will, and its being the same thing as the conjunction of good and truth, that being the conjunction that is effected in the world of spirits. Man has an understanding and a will. The understanding receives truths and is formed out of them, and the will receives goods and is formed out of them; therefore whatever a man understands and thinks from his understanding he calls true, and whatever a man wills and thinks from his will he calls good. From his understanding man can think and thus perceive both what is true and what is good; and yet he thinks what is true and good from the will only when he wills it and does it. When he wills it and from willing does it, it is both in his understanding and in his will, consequently in the man. For neither the understanding alone nor the will alone makes the man, but the understanding and will together; therefore whatever is in both is in the man, and is appropriated to him. That which is in the understanding alone is in man, and yet not really in him; it is only a thing of his memory, or a matter of knowledge in his memory about which he can think when in company with others and outside of himself, but not in himself; that is, about which he can speak and reason, and can simulate affections and gestures that are in accord with it.
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423. Primum hic aliquid dicendum est de conjunctione intellectus et voluntatis, ac de simili ejus cum conjunctione boni et veri, quoniam illa conjunctio fit in mundo spirituum. Est homini intellectus, et est voluntas intellectus recipit vera, et formatur ex illis; ac voluntas recipit bona, et formatur ex illis; quapropter quicquid homo intelligit et inde cogitat, hoc dicit verum, et quicquid homo vult et inde cogitat, hoc dicit bonum. Homo potest cogitare ex intellectu, et inde appercipere quod verum sit, et quoque quod bonum sed usque id non cogitat ex voluntate, nisi velit illud et faciat illud cum vult illud et ex velle facit illud, tunc est id tam in intellectu quam in voluntate, proinde in homine nam intellectus solus non facit hominem, nec voluntas sola, sed intellectus et voluntas simul quapropter quod est in utroque, hoc in homine est, ac ei appropriatum quod solum est in intellectu, hoc quidem est apud hominem, sed non in illo est modo res memoriae ejus, ac res scientiae in memoria, de qua potest cogitare cum non in se est, sed extra se cum aliis ita de qua potest loqui et ratiocinari, et quoque secundum quam simulare affectiones et gestus.