3463、“以撒的仆人来”表示理性概念或事物。这从“仆人”的含义和“以撒”的代表清楚可知：“仆人”是指理性概念或事物，以及记忆知识或事实（2567节）；“以撒”是指主的神性理性（1893， 2066， 2072， 2083， 2630， 3012， 3194， 3210节）。从前面的上下文清楚可知以撒在此代表主的哪一方面，即代表内义上的圣言，或圣言的内义。因为“亚比米勒、亚户撒和非各”表示取自圣言字义的信之教义事物，如那些被称为正面意义上的“非利士人”的人，也就是那些只有信之教义事物，但在生活上处于良善，不过处于真理之良善的人所拥有的信之教义事物；这些教义事物与内义，因而与主有某种结合。
那些只有信之教义事物，但却照之生活的人以某种方式与主结合，尽管以一种遥远的方式结合，因为他们出于任何情感都不知道什么是对邻之仁，更不知道什么是对主之爱，只有出于属于信的某种概念才能知道。因此，他们没有对良善的任何感知，只有一种说服，即：他们的教义事物所规定的，就是真理，因而就是良善。他们在确认这些教义事物时，会像服从真理那样服从虚假，因为只有良善才能使一个人确认什么是真理。真理的确教导什么是良善，但不是以感知来教导的；而良善则出于对它的感知来教导什么是真理。
仅从以下关于仁爱的总则，谁都能认识到这种不同及其性质：
无论何事，你们愿意人怎样待你们，你们也要怎样待人。（马太福音7:12）
按这个命令行动的人的确向他人行善；但他这样做是因为经上就是这么吩咐的，而不是出于内心的任何情感。每当他行这善时，都是从自己开始的，并且在行善的过程中也思想自己的功德。但当他出于仁爱，也就是出于情感，而不是出于命令行动时，就是从心里，因而在自由中行动。每当他行动时，都是从对良善的渴望本身，因而从给予他快乐的某种东西开始的。由于这种快乐就是他的回报，所以他没有邀功的想法。
由此可见出于信行善和出于仁行善有什么区别；那些出于信行善的人距离良善本身，也就是主，比那些出于仁行善的人更远。前者不容易被引入仁之良善，以至于拥有对它的感知，因为他们几乎没有真理，或说真理没有在很大程度上存在于他们里面。没有人能被引入这良善，除非非真理的东西先被根除；只要非真理的东西扎根太深，以至于一个人被说服相信它们是真理，被引入这良善是不可能的。
Potts(1905-1910) 3463
3463. That the servants of Isaac came. That this signifies rational things, is evident from the signification of "servants," as being rational things and memory-knowledges (n. 2567) and from the representation of Isaac, as being the Lord as to the Divine rational (n. 1893, 2066, 2072, 2083, 2630, 3012, 3194, 3210). From what goes before it is evident what of the Lord is here represented by Isaac, namely, the Word as to its internal sense; for by "Abimelech, Ahuzzath, and Phicol" are signified the doctrinal things of faith which are from the literal sense of the Word, such as are the doctrinal things of those who are called "Philistines" in a good sense, that is, those who are solely in the doctrinal things of faith, and as to life are in good, but in the good of truth, which doctrinal things have some conjunction with the internal sense, thus with the Lord. [2] For they who are solely in the doctrinal things of faith, and in a life according to them, are in a certain conjunction, but a remote one, for the reason that they do not know from any affection what charity toward the neighbor is, and still less what love to the Lord is, but only from a certain idea of faith; thus neither are they in any perception of good, but in a species of persuasion that what their doctrinal things dictate is true and thus good, and when they are confirmed in these doctrinal things, they may be in what is false equally as in what is true; for nothing but good confirms a man in regard to what is truth. Truth indeed teaches what good is, but without perception; whereas good teaches what truth is from perception. [3] Everyone may know how this is, and also what is the nature and quality of the difference, merely from this common precept of charity:
All things whatsoever ye would that men should do unto you, do ye even so to them (Matt. 7:12). He who acts from this precept does indeed do what is good to others, but because it is so commanded, thus not from the affection of the heart; and whenever he does it, he begins from himself, and also in doing good thinks of merit; whereas he who does not act from precept, but from charity, that is, from affection, acts from the heart, and thus from freedom; and whenever he acts, he begins from really willing what is good, thus for the reason that it is delightful to him; and as he has recompense in the delight, he does not think of merit. [4] From this then can be seen what the difference is between doing good from faith, and doing good from charity; and that those who do good from faith are more remote from good itself which is the Lord than those who do it from charity; neither can the former be easily introduced into the good of charity so far as to have a perception of it, because they are but little in truths; for no one can be introduced into this good unless things not true are first eradicated, which is impossible while such things are inrooted even to persuasion.
Elliott(1983-1999) 3463
3463. 'That Isaac's servants came' means rational concepts. This is clear from the meaning of 'servants' as rational concepts, and also as facts, dealt with in 2567, and from the representation of 'Isaac' as the Lord's Divine Rational, dealt with in 1893, 2066, 2072, 2083, 2630, 3012, 3194, 3210. From what has gone before it is clear what aspect of the Lord is represented here by Isaac, namely the Word as regards its internal sense. For by 'Abimelech, Ahuzzath, and Phicol' are meant matters of doctrine concerning faith which are drawn from the literal sense of the Word, like those matters of doctrine possessed by people who are called 'Philistines' in the good sense. That is, they are people who have no other matters of doctrine than those concerning faith, and yet so far as life is concerned they do what is good, though it is the good of truth. And these matters of doctrine do have a certain link with the internal sense, and so with the Lord.
[2] For people who have no other matters of doctrine than those concerning faith and yet who live according to them are linked in some way to Him, though in a remote way. It is remote for the reason that they do not know from any affection what charity towards the neighbour is, let alone love to the Lord, but only from some concept that belongs to faith. Thus they do not possess any perception of good, only a type of persuasion that that is true and accordingly good which their matters of doctrine tell them to be so. And when they are confirmed in those matters of doctrine they are just as likely to be subject to falsity as to truth, for nothing else than good can confirm a person as to what the truth is.
[3] Truth does indeed teach what good is, but it does so without perception, whereas good teaches what truth is from perception. Anyone may recognize this difference, and also the nature of it, simply from the following general command concerning charity,
All things whatever you would wish people to do to you, do so to them. Matt 7:12.
The person who acts from this commandment does indeed do what is good to others; but he does it because it is so commanded rather than from any affection in the heart. And as often as he does that good deed he begins from a selfish motive, and also in doing such good his thoughts are of merit. But when he does not act from the commandment but from charity, that is, from affection, his actions begin in the heart, and so in freedom. And as often as he performs that act he begins from the desire itself for what is good, and so that which is a delight to him; and because in this delight he finds reward he has no thought of merit.
[4] From this one may now see what the difference is between doing good from faith and doing it from charity, and that people who do it from faith are more remote from good itself, which is the Lord, than those who do it from charity. The former cannot be easily brought to the good that flows from charity so that they may perceive it because truths are not present in them to any great extent. For no one can be brought to that good unless untruths have been rooted out first, which cannot be effected as long as untruths are so deeply rooted that a person is persuaded that they are truths.
Latin(1748-1756) 3463
3463. `Et venerunt servi Jishaki': quod significet rationalia, constat a significatione `servorum' quod sint rationalia, ut et scientifica, de qua n. 2567; et a repraesentatione `Jishaki' quod sit Dominus quoad Divinum Rationale, de qua n. 1893, 2066, 2072, 2083, 2630, 3012, 3194, 3210. Ex illis quae praecedunt, constat quid Domini per Jishakum hic repraesentatur, nempe quod Verbum quoad sensum ejus internum; per `Abimelechum' enim, et `Ahuzzatum, (c)et Phicolem' significantur doctrinalia fidei quae ex sensu litterali Verbi sunt, qualia sunt illorum qui Philistaei in bono sensu {1}dicuntur, hoc est, qui in solis doctrinalibus fidei sunt, et quoad vitam in bono, sed in bono veri, quorum doctrinalium aliqua conjunctio est cum sensu interno, ita cum Domino; [2] sunt enim illi qui in solis doctrinalibus fidei ac in vita secundum illa, in quadam conjunctione sed {2}remota, ex causa quia non sciunt quid charitas erga proximum et minus quid amor in Dominum, ex quadam affectione sed modo ex quadam idea fidei, ita nec sunt in aliqua perceptione boni, sed in specie persuasionis quod id verum et sic bonum sit quod doctrinalia (c)illorum dictant, in quibus cum confirmati sunt, possunt aeque in falso esse quam in vero, nam nihil aliud confirmat hominem quid verum, quam bonum; [3] verum quidem docet quid bonum sed absque perceptione, at bonum docet quid verum ex perceptione; quisque scire potest quomodo hoc se habet, tum quae et qualis differentia sit, solum ex communi hoc charitatis praecepto, {3}Omnia quaecumque volueritis ut faciant vobis homines, sic et vos facite illis, Matth. vii 12;qui ex praecepto agit, is quidem aliis bonum facit, sed quia {4}sic jussum, ita non ex {5}affectione cordis, et quoties facit, a se incohat, et quoque in faciendo bonum, de merito cogitat; at qui non ex praecepto agit sed ex charitate, hoc est, ex affectione, is ex corde, ita ex libero, agit, et quoties agit, ex ipso velle bonum incohat, {6}ita ex eo quod ei sit jucundum; et quia in jucundo habet remunerationem, non de merito cogitat; [4] inde nunc constare potest quae differentia sit facere bonum ex fide et ex charitate, et quod illi remotiores sint quam hi ab ipso bono quod est Dominus; illi nec facile introduci in bonum charitatis usque ad perceptionem possunt, quia parum in veris sunt, nam in illud bonum nemo introduci potest nisi prius irradicata sunt non vera, quod fieri nequit dum non vera usque ad persuasionem irradicata sunt. @1 vocantur$ @2 i in$ @3 Quicquid vultis ut faciant vobis homines, hoc facite illis.$ @4 ita$ @5 corde$ @6 et tunc quia ei id jucundum, gaudet, quod possit$