3498.“不知道哪一天死”表属世层里面的生命。这从“天”和“死”的含义清楚可知：“天”是指状态（23，487，488，493，893，2788节）；“死”是指复活得生命，或唤醒生命（3326节）。因此，“死的那一天”表示复活得生命的状态，或也可说，表示生命。显然，这生命是属世层里面的生命，因为此处论述的主题是属世层里面的生命。若不了解理性层的生命和属世层的生命，或也可说，了解内在人的生命和外在人的生命，其中的情形就无法看清楚。理性人或内在人的生命与属世人或外在人的生命截然不同，甚至不同到理性人或内在人的生命有可能脱离属世人或外在人的生命；但属世人或外在人的生命不可能没有理性人或内在人的生命，因为外在人通过内在人存活，以至于倘若内在人的生命停止存在，外在人的生命立时不再存在。外层事物因此依赖于内层事物，如同在后之物通过在先之物存在，或结果通过有效的起因存在。因为若有效的起因停止存在，结果立时不再存在。外在人的生命相对内在人的生命也是如此。
这一点从人类看得更清楚，因为人在世，或活在肉体期间，他的理性层显明不同于其属世层，以致他能退离肉体的外在感官知觉，甚至在某种程度上退离其属世人的内部感官知觉，并能处于其理性层，因而处于属灵的思维。这一点从以下事实尤其显得清晰，即：当人死亡时，他便将肉体的外在感觉知觉完全抛弃，同时保留其内层人的生命。事实上，他会携带外部记忆或属世记忆的记忆知识，尽管他已不使用它们（参看2475-2477，2479-2483，2485，2486节）。由此明显可知，理性人或内在人与外在人截然不同。但人活在肉身期间，他的理性层与他的属世层看似没什么不同，这是因为他活在这个世界，或自然界。正因如此，理性层的生命显现在属世层里面，以致理性层似乎根本没有任何生命可言，除非同时属世层拥有生命。在这种情况下，理性层看似拥有生命的量取决于属世层与它对应的程度（参看3493节）。由此可见，属世层里面有对应的生命，这生命就是以撒对以扫说“我不知道哪一天死”这句话所表示的。因为“以撒”代表理性层，“以扫”代表属世层，这二者都是良善方面的。
Potts(1905-1910) 3498
3498. I know not the day of my death. That this signifies life in the natural, is evident from the signification of "day," as being state (n. 23, 487, 488, 493, 893, 2788); and from the signification of death," as being to rise again, or to be resuscitated into life (n. 3326); thus by the "day of death" is signified a state of resuscitation of life, or what is the same, life; that this is in the natural is evident, because life therein is here treated of. How the case herein is cannot be seen unless it is known how the case is with the life of the rational and with the life of the natural; or what is the same, with the life of the internal man and the life of the external. The life of the rational or internal man is distinct from the life of the natural or external man, and indeed so distinct that the life of the rational or internal man is possible apart from the life of the natural or external man; but the life of the natural or external man is not possible without the life of the rational or internal man, for the external man lives from the internal, insomuch that if the life of the internal man should cease, the life of the external would immediately become a nullity, because exterior things depend on interior ones as posterior things on prior, or as the effect on the efficient cause, for if the efficient cause should cease, the effect would immediately become a nullity. It is the same with the life of the external man relatively to the life of the internal. [2] This may be plainly seen from man; for when man is in the world, or lives in the body, his rational is distinct from his natural, insomuch that he can be withdrawn from the external sensuous things of the body, and also in some degree from the interior sensuous things of his natural man, and can be in his rational, thus in spiritual thought. This appears better from the fact that when a man dies he altogether leaves the external sensuous things of the body, and then retains the life of his interior man; and also that although he indeed has with him the memory-knowledges of the external or natural memory, he nevertheless does not enjoy the use of them (see n. 2475-2477, 2479-2486). From this it is evident that the rational or internal man is distinct from the external; but during man's life in the body his rational does not appear to be distinct from his natural, because he is in the world, or in nature; and this being so, the life of the rational appears within the natural, insomuch that there does not appear to be any life in the rational unless it is in the natural at the same time. (That the rational appears to have life only insofar as the natural corresponds to it, may be seen above, n. 3493.) From this it may be seen that it is life corresponding in the natural which is signified by these words which Isaac spoke unto Esau, "I know not the day of my death;" for the rational is represented by Isaac, and the natural by Esau, both as to the good therein.
Elliott(1983-1999) 3498
3498. 'I do not know the day of my death' means the life within the natural. This is clear from the meaning of 'day' as state, dealt with in 23, 487, 488, 493, 893, 2788, and from the meaning of 'death' as rising again or awakening into life, dealt with in 3326. 'The day of death' accordingly means a state of awakening to life, or what amounts to the same, it means life - the life within the natural, it is evident, being meant in particular here, because that life is the subject here. What is implied in all this does not become clear unless one knows about the life of the rational, and the life of the natural, or what amounts to the same, about the life of the internal man and the life of the external man. The life of the rational or internal man is distinct and separate from that of the natural or external man, so distinct indeed that the life of the rational or internal man may exist quite independently of the life of the natural or external man; but the life of the natural or external man cannot exist apart from that of the rational or internal man. For the external man lives from the internal man, so much so that if the life of the internal man ceased to be, the life of the external man would instantly be no more. Exterior things are accordingly dependent on interior in the way that things which are posterior exist from those that are prior, or as an effect exists from its efficient cause. For if the efficient cause ceased to be, the effect would instantly be no more. The same is also so with the life of the external man in relation to the life of the internal man.
[2] This may be seen even more clearly in the human being, for while a person is in the world, that is, while he lives in the body, his rational is distinct and separate from the natural, so much so that he can be raised above the level of external sensory perceptions which belong to the body, and even to a certain extent above the level of inner sensory perceptions which belong to his natural man, and to be aware on the level of his rational, and so of spiritual thought. This is even more evident from the fact that when a person dies he leaves behind him altogether the external sensory perceptions that belong to the body, retaining at the same time the life of his interior man. Indeed he brings with him even the facts that exist in the external or natural memory, though he does not have the use of them, see 2475-2477, 2479-2483, 2485, 2486. From this it is evident that the rational or internal man is distinct and separate from the external man. But while a person is living in the body his rational does not seem to be distinct and separate from the natural, the reason being that he is living in the world or the natural order. That being so the life of the rational manifests itself within the natural, so much so that the rational does not seem to have any life at all if the natural does not at the same time have any. The amount of life that the rational seems to have in this case depends on how far the natural corresponds to it - see above in 3493. From this it may be seen that there is a corresponding life in the natural, which life is meant by the words which Isaac addressed to Esau, 'I do not know the day of my death'. For 'Isaac' represents the rational, and 'Esau' the natural, in both cases as regards good.
Latin(1748-1756) 3498
3498. `Non scio diem mortis meae': quod significet vitam in naturali, constat a significatione `diei' quod sit status, de qua n. 23, 487, 488, 493, 893, 2788; et ex significatione `mortis' quod sit resurgere seu resuscitari in vitam, de qua n. 3326; ita per `diem mortis' significatur status resuscitationis vitae, seu quod idem, vita; quod in naturali, patet quia de vita ibi agitur. Quomodo haec se habent, non constare potest nisi sciatur quomodo se habet cum vita rationalis, et cum vita naturalis, seu quod idem est, cum vita interni hominis et cum vita externi; vita rationalis seu interni hominis distincta est a vita naturalis seu externi, et quidem ita distincta, ut vita rationalis seu interni hominis detur praeter a vita naturalis seu externi, sed vita naturalis seu externi hominis non dari potest absque vita rationalis seu interni; externus enim vivit ab interno, usque adeo ut si vita interni hominis cessaret, vita externi ilico fieret nulla; exteriora enim ita dependent ab interioribus, sicut posteriora a prioribus, aut sicut effectus a causa efficiente; si enim cessaret causa efficiens, effectus ilico nullus esset; ita quoque se habet cum vita externi hominis respective ad vitam interni: [2] hoc {1}manifeste constare potest {2}ab homine; cum enim homo est in mundo, seu vivit in corpore, rationale ejus est distinctum a naturali, usque adeo ut homo abduci possit a sensualibus externis quae sunt corporis, etiam aliqualiter a sensualibus interioribus quae sunt ejus naturalis hominis, et in rationali suo esse, ita in cogitatione spirituali; hoc adhuc melius patet ex eo quod cum homo moritur, sensualia externa quae sunt corporis, prorsus relinquat, et tunc vitam interioris sui hominis retineat; immo etiam quod scientifica quae sunt memoriae externae seu naturalis, quidem secum habeat, sed usque illa non fruatur, videatur n. 2475-2477, 2479-2483, 2485, 2486; inde patet quod rationalis seu internus homo distinctus sit ab externo; sed cum homo in corpore vivit, tunc rationale ejus non apparet distinctum a naturali, ex causa quia in mundo est, {3}seu in natura, et quia ita, apparet vita rationalis in naturali, usque adeo ut non aliqua vita appareat esse rationali, si non simul naturali quod rationali tantum vitae appareat esse tunc, quantum ei naturale correspondet, videatur supra n. 3493. Inde constare potest quod sit vita in naturali correspondens, quae significatur per illa verba quae Jishakus ad Esavum dixit, `non scio diem mortis meae'; per `Jishakum' enim repraesentatur rationale, et per `Esavum' naturale, utrumque quoad bonum ibi. @1 manifestius$ @2 a vita hominis$ @3 proinde$